PAGE 42

 Clarifications maintain the position or peculiar state as occupying a spatial point in temporal conditions, with a significant relevance to the amplitude larger in extent or a greater capacity that the average infinitive period has of time. Whereas in  absence or termination must reflect on or upon the fearing analysis if the transference, as compelling of a generally acknowledged focal point, this itself may debase the appropriate factor that generates, in every degree. The exemplifying analytic technique that would react upon the discipline needed to utilize the new values, whereby, they can be ascribed as the commonality in holding the services to a  suspicious self-direction and comprehensive understanding, in that of whatever is humanly affiliated to the best as can be, and yet, the advocacy to the analysis of the transference is generally acknowledged as the central feature of analytic technique? Freud regarded transference and resistance as facts in the observational conceptuality for which of representing the state of inventions. He writes, . . . that the theory of psychoanalysis in an attempt to account for two striking and unexpected facts of observation which emerge whenever an attempt is made. Evidently the symptoms of a neurotic source, may in his past life, inhabit the sources of experiential recall to the past or the introspective reflections. In the state of affairs, in that for being the latent characterizations announced as the factoring responsibility for the transference and of resistance . . . one which takes the other side of the problem, while accepting as such, to the latencies and the hidden values non-accepting for new interactions as brought through a hypothesis that will hardly escape the charge of misappropriation of properties by attempting endeavour to re-associate the essentially established personalization, that if the pursuit in calling them a psychoanalyst’. Rapaport (1967) argued, in his posthumously published paper on the methodology of psychoanalysis, that transference and resistance inevitably follow from the fact that the analytic situation is interpersonal.
 Despite this general agreement on the centrality of transference and resistance in technique, in that, the analysis of transference is not pursued as systematically and comprehensively affirmed, however, it could be and should be. The relative privacy for which psychoanalytic work makes it impossible for one or of that of any-other, to skillfully improve upon the attemptive conceptual representation as comprehended of issues, its assumption to state this view as anything more that impressions, involving on that of what in the analysis of the transference and to states awareness in the number of reasons that an important aspect in the analysis of the transference of the transference, namely in the resistance, by the awareness of the transference is especially, and often adhering to the analytic procedures that interact among cultural inhibitors, but that  will be distinguished as such, that its ranging manifold of distancing non-localities as founded of the analyst’s.
 However, it must first be to distinguish between two types of interpretation of the transference.  That one is an interpretation of resistance to the awareness of transference, the other, is an interpretation of resistance to the resolution of transference. The distinction has clearly been best spelled out in the form from which copies or reproductions can be produced, as to cause to make its awareness and yielding values as grounded in the cognisance to Greenson (1967) and Stone (1967). The first kind of resistance may be called decence transference, although this term emphases the terminological characterization by its term is mainly employed to refer to a phrase of analysis and carried within the  general resistance to the transference of wishes, it can also be used for a more isolated instance of transference of defence. With some oversimplification, one might say that in resistance to the awareness of transference, the transference, the transference is what does the resisting.
 Another connected description of stating this distinction between resistance and the awareness of transference and resistance to the resolution of transference is between implicit and indirect references to the transference and explicitly or directly referential to the transference. The interpretation of resistance to awareness of the transference is intended to make the implicit transference explicit. While the interpretation of resistance to the resolution of transference is intended to make the patient realize that the already explicit transference does indeed include a determinant from the past.
 It is also important to distinguish between the general concept of an  interpretation of resistance to the resolution of transference and a particular variety of such an interpretation, namely, a genetic transference interpretation - that is, an interpretation of how an attitude in the present is an inappropriate carry-over from the past. While there is a tendency among analysts to deal explicit references to the transference primarily among analyses to deal explicitly the references to the transference as primarily by a genetic transference interpretation, there are other ways of working toward a revolution of the transference. However, this argument does so implicate that not only is not enough emphasis being given to interpretation of the transference in the here and now, that is, to the interpretation of implicit manifestations of the transference, but also that interpretations intended to resolve the transference as manifested in explicit references to the transference should be primarily in the here and now, rather than genetic transference interpretations.
 A patient’s statement that he feels the analyst is harsh, for example, is, at least to begin with, likely best dealt with not by interpreting that this is a displacement from the patient’s feeling that his father was harsh, but by as elucidation of some other aspect of this here and now attitude, such as what has gone on in the analytic situation that seems to the patient to justify his feeling or what was the anxiety that made it so difficult for him to express his feelings. How the patient experiences the actual situation is an example of the role of the actual situation in a manifestation of transference, which will be a major point of relevant significance.
 Of course, both interpretations of the transference in the here and now and genetic transference interpretations are valid and constitute a sequence. We presume that a resistance to the transference ultimately rests on the displacement onto the analysts of attitudes from the past.
 Because Freud’s case histories focus much more on the yield of analysis than on the details of the process, they are readily but perhaps incorrectly construed as emphasizing work outside the transference much more than work within the transference, and, even within the transference, emphasizing genetic transference interpretations much more than work with the transference in the here and now (Muslin and Gill, 1978). The example of Freud’s case reports may have played a role in what is to be considered as the common maldistribution of emphasis in these two respects - not enough on the transference and, within the transference, not enough on the here and now.
 Transference interpretations in the here and now and genetic transference interpretations are, of course, exemplified in Freud’s writings and are in the repertoire of every analyst, but they are not distinguished sharply enough.
 Both participants in the analytic situation are motivated to avoid these interactions. Flight away from the transference and to the past can be a relief to both the patient and the analyst.
 These aligning measures have been divided into five categorical divisions and placed into the following parts: (1) The principle that the transference should be encouraged to expand as much as possible within the analytic situation because the analytic work is best done within the transference. (2) the interpretation of disguised allusion to the transference as a main technique for encouraging the expansion of the transference within the analytic situation, (3) the principle that all transference has a connection with something in the present actual analysis situation, (4) how the connection between transference and the actual analytic situation is used in interpreting resistance to the awareness of transference, and (5) the resolution of transference within the here and now and the role of genetic transference interpretation.
 The importance of transference interpretations will surely be agreeing to by all analysts, the greater effectiveness of transference interpretations than interpretations outside the transference will be agreeing to by many, but what of the relative roles of interpretation of the transference and interpretation outside the transference?
 Freud can be interpreted as either of saying that the analysis of the transference in auxiliary to the analysis of the neurosis or that the analysis of the transference is equivalent to the analysis of the neurosis. The first position is stated in his saying (1913) that the disturbance of the transference has to be overcome by the analysis of transference resistance in order to get on with the work of analyzing the neurosis. It is also implied in his reiteration that the ultimate task of analysis is to remember the past, to fill in the gap in memory. The second position is stated in his saying that the victory must be won on the field of the transference (1912) and that the mastery of the transference neurosis ‘coincides with getting rid of the illness which was originally brought to the neurosis (1917). In this second view, he says that after the resistance is overcome, memories appear relatively without difficulty.
 These two different positions also find expression in the two different ways in which Freud speaks of the transference. In `Dynamics of Transference` he refers to the transference, on the one hand, as `the most powerful resistance to the treatment`(1912) but, on the other hand, as doing us the inestimable service of making the patient’s . . . , immediate impulses and manifests, when all is said and done, it is impossible to destroy anyone in absentia or in effigie (1912).
 It can be agreed that his principal emphasis fails on the second position. He wrote once, in summary, ‘Thus our therapeutic work falls into two phases in the first, all the libido is forced from the symptoms into the transference and concentrated there, in the second, the struggle is waged around this new object and the libido is liberated from it`(1912).
 The detailed demonstration that he advocated that the transference should be encouraged to expand as much as possible within the analytic situation lies in clarification that resistance is primarily expressed by repetition, and repetition takes place both within and outside the analytic situation, but that the analyst seeks to deal with it primarily within the analytic situation, that repetition can be not only in the motor sphere (acting) but also in the psychical sphere, and that the psychical sphere is not confined to remembering but includes the present, too.
 Freud`s emphasis that the purpose of resistance is to prevent remembering can obscure his point that resistance shows itself primarily by repetition, whether inside or outside the analytic situation. `The greater the resistance, the more extensively, and will act out (repetition)replace remembering`. Similarly in `The Dynamics of Transference` Freud said that the main reason that the transference is so well suited to serve the resistance is that the unconscious implies does not want to be remembered . . . but endeavour to reproduce themselves . . . (1918), the transference is a resistance primarily insofar as it is a repetition.
 The point can be restated in terms of the relation between transference and resistance. The resistance expresses itself in repetition, that is, in transference both inside and outside the analytic situation. To deal with the transference. Therefore, is equivalent to dealing with the resistance. Freud emphasized  transference within the analytic situation so strongly that it has come to mean only repetition within the analytic situation, even though, conceptually speaking, repetition outside the analytic situation is transference too, and Freud once used the term that way. `We soon perceive that the transference is itself only a piece of repetition and that the repetition is a transference of the forgotten past not only onto the analyst but also onto all the other aspects of the current situation. We . . .  find . . . the compulsion to repeat, which now replaces the impulsion to remember, not only in his personal attitude to his analyst but also in every other activity and relationship which may occupy his life at the time . . . (1914).
 It is important to realize that the expansion of the repetition inside the analytic situation, whether or not in a reciprocal relationship to repetition outside the analytic situation, is the avenue to control the repetition: `The main instrument . . . for curbing the patients compulsion to repeat and for turning it into a motive for remembering lies in the handling of the transference. We render the compulsion harmless, and indeed useful, by giving it the right to assert itself in a definite field`(1914).
 Kanzer has discussed this issue well in his paper on ‘The Motor Sphere of the Transference’ (1966). He writes of a ‘double-pronged stick-and-carrot’ technique by which the transference is fostered within the analytic situation and discouraged outside the analytic situation. The ‘stick’ is the principle of abstinence as exemplified in the admonition against making important decisions during treatment, and the ‘carrot’ is the opportunity afforded the transference to expand within the treatment, ‘in almost complete freedom’ as in a ‘playground’ (Freud, 1914). As Freud put it, ‘Provided only that the patient shows compliance enough to respect the necessary conditions of the analysis, we regularly succeed in giving all the symptoms of the illness a new transference meaning, and in replacing his ordinary neurosis by a ‘transference neurosis’ of which he can be cured by the therapeutic work’ (1914).
 The reason it is desirable for the transference to be expressed within the treatment is that there, it `is at every point accessible to our intervention`(1914). In a later statement he made the same point this way. `We have followed this new edition - the transference-neurosis - of the old disorder from its start, we have observed its origin and growth, and we are especially well able to find our way about in it since, as its object, we are situated at it’s very centre, (1917), it is not that the transference is forced into the treatment, but that it is spontaneously but implicitly present and is encouraged to expand there and become explicit
 Freud emphasized acting in the transference so strongly that one can overlook the repetition in the transference, but does not of necessity for its enactment or recognition that gives validity to acts of a subordinate conformation as ratified in support of explicit authoritative permission. Repetition need not go as far as motor behaviour, it can also be expressed in attitudes, feelings, and intentions, and, indeed, the repetition often does take such form rather than motor action. The importance of making this clear is that Freud can be mistakenly read to mean that repetition in the psychical sphere can only mean remembering the past, are when he writes that the analyst as prepared for a perpetual struggle with his patient to keep in the psychical sphere all the impulses which the patient would like to direct into the motor sphere, and he celebrates it as a triumph for the treatment if he can bring it about that something the patient wishes to discharge in action are disposed if through the work of remembering (1914).
 It is true that the analyst’s efforts are to convert acting in the motor sphere into awareness in the psychical sphere, but transference may be in the psychical sphere to begin with, albeit disguised. The psychical sphere includes awareness in the transference as well as remembering.
 One of the objections one hears, from both analysts and patient, to a heavy emphasis on interpretation of associations about the patients real life primarily in terms of the transference is that it means the analyst is disregarding the importance of what goes on in the patients real life. The criticism is not judicial. To emphasize the transference meaning is not to deny or belittle other meanings, but to focus on the one of several meanings of the content that is the most important for the analytic process, for the reasons of positing the addition for one coming to any falsifiable conclusion.
 Another way in which interpretations of resistance to the transference can be, or at lease appear to the patient to be, a belittling of the importance of the patients outside life is to make the interpretation as though the outside behaviour is primarily an acting out of the transference. The patient may undertake some actions in the outside world as an expression of and resistance to the transference, that is, acting out. But the interpretation of associations about actions in the outside world as having implications for the transference needs mean only that the choice of outside action to figure in the associations is co-determined by the need to express a transference indirectly. It is because of the resistance to awareness of the transference that the transference to be disguised. When the disguise is unmasked by interpretation, it becomes clear that, despite the inevitable differences between the outside situation and the transference situation, the content is the same for the analysis of the necrosis that coincides (Freud wrote that the mastering of the transference neurosis only coincides with getting rid of the illness which was originally brought to the treatment (1917)).
 The analytic situation itself fosters the development of attitudes with primary determinants in the past, i.e., transference. The analyst’s reserve provides the patient with few and equivocal cues. The purpose of the analytic situation fosters the development of strong emotional responses, and the very fact that the patient has a neurosis means, as Freud said, that’ . . . it is a perfectly normal and intelligible thing that the libidinal cathexis [we would now add negative feelings] of someone who is partly unsatisfied, a cathexes which are held ready in anticipation, should be directly as well to the figure of the analyst (1912).
 While the analytic setup itself fosters the expansion of the transference within the analytic situation, the interpretation of resistance to the awareness of transference will further this expansion.
 There are important resistance on the part of both patient and analyst to awareness of the transference. On the patient’s part, this is because of the difficulty in recognizing erotic and hostile impulses toward the very person to whom they have to be disclosed. On the analyst’s part, this is because the patient is likely to attitude the very attitudes to him which are most likely to cause him discomfort. The attitudes the patient believes the analysts has toward him are often the ones the patient is least likely to voice, in a general sense because of a feeling that it is impertinent for him to concern himself with the analyst’s feelings, and in a more specific sense because the aptitudes as held by the analyst are often attitudes the patient feels the analyst will be comfortable about having ascribed to him. It is for this reason that the analyst must be especially alert to the attitudes the patient believes he has, not only to the attitudes the patient does have toward him. If the analyst is able to see himself as a participant in an interaction, as he will become much more attuned to this important area of transference, which might otherwise escape him.
 The investigations of attitudes are ascribed to the analyst makes easier the subsequent investigation of the intrinsic factors in the patient that played a role in such ascription. For example, the exposure of the fact that the patient ascribes sexual interests in him to the analyst, and generally to the patient, alternatively the subsequent exploration of the patient’s sexual wish toward the analyst, and genetically the parent.
 The resistance to the awareness of these attitudes is responsible for their appearing in various disguises in the patient’s manifested associations and for the analyst’s reluctance to unmask the disguise. The most commonly recognized disguise is by displacement, but identification is an equally important one. In displacement, the patient’s attitudes are narrated for being toward a third party. In identification, the patient attitudes to himself attitudes he believes the analyst has toward him.
 To encourage the expansion of the transference within the analytic situation, the disguises in which the transference appears have to be interpreted in the case of displacement the interpretation will be of allusions to the transference in association not manifestly about the transference. This is a kind of interpretation every analyst often makes. In the case of identifications, the analyst interprets the attitudes that  the patient ascribes to himself the identification with which an attitude and subsequently attributed to the analyst. Lipton (1977) has recently described this form of disguise allusion in the transference with illuminating illustration.
 In his autobiography, Freud wrote, ‘The patient remains under the influence of the analytic situation as hopefully  of a latter position or a period of decline, as though he is not directing responsibly for the mental activities onto a particular subject. Justly in assuming that nothing will occur, as not of some reference to the situation (1925). Since associations are obviously often not directed about the analytic situation, the interpretation of Freud’s remark rests on what he meant by the ‘analytic situation’.
 It is believed that Freud’s meaning can be clarified by reference to a statement he made in, ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’. He said that when the patient is told to say whatever comes into his mind, his associations become directed by the ‘purposive ideas inherent in the treatment’ and that there are two such inherent regressive themes, one relating to the illness and the other - concerning which, Freud said, the patient has ‘no suspicion’; - relating to other analyst’s relating to the patient has ‘no suspicions’ - relating to the analyst (1900). If the patient has ‘no suspicions’ of the theme relating to the analyst, such that the theme appears only in disguise, the patient ‘s associations, it is contended that Freud’s remark not only specifies the themes inherent in the patient ‘s identifications’, but means that the associations are simultaneously directed by these two purposive ideas, not something by one and sometimes by the other.
 One important reason that the early and continuing presence of the transference is not always recognized in that it is considered to be absent in the patient who is talking recognized is that it is considered to be absent in the patient  who is talking freely and apparently without resistance. As (Muslin and Gill, 1976) pointed out in a paper on the early interpretation of transference resistance, to the transference is probably present from the beginning, even if the patient is talking apparently freely. The patient may well be talking about issues not manifestingly about the transference which are nevertheless, also allusions to the transference, but the analyst has to be alert to the pervasiveness of such allusory discernment about them.
 The analyst should progress on the working assumption, that the patient’s associations have transference implications pervasively, that with which this assumption is not to be confused with denial or neglect of the current aspects of the analytic situation. It is theoretically always possible to give precedence to a transference interpretation if one can only discern it through its disguise by resistance. This is not to dispute the desirability of learning as much as one can about the patient, if only to be a position to make more correct interpretations of the transference. One therefore, does not interfere with an apparently free flow of associations, especially early, unless the transference threatens the analytic situation to the point where its interpretation is mandatory rather than optional.
 With the recognition that evens apparently freely associating patient may also be showing resistance to awareness of the transference, this formulation should not interfere as long a useful information being gathered should replace Freud’s dictum that the transference should not be interpreted until it becomes a resistance (1913).
 It can be argued that every transference has some connection to some aspect of the current analytic situation, in the sense that the past can exert an influence only insofar as it exists in the present. Of course, all the determinants of a transference are current in the sense that what I am distinguishing is the current reality of the analytic situation, that is, what actually goes on between patient and analyst in the situation from how the patient is currently constituted as a result of his past.
 All analysts would dubiously agree that there are both current and transferential determinants of the analytic situation, and probably no analyst would argue that a transference of the analytic situation, and probably no analyst would argue that a transference idea can be expressed without contamination, as it was, that is, without any connection to anything current in the patient-analyst relationship. Nevertheless, the implications of this fact for technique are often neglected in practice, as my next point is only to argue for the connection.
 Several authors, e.g., Kohut 1959 and Loewald 1960, have pointed out that Freud`s early application by the act or practice of using something or the state of being used, this, however, employ of the quality of being appropriate or valuable to some end as to accommodate the accountable or warrant the use of the term transference. In `The Interpretation of Dreams, in a connection not immediately recognizable as related to the present day use of the term, reveals the fallacy of considering that transference can be expressed free of any connection to the present. That early use was to refer to the fact that an unconscious idea cannot be expressed as such, but only as it becomes connected to a preconscious o r conscious content. In the phenomenon with which Freud was then concerned, the dream transference took place from an unconscious wish to a day residue. In `The Interpretation of Dreams, `Freud used the term transference both for the general rule that an unconscious content is expressible only as it becomes transferred to a preconscious or conscious content and for the specific application of this rule to a transference to the analyst. Just as the day residue is the point of attachment of the dream wish, so must there be an analytic-situation residue, though Freud did not use that term, as the point of attachment of the transference.
 Analysts have always limited their behaviour, both in variety and intensity, to increase the extent to which the patient‘s behaviour is determined by his idiosyncratic interpretation of the analyst’s behaviour. In fact, analysts unfortunately sometimes limit the behaviour so much as to compare with such an expression or unpiled standard or absolute approximation, that the entire relationship with the patient matter of technique, with no nontechnical personal relation, as Liptop (1977) has pointed out.
 But no matter how far the analyst attempts to carry this limitation of his behaviour, the very existence of the analytic situation provides the patient with innumerable cues which can enviably become his rationale for his transference responses. In other words, the current situation cannot be made to disappear - that is, the analytic situation is real. It is easy to forget this truism in one’s zeal to diminish the role of the current situation in determining the patient ‘s responses. One can try to keep past and present determinants relatively perceptible from one another, but one cannot obtain either ‘pure culture‘. Freud wrote: ‘I insist on this procedure [the couch], however, for its purpose and result are to prevent the transference from mingling with the patient’s associations imperceptibly, to isolate the transference and to allow it to come forward in due course sharply defined as a resistance’ (1913). Even ‘isolate’ is too strong a word in the light of the inevitable intertwining of the transference with the current situation.
 If the analyst remains under the illusion that the current cues he provides to the patient can be reduced to the vanishing point, he may be led into a silent withdrawal, which is not too distant from the caricature of an analyst as someone who does refuse to have any personal relationship with the patient. What happens then is that silence has become a technique rather than merely an indication that the analyst is listening. The patient’s responses under such conditions can be mistaken fo uncontaminated transference when they are in fact transference adaptions to the actuality of the silence.
 The recognition, from which it takes its point of departure, as it was, has a crucial implications for the technique of interpreting resistance to the awareness of transference, in that, if, the analyst becomes persuaded of the centrality of transference and the importance of encouraging the transference to expand within the analytic situation, he has to find the presenting and plausible interpretation of resistance to the awareness of transference he should make. Is that, his most reliable guide is the cues offered by what is actually going on in the analytic situation? : On the one hand, the events of the situation, such as change in time of session, or an interpretation made by the analyst, and, on the other hand,  how the patient is experiencing the situation as reflected in explicit remarks about it, however, fleeting these may be. This is the primary yield for technique of the recognition that any transference must have a link to the actuality of the analytic situation. The cue points to the nature of the transference, just as the day residue for a dream may be a quick pointer of the latent dream thoughts. Attention to the current situation for a transference elaboration will keep the analyst from making mechanical transference interpretation, in which he interprets that there are allusions to the transference in association not manifestly about the transference, but without offering any plausible bias for the interpretation. Attention to the current stimulation offers some degree of protection against the analyst’s inevitability whose tendency to project his own views onto the patient, either because of countertransference or because of a preconceived theoretical bias about the content and hierarchical relationships in psychodynamics.
 The analyst may be very surprised at what in his behaviour the patient finds important or unimportant, for the patient’s responses will be idiosyncratically determined by the transference, the patient’s responses may seem to be something the patient as well as the analysts consider trivial, because, as in displacement to a trivial aspect of the day residue of a dream, displacement can better serve resistance when it is to something trivial. Because it is connected to conflict-laden material, the stimulus to the transference may be difficult to find. It may be quickly disavowed, so that its presence in awareness is only transitory. With the discovery of the disavowed, the patient may also gain insight into how it repeats as disavowed earlier in his life. In his search for the present stimuli which the patient is responding transferentially, as the analyst must therefore remain alert to both fleeting and apparently trivial manifested reference to himself as well as in the events of the analytic situation.
 If the analyst interprets the patient’s attitudes in a spirit of seeing their possible plausibility in the light of what information the patient does have, rather than in the spirit of either affirming or denying the patient’s views, the way is open for their further expression and elucidation. The analyst will be respecting the effort to be plausible and realistic, rather than manufacturing his transference attitudes out of whole bodied material.
 Importantly, is to make a transference interpretation plausible to the patient in terms of as current stimulus that, if the analyst is persuaded that the manifest content has important implications for the transference but he is unable to see a current stimulus for the attitude, he should explicitly say so if he decides to make the transference interpretation anyway. The patient himself may then be able to say what the current stimulus is.
 It is sometimes argued that the analyst’s attention to his own behaviour is a precipitant for the transference, will increase the patient’s resistance to recognizing the transference. That, on the contrary, that because of the inevitable interrelationship of the current and transferential determinants, it is only through interpretation that they can be disentangled.
 It is also argued that one must wait until the transference has reached optimal intensity before it can be advantageously interpreted. It is true that too hasty and interpretation of the transference can serve as a defensive function for the analyst and deny him the information he needs to make a more appropriate transference interpretation. But it is true that delay in interpreting transference interpretation, but it is also true that delay in interpreting runs the risk of allowing an unmanageable transference to develop. It is also true that deliberate delay can be a manipulation in the service of abreaction rather than analysis, and, like silence, can lead to a response to the actual situation which is mistaken for uncontaminated transference. Obviously important, is assumed in the issues of timing are involved, whereas an important clue to when a transference interpretation is apt and which one to makes lies in whether the interpretation can be made plausibly in terms of the determinant, namely, as something in the current analytic situation. Such as, in the approaching transference in the spirit of seeing how it appears plausibly realistic to the patient, it paves the way toward its further elucidation and expression.
 Freud’s emphasis on remembering as the goal of the analytic work implies that remembering is the principal avenue to the resolution of the transference. But the delineation of the successive steps in the development of the analytic technique (1920) makes clear that he saw this development as a change from an effort to reach memories directly to the utilization of the transference as the necessary intermediacy to reaching the memories.
 In contrast to remembering as the way the transference is resolved, Freud also described resistance for beings primarily overcome in the transference, with remembering following relatively easily afterwards, ‘From the repetitive reactions which are exhibited in the transference we are led along the familiar paths to the awakening of the memories, which appear without difficulty, as it was, after the resistance has been overcome’ (1914), and ‘This revision of the process of repetition can be accomplished only in part in connection with the memory traces of the process which led to repression. The decisive part of the work’s achieved by creating in the patient’s relation to the analyst - in the ‘transference‘ new editions of the old conflicts . . . Thus, the transference becomes the battlefield on which all the mutually struggling forces should meet one another’ (1917). This is the primary indication for which Strachey (1934) classified in his seminal paper on the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis.
 There are two main ways in which resolution of the transference can take place through work with the transference in the here and now. The first lies in the clarification of what are the clues in the current situation which are the patient‘s point of departure force a transference elaboration. The exposure of the current point of departure at once raises the question of whether
 Whether we call it analysis or not, it is clear that successful treatment does not depend on technical rules of any special psychiatric school but rather on the basic attitude of individual therapist toward psychologic persons. If he meets them as strangle creatures of another world whose productions are not comprehensible to ‘normal’ beings, he cannot treat them, if he realizes, however, that the difference between himself and the psychologic is only of degree, and not of kind, he will know better how to meet him. He will not be able to identify himself sufficiently with the patient to understand and accept his emotional reactions without becoming involved in them.
 The process of constant and perpetual change is examined and closely matched within the study of philosophical speculations and pointed of a world view that asserts that basic reality is constantly in a process of flux and change. Indeed, reality is identified with pure process. Concepts such as creativity, freedom, novelty, emergence, and growth are fundamental explanatory categories for process philosophy. This metaphysical perspective is to be contrasted with a philosophy of substance, the view that a fixed and permanent reality underlies the changing or fluctuating world of ordinary experience. Whereas substance philosophy emphasizes static being, process philosophy emphasizes dynamically becoming.
 Although process philosophy is as old as the 6th-century Bc Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, renewed interest in it was stimulated in the 19th century by the theory of evolution. Key figures in the development of modern process philosophy were the British philosophers Herbert Spencer, Samuel Alexander, and Alfred North Whitehead, the American philosophers Charles S. Peirce and William James, and the French philosophers Henri Bergson and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Whitehead's Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (1929) is generally considered the most important systematic expression of process philosophy.
 Contemporary theology has been strongly influenced by process philosophy. The American theologian Charles Hartshorne, for instance, rather than interpreting God as an unchanging absolute, emphasizes God's sensitive and caring relationship with the world. A personal God enters relationships in such a way that he is affected by the relationships, and to be affected by relationships is to change. So too is in the process of growth and development. Important contributions to process theology have also been made by such theologians as William Temple, Daniel Day Williams, Schubert Ogden, and John Cobb, Jr.
 ‘Reality’ is a difficult word to use to every one’s satisfaction or even to one’s own satisfaction. In this instance the word reality is used arbitrarily to designate the direct, here-and-now impact of the analyst upon the patient. Reality. In this sense, contrasts with the impact the analyst has through his representation in the patient’s fantasy life, neurosis, and transference, since both kinds of impact seem always to coexist and since the former - the analyst’s real impact - may be the worst enemy of the transference, the matter of their differentiation is possibly the most challenging aspect of analysis.
 The analytic situation, which is set up to shut out ordinary reality intrusions, that cannot . . . nor, should not exclude all, but to say, that in the beginning months, for instance, reality inevitably has the upper hand. The analyst, the office, the procedure, are all overwhelmingly real. Everything is strange, frightening and exciting, gratifying and frustrating. Unlike the patient can test it and orient himself to it, the impact of this reality is usually so great that even an ordinary useful transference relationship cannot be expected to develop.
 Perhaps the most confusing aspect of this beginning period is the frequent appearance in it of what can be regarded as a false transference relationship. With great intensity and clarity, the patient may reveal, through transference-like references about the analyst, some of the deepest secrets only of his neurosis but of its genesis. The pseudotransference, too good to be true, is almost sure to be nothing more than the patient’s attempt to deal with the person of the analyst, the entire spectrum of his various patterns of behaviour. If, it is easy to do, the analyst overlooks the likelihood that the patient’s relationship with at this time is really about that almost everything said about it is related, analysis may get off to a very bad start. And if, as is even earlier to do, the analyst’s interests the genetic meaning of the openly exposed material, a good transference relationship may be seriously delayed and a workable transference necrosis may never appear. Even after initial reality has had time to fade, reality may continue to intrude in ways that are very hard to detect and that is very troublesome.
 One of the most serious problems of analysis is the very substantial help that the patient receives directly from the analyst and the analytic situation. For many a patient, the analyst in the analytic situation is in fact the most stable, reasonable, wise and understanding person he has ever met, and the setting in which they meet may actually be the most honest, open, direct and regular relationship he has ever experienced. Added to this is the considerable helpfulness to him of being able to clarify his life storey. Confess his guilt, express his ambitions, and explore his confusions. Further real help comes from the learning-about-life accruing from the analyst’s skilled questions, observations and interpretations. Taken together, the total real value to the patient of the analytic situation can easily be immense. The trouble with this kind of help is that it goes on and on, it may have such a real, direct and continuing impact upon the patient that he can never get deeply enough involved in transference situation to allow him to resolve or even to become acquainted with his most crippling internal difficulties. The trouble is far too good, the trouble also is that we as analysts apparently cannot resist the seductiveness of being directly helpful, and this, when combined with the compelling assumption that helpfulness is bound to be good, permits us top credit patient improvements to ‘analysis’ when more properly it should often be recognized for being the amounting result for the patient’s using the analytic situation, as the model, for being the preceptors and supporter in the dealing practically within the immediate distractions as holding to some problem.
 Perhaps, we can now refer to something in a clear unmistakable manner, and it would be to mention, for being, that one more difficult-to-handle intrusion of reality into the analysis, that by saying, that this is the definitive and final interruption of the transference neurosis by the reality of termination; in the sense, the situation is reversed and the intrusion is analytically desirable, since ideally the impact of reality of impending and certain termination is used to facilitate the resolution of the transference. As with the resolution of earlier episodes of transference neurosis, this final one is brought about principally by the analyst’s interpretations and reconstructions. As these take effect, the transference neurosis and, hopefully, along with it the original neurosis is resolved. This final resolution, however, which is much more comprehensive, is usually very different and may not come about at all without the help of the reality of termination. Accordingly, any attenuation of the ending, such as tapering off or causal or tentative stopping, should be expected to stand in the way of an effective resolution of the transference. Yet, it seems that this is what most commonly happens to an ending, and because of this a great many patients may lose the potentially great benefit of a thorough resolution and are forever after left suspended in the net of unresolved transference.
 Yet, slurring over a rigorous termination seems understandable, as difficult as transference neurosis may be in the analyst at other times, this ending period, if rigorously carried out, simply has to be the period of his greatest emotional strain. There can surely be no more likely time for an analyst to surrender his analytic position and, responding to his own transference, become personally involved with his patient than during the process of separating from a long and self-restrained relationship. Accordingly, it may be better to slur over the ending lightly than to mishandle it in an attempt to be rigorous.
 In considering more broadly the function of the transference in the psychoanalytic process, one is confronted by the apparent naïve, but, nonetheless important questions of the role of the actual (current) object as compared with that of the object representation of the original personage in the past. We recall Freud’s paradoxical, somewhat gloomy, but portentous concluding passage in ‘The Dynamics of Transference.’ This struggle between the doctor and the patient, between intellect and instinctual life, between understanding and seeking to act, is played out almost exclusively in the phenomena of transference. It is on that field that the victory must be won - the victory whose expression is on that field that the victory must be won - the victor y whose expression is the permanent cure of the neuroses. It cannot be disputed that controlling the phenomena of transference presents the psychoanalysis with the greatest difficultly, but it should not be forgotten that they do us the inestimable service of making the patient ‘s hidden and forgotten erotic impulses of showing their immediate and manifested impossibilities, for when all is said and done, it is impossible to destroy anyone in absentia or in effigies.
 Both object and representation is made necessary by the basic phenomenon of original separation. The existence of an image of the object, which persist in the absence of the object, is one of the important beginnings of psychic life in general, certainly an indispensable prerequisite for object relationship. As generally construed. Whether this is viewed as (or a times demonstrably is) something unstable for allotting introjection, s always subject to alternative projection, or an intrapsychic object representation clearly distinguished from the self-representation, or firm identification in the superego, or in the ego itself, these phenomena are in various ways components of the system of mastery of the fact of separation, or separateness, from the original absolutely necessarily anaclitic (in the earliest period) symbiotic ‘object’. In the light of clinical observation, it would appear to be that the relative stability (parental) objects representation. At which time of varying degree, are to a greater extent for the archaic phenomena. Even in nonpsychotic patients, overwhelmed by them, sometimes resembles the restoration from oedipal identification, which provides the preponderant basis for most demonstrable analytic transferences. That within the necrotic patients, the transference is effectively established when this representation invests the analyst to a degree - depending on intensity of drive and most of ego participation - which ranges in all the, wishing and strivings to remake and analyst to biasses judgements and misinterpretation of data, are finally the actual perceptual distortions.
 However, the old object representations as such may be invested, however rigidly established the libidinal or aggressive cathexis of the image may be, this as such can become the actual and exclusive focus of instinctual discharge, or of complicated and intense instinct-defence solutions, only and general energy-sparing quality of strictly intrapsychic processes. For the vast majority of persons, visible to any degree, including those with severe neurosis, character distortions, addictions and certain psychoses, the striving is toward the living and actual object, even at the cost of intense suffering. In a sense, this returns us to the state in which the psychological ‘object-to-be’. Has a critical importance never again to be duplicated, except in certain acute life emergencies, even if the object is not firmly perceived as such, in the sense of later object relations? And it does seem that trance impressions from the earliest contacts in the service of life preservation,  and the associated instinctual gratifications, and innumerable secondarily associated sensory impressions. Are activated by the specific inborn urges of sexual maturation? These propel the individual to renew many of the earliest modes of actual bodily contact, in connection with seeking for specific instinctual gratification. Or, to look away from clear-cut instinctual matters to the more remote elaborations of human contact: Few regard loneliness as other than a source of suffering, even self-imposed, as an apparent matter of choice, and the forcible imposition of ‘solitary confinement ‘ is surely one of the most cruel of punishments.
 Of these few generalizations have some important implications, no reaction to another individual is all transference, just as surely as no relationship is entirely free of it. There is not only the general maturational-developmental drive toward the outer world, but the seeking for a variety of need and pleasure satisfactions, learned or simulated in relation to the primordial object, but necessarily and inevitably transferred from this object the generically related things and persons in the expanding environment. These may be used or enjoyed without penalty, if the distinction between the original and the new is profoundly and genuinely established (with due respect for the quantitative ‘relativism’ of such concepts). The range of such inevitable displacement (transfers) in endless in all spheres - sexual, aggressive, aesthetic, utilitarian, intellectual. More immediately relevant, in the lives of those whose development has been relatively healthy, are those individuals whose vocations provide similarities or parallels, however, rarefied, to the caretaking functions of the original parents: Teachers, physicians, clergymen, political rulers, occasionally others. Again it must be noted, that such persons perform real functions, that the adult individual’s interest in them, his specific need for them, often greatly outweighs similar reactions to parents, who retain their unique place for a complex and variable combination of other  reasons. For such surrogate parents perform for the adult what his parents largely performed for him in realist years, and the psychological comparison is with an old object representation, or with an early identification, to which such latter-day parent surrogates may add important layers of elaborations. It is on the basis of such functional resemblances that persons in these roles have a unique transference valence. The analyst is first perceived as a real object, who awakens hope of help in the patients experience at all level of integration, from that of actual and immediate perception, evaluation, and response, to the activation of original parental object representations and their cathexes. That the analyst becomes invested with such representations, in forms ranging from wishes or demands to functional or even perceptual misidentifications, comprises the broad range of phenomena that we know as the therapeutic transference. Thus, the complicate structural phenomena of conflict are activated in relation to a real object, and such activation is uniquely dependent on the participation of this object, in a situation whose realities revive, with the affirmative associations, the memories of old and painful frustrations. In this situation, the continuing and prolonged contact, under strictly controlled conditions, is an important real factor, which has been elaborated previously. Without these actualities, dream life, - or instance of greater energid imbalance between impulses and defence - neurosis, will be the spontaneous solution, while everyday ‘give-and-take’ object relations are, at least on the surface, maintained as such. Occasionally, neurotic behaviour, where transferences dominate the everyday relationships, will supervene.
 Interpretation, recollection or reconstruction, and, of course, working through, is essential for the establishment of effective insight, but they cannot operate mutatively if applied only to memories in the structural sense, whether of higher cathected events or persons. For it is the thrust of wish or impulse, or the elaboration of germane dynamic fantasies, and the corresponding defensive structures and their inadequacies, associated with such memories, which give to neurosis. It is a parallel thrust that creates the transference neurosis. Where memories are clear and vivid, through recall, or accepted as much through reconstruction and associated with variable, optional, and adaptive, rather than rigidly structuralized’ response patterns, the analytic work has been done.
 This view does place somewhat of a weighty emphasis on the horizontal coordinate of procedural operations, the conscious and unconscious relation to the analyst as a living and actual object, which is of investing upon the becoming  imagery, traits, and functions of critical objects of the past. The relationship is to be understood in its dynamic, economic, and adaptive meaning, in its current structuralized tenacity, the real and unreal carefully separated from one another. The process of subjective memory or of reconstruction, the indispensable genetic dimension, is, in this sense, involved toward the decisive and specific autobiographic understanding of the living version of old conflict, than with the assumption that the interpretative reduction of the transference neurosis to gross mnemic elements is, in itself and automatically,  mutative. At least, this view of the problem would seem appropriate to most chronic neurosis embedded in germane character structures of some plexuity. That neurosis symptoms connected with isolated traumatic events, covered by amnesia, may, at times, disappear on restoration of memories with adequate effective discharge, regardless of technical method, is, of course, indisputably true, even though the details of process, including the role of transference, are probably not yet adequately understood. Psychoanalysis was born in the observation of this type of process. In a thoughtful manner, the role of transference, in the early writings of both Freud and Ferenczi, seemed weighted somewhat in the direction of its resistance function, i.e., as directed against recall, although its affirmative functions were soon adequately appreciated, and placed in the dialectical position, which has obtained to the present day.
 Other while, the primal processes of projection ad introjection, being inextricably linked with the infant’s emotions and anxieties, initiate object-relations, by projecting, i.e., deflecting libido and aggression onto the mother’s breast, the basis for object-relations is established, by introjecting the object, first of all the breast, relations to internal objects comes into being. The term ‘object-relations’ are based on the contention that the infant has from the beginning post-natal life a relation to the mother, although focussing primarily of her breast, which is imbued with the fundamental element’s of an object-relation, i.e., loves, hatred, phantasies, anxieties, and defences? The introjection of the breast is the beginning of superego formation that extends over years. We have grounds for assuming that from the first feeding experience onwards the infant’s introjection, the breast in its various aspects. The core of the superego is thus the mother’s breast, both good and bad. Given to the simultaneous operation of introjection and projection, relations to external and internal objects interact. The father too, who soon plays a role in the child’s life, early on becomes part of the infant’s internal world it is characteristic of the infant‘s emotional life that there are rapid fluctuations between love and hate, between external and internal situations between perception of reality and the fantasises relating to it, and accordingly, an interplay between prosecutory anxiety and idealization - both referring to the internal and external object’s, the idealized object brings a corollary of the prosecutory, extremely bad one.
 The ego’s growing capacity for integration and synthesis leads more and more, even during these first few months, to states in which love and hatred, and correspondingly the good and bad aspects of objects, for being synthesized.  This gives rise to the second form of anxiety - depressive anxiety - for the infant’s aggressive impulses and desires toward the bad breast (mother) are now felt to be a danger to the good breast (mother) as well. In the second quarter of the first year these emotions are reinforced, because at this stage the infant increasingly perceives and introjects the mother as a person. Depressive anxiety is intensified, for the infant feels he has destroyed or is destroying a whole object by his greed and uncontrollable aggression. Moreover, owing to the growing synthesis of his emotions, he now feels that these destructive impulses are directed against as a ‘loved person’. Similar processes operate in relation to the father and other member s of the family. These anxieties and corresponding defences constitute the ‘Depressive position’, which comes to a head about the middle of the first year and whose essence is the anxiety and guilt relating to the destruction and loss of the loved internal and external objects.
 It is at this stage, and bound up with the depressive position, that the oedipus complex sets in. Anxiety and guilt add a powerful impetus toward the beginning of the oedipus complex. For anxiety and guilt increase the need to externalize (project) bad figures and to internalize (introject) good ones. There to attaching desires, love, feeling of guilt, and reparative tendencies to internal figures in the external world, however, not only is the search for new objects that dominates the infant’s needs, but also, the drive toward new life proposes: Away from the breast toward the penis, i.e., from oral desires toward genital ones. Many factors contribute to these developments, the forward drive of the libido, the growing integration of the ego, physical and mental skills and progressive adaption to the external world. These trends are bound up with the processing of symbol formation, which enables the infant to transfer not only emotions and phantasies, anxiety and guilt, from one object to another.
 The processes are linked with another fundamental phenomenon governing its mental life, such that pressures exerted by the earliest anxiety situation are factors through which bring about the repetition compulsion, however, one conclusion about the earliest states of infancy are a continuation of Freud’s discoveries; on certain points, nonetheless, the divergencies having to arise of which are very relevant, perhaps, its main contention that object-relations are operative from the beginning of post-natal life.
 Nevertheless, the view that autoerotism and narcissism are the young infant contemporaries with the first relation to objects - external and internalized, that hypothetically, autoerotism and narcissism include the love for and relation with the internalized good object that in phantasy forms part of the loved body and self. It is to this internalized object that in autocratic gratification and narcissistic stages a withdrawal takes place. Concurrently, from birth onwards, a relation to objects, primarily the mother (her breasts) is present. This hypothesis contradicts Freud’s concept of autoerotic and narcissistic stages that preclude an object-relation. However, the difference between Freud’s statement on this issue is equivocal. In various context he explicitly and implicitly expresses opinion that suggested a relation to an object, the mother’s breast, preceding autoerotic and narcissism.
 In the first instance the oral component instinct finds satisfaction by attaching itself to the sating of the desire for nourishment, and its object in the mother’s breast. It then detaches itself, becomes independent and at the same time of autoerotic objectivity is found to an object in the child’s own body.
The act or practice for which Freud’ of using something or the state of being used is found in the applications availing to the term object is somewhat different from the context that is used of this term, but Freud is referring the object of an instinctual aim. What it is to mean, that, while, in addition, it is meant as an object-relation involving the infant’s emotions, phantasies, anxieties and defences. Nevertheless, in sentence referred to, Freud clearly speaks of a libinal attachment to an object, the mother’s breast, which precedes autoerotism and narcissism.
 In this context, it is reminded that of Freud’s findings about early identification. In ‘The Ego and the Id,’ speaking of abandoned object cathexes. He said, ‘ . . .  The effects of the first identification in earliest childhood will be profound and lasting. This leads us back to the origin of the ego-ideal,  . . . Freud then defines the first and most important identifications that lie hidden behind the ego-ideal as the identification with the father, or with the parent’s, and places them, as he expresses it, in the ‘prehistory’ of every person’. These formulations come close to the deceptions as described of their resulting of introjected objects, for by definition identifications are the result as such, but that the statement and the passage quoted from the Encyclopaedia article, it can be deduced that Freud, although he did not pursue this line of though t, however, he did assume that in the earliest infancy that both an object and introjective processes play a part.
 That is to say, as regards autoerotism and narcissism we meet with an inconsistency in Freud’s views. Such inconsistencies that exist on a number of points of theory clearly show, which on these particular of issue s Freud had not yet arrived at a final decision. In respect to the theory of anxiety he stated this explicitly in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. His realization that much about the early stages of development was still unknown or obscure to him is also exemplified by his speaking of the first years of a girl’s life as, ‘ . . . lost in a past so dim and shadowy . . .’
 As regards to the question of autoerotism and narcissism, Anna Freud - although her views about this aspect of Freud’s work remains unknown, but she seems only to have taken into account Freud’s conclusions that an autoerotic and a narcissistic stage precede object-relations, and not to be allowed for other possibilities, of which are implied in some of Freud’s statements such as the ones inferred above.  This is one of the reasons why the divergence between Anna Freud’s conception and the immediacy of early infancy is far greater than that between Freud’s views, taken as a whole, and those of stating it as the essential to clarify the content and nature of the differences between the two schools of psychoanalytic thought, represented by Anna Freud and those that imply of such clarification is required in the interests of psychoanalytic training and also because it could help to open up fruitful discussions between psychoanalysts and thereby contribute to a greater generality of a better understanding of the fundamental problems of early infancy.
 The hypothesis that a time interval extending over several months precedes object-relations implies that - except for the libido attached to the infant’s own body - impulses, phantasies, anxieties, and defences either are not present in him, or are not related to an object, that is to say, they would operate in vacua. The analysis of very young children, as to implicate, would show that there is no instinctual urge, no anxiety situation, no mental process that does not involve objects, external or internal, in other words, object-relations are at the centre of emotional life. Furthermore, love and hatred, phantasies, anxiety and defences are also operative from the beginning and are ‘ad initio’ indivisibly linked with object-relations.
 The oedipus complex, in a pragmatic analytic sense, retains its position as the ‘nuclear complex’ of the neurosis. It is a climactic organization experience of early childhood, apart from its own vicissitudes, It can under favourable circumstances provide certain solutions for pregenital conflicts, or in itself suffer from them. In any case, include them in its structure. Only when the precursor experiences have been of a great severity, for which it is to claim to a shadowy organic determinacy, as the new ‘frame of reference’, which hardly having the independent and decisive significance of its own. In any case, its attendant phallic conflicts must be resolved in their own right, in the analytic transference. From the analyst, (or his current surrogate in the outer world) thus from the psychic representation of the parent, the literal (i.e., bodily) sexual wishes must be withdrawn, and genuinely displaced to appropriate objects in the outer world. The fraction of such drive elements that can be transmuted to friendly, tender feeling toward the original object. Or too other acceptable (neutralized) variants, will of course, influence the economic problem involved. This genuine displacement is opposed to the sense of ‘acting out’, while other objects are perceptually different substitutes for the primary object (thus for the analyst). This may be thought to follow automatically on the basic process of coming to terms with (accepting) the childhood incestuous wish and its parricidal connotation. Such assumption does not do justice to the dynamic problem implicit in tenaciously persistent wishes. To the extent that these wishes are to be genuinely disavowed or modified, rather than displaced, a further important step is necessary: The thorough analysis of the functional meaning of the persisting wishes and the special etiologic factors entering into their tenacity, as reflected in the transference neurosis. Thus, in principle, the literal accuracy of the concept phrased by Wilhelm Reich, ‘transference of the transference,’ as the final requirement for dissolution of the erotic analytic transference, even though the clinical discussion, which is its context, is useful. This expression would imply that the object representation that largely determines the distinctive erotic interest in the analyst can remain essentially the same, so long as the actual object changes. While a semantic issue may be involved in some degree, it is one that impinges importantly on conceptual clarity. However, such definite conceptualization of one basic element in the phenomenon or transference may be, and should be, subject to the reservations appropriately attaching themselves to any very clear-cut ideas about obscure areas, with the clinical concept of transference, its clinical derivation and its generally accepted place in the psychnalytic process.
 The evolution of the reality-relatedness between patient and therapist, over the course of the psychotherapy, is something that has received little more than passing mention in the literature, Hoedemaker (1955), in a paper concerning the therapeutic process in the treatment of schizophrenia, stresses the importance of the schizophrenic patient’s forming healthy identifications with the therapist, and Loewald (1960), his concerns and considerations to the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis in general, repeatedly emphasizes the importance of the real relationship between patient and analyst, but only in the following passage eludes the evolution, the growth, of this relationship over the course of treatment:
 . . . Where repression is lifted and unconscious and preconscious are again in communication, infantile object and contemporary object may be united into one - a truly new object as both unconscious and preconscious are changed by their mutual communication, the object that helps to bring this about in therapy, the analyst, mediates this union. . . .
It has been distinctly impressive that the patient’s remembrance of new areas of his past - his manifestation of newly de-repressed transference reactions to the therapist - occurs only hand-in-hand with the reaching of comparable areas of feeling in the evolving reality-relatedness between patient and therapist. For example, he does not come to experiencing fond memories of his mother until the reality-relatedness between himself and the therapist has reached the point where the feelings between them have become, in reality, predominantly positive. Loewald’s words, imply that an increment of transference resolution slightly preceding in time or in arrangement to go before as to go before time, the all-out preceding that many are the cause to be preceded, which makes it possible in the forming of each successive increment the evolving reality-relationship between patent and analyst. It has been, by contrast, that the evolution of the reality-relatedness proceeds alway a bi t ahead of, and makes possibly, the progressive evolution and resolution of the transference, although to be sure the latter, in so far as it frees psychological energy and makes it available for reality-relatedness, helps greatly to consolidate the ground just taken over by the advancing reality-relatedness. Loewald (1960) thinks of it that
 . . . The patient can dare to take the plunge into the regressive crises of the transference neurosis that brings him face to face again with his childhood anxieties and conflicts, if he can hold on to the potentialities of a new object-relationship, represented by the analyst.
It seems that this new object-relationship is more that a potentiality, to be realized with comparative suddenness, toward the end of this treatment with the resolution of the transference. Rather it is, it has seemed as constantly being there, being built up bit by bit, just ahead of the likewise evolving transference relationship. Predeterminates as in Freud’s (1922) having pointed out that projection (expressed in the Latin is called ‘projectio’) which is, after all, so major an aspect of transference - is directed not ‘into the sky, so to speak, were there is nothing of the sort already’, but rather onto a person who provides some reality-basic for the projection.
 In the final months of the therapy, the therapist clearly sees that extent to which the patient’s transferences to him as representing a succession of figures from the latter’s earlier years have all been in the service the patient’s unconscious successively decreasing extent, fro experiencing the full and complex reality of the immediate relatedness with the therapist in the present. The patent at last comes to realize that the relationship with a single other human being - in this instance, the therapist - is so rich as to comprise all these earlier relationships - so rich as to evoke all the myriad feelings that have been parcelled out and crystallized, wherefore, in the transference that have now been resolved. This is a province most beautifully described by the Swiss novelist, Herman Hesse (1951) winner of the Nobel Prize in 1946,in his little novel. Siddhartha. The protagonist in a lifelong quest for the ultimate answer to the enigma of man’s role on earth, finally discovers in the face of his beloved friend all the myriad persons, things, and events that he has known, but incoherently before, during the vicissitudes of his many years of searching.
 It is thus that the patient, schizophrenic or otherwise, becomes at one with himself, in the closing phase of psychotherapy. But although the realization may come to him as a sudden one, it is founded on a reality-relatedness that has been building up all along. Loewald (1960) in his magnificent paper to which transference resolution plays in the development of this reality-relatedness. As, perhaps, that the evolution of the ‘countertransference’ - not counter-transference in the classical sense of the therapist’s transference to the patient, but rather in the sense of the therapist’s emotional reaction to the patient’s transference - forms an equally essential contribution to this reality-relatedness.
 It is, nonetheless, but often, that the therapist who sees a new potentiality in the patient, a previously unnoted side of him that heralds a phase of increasing differentiations. And frequently the therapist is the only one who sees it. Even the patient does not see it as yet, except in the projected form, so that he perceives this as an attribute of the therapist. This situation can make the therapist feel very much inalienable as separated from others that apart or detached in the isolated removal and intensely threaten.
 Upon which the transference relationship with the therapist, we find that the patient naturally brings this relationship, just as he brings into the relatedness in which the difficulties concerning differentiation and integration that were engendered by the pathological upbringing upon the advances in differentiation and integration necessarily occur first outside the patient - namely, in the therapist’s increasingly well differentiated and well-integrated view of, and consequently, responses to, him - before these can become well established within him.
 Because the schizophrenic patient did not experience, in his infancy, the symbolic relatedness with his mother such as each human being needs for the formation of a healthy core in his personality structure, in the emotion of the transference relationship to his therapist he must eventually succeed in establishing such a mode of relatedness.
 This means that he must eventually regress, in the transference, to such a level in order to get a fresh start toward a healthier personality differentiation and integration than he had achieved before entering therapy. This is not to say that he must ‘act out’ the regressive needs in his daily life, to be sure, the schizophrenic patient, whether in therapy or not, inevitably does so to a considerable degree, but to the extent that these needs can be expressed in the transference relationship, they need not seek expression, unconsciously, thorough acting out in daily life.
 Focussing now upon the transference relationship with the therapist, we find that the patient naturally brings about the difficulties concerning differentiation in the process of integration that was engendered by the pathological upbringing as for being the one more interruption in the impeding principle of reconstructions of an identifying manufacture of the transference. And the every day, relationships are found in the interplaying form of corresponding advances in differentiated dynamic integrations necessarily occur first outside the patient - namely, in the therapist’s increasingly well or acceptably differentiated by the integrated extent or range of vision, that the position or attitudes that determine how of the intent of something (as an aim or an end or motive)or by way the mind is directed. Its view of and the consequent response ought to become acknowledgingly established within them.
 Because the schizophrenic patient did not experience, in his infancy, the establishment of and later emergence form, a healthy symbiotic relatedness with his mother such as each human brings needs for the formation of a healthy core in his personality structure, in the evolution of the transference relationship to his therapist he must eventually succeed in establishing such a mode of relatedness.
 This means that he must eventually regress, in the transference, to such a level, in order to get a fresh start toward a healthier personality differentiation and integration than he had achieved before entering therapy. This is not to say that he must act out the regressive needs in his daily life. To be sure, the schizophrenic patient, whether in therapy or not, inevitably does so to a considerable degree; even to the extent that these needs can be expressed in the transference relationship, they need not seek expression, unconsciously, through acting out in daily life.
 This symbiotic mode of relatedness is necessarily mutual, participated in by therapist as well as patient. Thus, the therapist must come to experience not only the oceanic gratification, but also the anxiety involved in his sharing a symbiotic, subjective oneness with the schizophrenic patient. This relationship, with its lack of felt ego-boundaries between the two participants, at times invokes the kind of deep contentment, the kind of felt communion that needs no words, which characterize a loving relatedness between mother and infant. But at other times it involves the therapists feeling unable to experience himself as differentiated from the pathology-ridden personality of the patient. He feels helplessly caught in the patient’s deep ambivalence. He feels one with the patient’s hatred and despairs and thwarted love, and at times he cannot differentiate between his own subjectively harmful effect upon the patient, and the illness with which the patient was to come or go or nearly recede in the achievement afflicting when the therapist first undertook to help him. Thus, at these anxiety-ridden moments in the symbiotic phase, the therapist feels his own personality to be invaded by the patient’s pathology, and feels his identity severely threatened, whereas in the more contented moments, part of the contentment resides in both participants enjoying a freedom from any concern with identity.
 This same profound lack of differentiation may come to characterize the patient’s view of the persons about him, including his therapeutic, and at time’s, in line with his need to project a poorly differentiated conglomeration of ‘bad’ impulses, he may perceive the therapist for being but one head of a hydra-headed monster. The patient’s lack of differentiation in this regard, prevailing for month after month of his charging the therapist with saying or doing various things that were actually said or have done by others in the hospitalized presences to its containing of environmental surfaces, or by the family members, can have a formidably eroding effect upon the therapist’s sense of personal intensity. But the patient may need to regress to just such a primitivity, poorly differentiated view of the world in order to grow up again, psychologically, in a healthier way this time.
 Among the most significant steps in the maturation that occurs in successful psychotherapy are those moments when the therapist suddenly sees the patient in a new light. His image of the patient suddenly changes, because of the entry into his awareness of some potentiality in the patient. Which had not shown itself before? From now on, his responses t o the patient is a response to this new, enriched view, and through such responding he fosters the emergence, and further differentiation, of this new personality area. This is another way of describing the process that Buber and in Friednan, 1955, calls ‘making the other person present, seeing in the other  persons potentialities of such even presents: Seeing in the other persons potentiality of which in him, that he is not aware of his helping him, by responding to those potentialities, to realize them.
 Schizophrenic patient’s feelings start to become differentiated before they have found new and appropriate modes for expressing the new feelings, thus patient’s may use the same old stereotyped behaviour or utterance to express nuances of new feelings. This is identical with the situation in those schizophrenics’ familiar which is permeated with what Wynne (1958) termed ‘pseudo-mutuality’ or toward maintaining the sense of reciprocal perceiving expectations. Thus, the expectations are left unexplored, and the old expectations and roles, even though outgrown and inappropriate in one sense, continue to serve as the structure for the relation.
 The therapist, through hearing the new emotional connotation, the new meaning, in the stereotyped utterance and responding in accordance with the new connotation, fosters the emerging differentiation. Over the course of months, in therapy, he may find the same verbal stereotype employed in th e expression of a whole gamut of newly emerging feelings. Thus, over a prolonged time-span, the therapist may give as many different responses to a gradually differentiating patient as are simultaneously given by the various members of the surrounding environment, to the patient who shows the contrasting ego-fragmentation (or, in a loose manner of speaking, over-differentiations).
 Persistently stereotyped communications from the patient tend to bring from the therapist communications that, over a period of time, become almost equally stereotyped. One can sometimes detect, in recordings playing during supervisory hours, evidence that new emotional connotations are creeping into the patient’s verbal stereotypes, and into the therapist’s responsive verbal stereotypes, before either of the two participants has noticed this.
 What the therapist does which assists the patient’s differentiation often consists in his having the courage and honesty to differ from whether the patient’s expressed feelings or, often most valuable, with the social role into which his sick behaviour tends to fix or transfix the therapist. This may consist in his candid disagreement with some of the patient, and s strongly felt and long-voiced views, or in his flatly declining to try to feel ‘sympathy’ - such as one would be conventionally expected to feel in response to behaviour, which seems, at first glance, to express the most pitiable suffering but which the therapist is convinced primarily expresses sadism on the patient’s part. Such courage to differ with the expected social role is what is needed from the therapist, in order to bring to a close the symbiotic phase of relatedness that has served, earlier, a necessary and productive function. Through asserting his individuality, and at many later moments in the therapeutic interaction, the therapist fosters the patient’s own development of more complete and durable ego-boundaries. At the same time he offers the patient the opportunity to identify with a parent-figure who dares to be an individual-dares to be so in the face of pressures from the working group of which he is part, and from his own reproachful superego, it can be of notice, that of a minor degree a consciously planned and controlled therapeutic technique wherefore, the content descriptions are rather a natural flow of events as in the transference evolution, with which the therapist must have the spontaneity to go along.
 The patient, particularly in the symbiotic phase of the therapy but in preceding and succeeding phases as well, is notably intolerant of sudden and marked changes in the therapeutic relationship - that is, of suddenly seeing himself, or feeling that his therapist sees him, through new eyes. He rarely gives the therapist to feel that the latter have made an importantly revealing interpretation, or should be concealed, but when to arrive at by reasoning from evidence or from its premises that we can infer from that which he was derived as to a conclusion, that it conveys of a higher illumination of mind. Methodologically historical information is an approving acceptation by the therapist, he does so causally, he tends to experience important increments of depreciated material, yet not as every bit for reverential abstractions as to make a new, amended, or up-to-date reversion of the many problems involved in revising the earthly shuddering revelations in his development. The things that he has known all along and simply never happened to think of. His experience of an inherent perception of the world as surrounding him is often permeated by ‘deja vu’ sensations, and misidentification of the emphasizing style at which the expense of thought for taking the rhetorical rhapsody to actions or a single inaction of moving the revolutions of the earth around the sun is mostly familiar an act from his past.
 The motional progressions in therapy, on the patient’s part, occur each time only after a recrudescence in his symptoms. It is as though he has to find reassurance of his personal identity, for being really the same hopeless person he has long felt himself to be, before he can venture into a bit or new and more hopeful identity.
 Of what expressions are that object relations of state or fact of having independent reality whose customs that have recently come into existence, such by the actuality for something having existence from the beginning of life, being the mother’s breast that it splits into a good (gratifying) and bad (frustrating) breast; this splitting results in a division between love and hate. What is more, is that of the relation to the first object implies its introjection and projection, and thus, from the beginning object relations are moulded by an interaction between introjection and projection, between internal and external objects and situation.
 . . . .With the introjection of the complete object in about the second quarter of the first year marked steps in integration are made. . . . The loved and hated aspects of the mother are no longer felt to be so widely separated, and the result is an increased fear of loss, a strong feeling of guilt and states akin to mourning, because the aggressive impulses are felt to be divorced against the love object, the depressive position has come to the fore . . .
 . . . In the first few month of life anxiety is predominantly experienced as fear of persecution and . . . this contributes to certain mechanisms and defences that characterize the paranoid and schizoid positions. Outstanding among these defences is the mechanism of splitting internal and external objects, emotions and the ego. These mechanisms and defences are part of normal development and at the same time form the basis for later schizophrenic illness. The descriptive underlying identification by projection, i.e., projective identification, as a combination of splitting off parts of the self and projecting them onto another person . . .
 Rosenfeld, a follower of Klein writes that, he presents detailed clinical data that serve to document the implicit point, among others, that whereas, the schizophrenic patient may appear to have regressed to such an objectless autoerotic level of development as was postulated by Freud (1911, 1914) and Abraham (1908), in actuality the patient is involved in object-relatedness with the analyst, object-relatedness of the primitive introjective and projective identification kind. For example, Rosenfeld concludes his description of, the data from one of the sessions as follows:
 . . . The whole material of the session suggested that in the withdrawal state he was introjecting me and my penis, and at the same time was projecting himself into me. So here, again, it to suggest that it be something possible to detect the object-relation in an apparently autoerotic state.
 . . . only at a later stage of treatment was it possible to distinguish between the mechanisms of introjection of objects and projective identifications, which so frequently go on simultaneously (1952).
We find, among the writings of the Kleinian analysts, a number of interesting examples of delusional transference interpretation, in all of which the keynote is the concept of projective (or introjective) identification. For instance, Rosenfeld writes at one juncture (1952),
 The patient himself gave the clue to the transference situation, and showed that he had projected his damaged self containing the destroyed world, not only into all the other patients, but into me, and had changed me in this way. But, instead of becoming relieved by this projection he became more anxious, because he was afraid of what I was then putting back into him. Whereupon his introjective processes became severely disturbed. One would therefore expect a severe deterioration in his condition, and in fact his clinical state during the next ten days became very precarious. He began to get more and more suspicious about food, and finally refused to eat and drink anything. . . . Everything he took inside seemed to him bad, damaged, and poisonous (like faeces) as there was no point in eating anything. We knew that projection led again into reintroduction, so that also, it had felt as if he had inside himself all the destroyed and bad objects that he had projected into the outer world: And he indicated by coughing, retching and movements of his mouth and fingers that he was preoccupied with this problem . . .  I told him that he was not only afraid of getting something bad inside him. But that he was also afraid of taking good things, the good orange juice and good interpretations, instead, since he was afraid that these would make him feel guilty again. When l said this, a kind of shock went right through his body; he gave a groan of understanding, and his facial expression changed. By the end of the hour he had emptied the glass of orange juice, the first food or drink he had taken for two days . . .
Bion (1956) defines projective identification as:
 . . . a splitting off by the patient of a part of his personality and a projection of it into the object where it becomes installed, sometimes as a persecutor, leaving the psychic from which it has been split off correspondingly impoverished.
It now seems that the instances of verbal transference interpretation can be looked upon as one form of intervention, at times effective, which constitutes an appeal for collaboration to the non-psychotic area of the patient’s personality, an area of which both Katan (1954) and Bion (1957) has written. But, particularly among long hospitalized chronically schizophrenic persons, we are many a patient who is too ill to be able to register verbal statements, and even in th e foregoing examples from Rosenfeld’s and Bion’s experiences, it is impossible to know to what extent the patient is helped by an illuminating accurate verbal content in the therapist’s words, or to what extent that which is effective springs, rather from the feelings of confidence, firmness, and understanding which accompany these words spoken by a therapist who feels that he has a reliable theoretical value for formulating the clinical phenomena in which he finds himself.
 In trying to conceptualize such ego-states in the patient, and such states of relatedness between patient and doctor. Additional value placed the concept presentation by Little in her papers, ‘On Delusional Transference’ (Transference Psychosis) (1958) and ‘On Basic Unity’ (1960).
 One of the necessary development, in along-delusional patient’s eventual relinquishment of his delusions is for these gradually to become productions that the therapist sees no longer as essentially ominous and the subject for either serious therapeutic investigation, or argumentation, or any other form of opposition, rather, the therapist comes to react to these for being essentially playful, unmaligant, creatively imaginative, and he comes to respond to them with playfully imaginative comments of his own. Nothing helps more finally to detoxicate a patient’s previously self-isolating delusional state than to find in his therapist a capacity to engage him in a delightfully crazy playfulness - a kind of relatedness of which the schizophrenic patient had never a chance to have his fills during his childhood. Typically, such early childhood playfulness was subjected to massive repression, because of various intra-familial circumstances.
 Innumerable instances of the therapist’s uncertainty how to respond to the patient’s communication turn upon the question of whether the communication is to be ‘taken personally’ - to be taken as primarily designed, for instance, toward filling the therapist with perplexity, confusion, anxiety, humiliation, rage, or some other negatively toned affective state, or whether it is to be taken rather as primarily an effort to convey some basically unhostile needs on the patient’s par. Just as it is often essential that the therapist become able to sense and respond to personal communications in a patient’s ostensibly stereotyped behaviour or utterance, so too it is frequently essential that he be able to see, behind the overt ‘personal’ reference to himself - often a stinging or otherwise emotionally evocative reference - some fundamental needs that the patient is hesitantly to communicate openly.
 Some comments by Ruesch, although concerned primarily with nonverbal communication, are beautifully descriptive of the process that occurs in such patients as the transference evolves over the course of the therapy:
 . . . .The primitive and uncoordinated movements of patient at th e peak of severe functional psychosis . . . may be viewed as attempts to reestablish the infantile system of communication through action. It is as if these were frustrating in early childhood, with the hope that this time there will be another person who will understand and reply in nonverbal terms. This thesis is supported by observations of the behaviour of psychotic children who tend to play with their fingers, make grimaces or assume bizarre body position. Their movements are rarely directed at other people but rather at themselves, something to the point of producing serious injuries. As therapy proceeds, interpersonal movements gradually replace the solipsistic movements, and stimulus becomes marching to response. Once these children have been satisfied in a nonverbal ways, they become willing to learn verbal forms of codification and begin to acquire mastery of discursive language.
It seems, but nevertheless, that there is widespread agreement concerning whose functional importance of dependency process in schizophrenia, for which the patient  who is involved in a schizophrenic illness, probably nothing is harder to endure than the circumstance of his having intense dependency needs that he cannot allow himself to recognize, or which if recognized in himself he dare not express to anyone, or which are expressed by him in a fashion that, more often than not, brings an uncomprehending or actively rejecting response from the other person. For the therapist who is working with such a patient, certainly there is nothing that brings more anxiety, frustration, and discouragement than do these processes in the schizophrenic person with whom he is dealing.
 The dependencies on which is focussed upon effectual acknowledge in the presence of which has its closest analogue, in terms of normative standards, is such that the personality development, in the experience and behaviour of the infant or of the young child. The dependency needs, attitudes, and strivings that the schizophrenic manifests may be defined in the statement that he seeks for another person to assume a total responsibility for gratifying all his needs, both physiological and psychological, while this person is to seek nothing from him.
 Of the physiological needs, which the schizophrenic manifests, those centring about the oral zone of interaction are usually most prominent, analogous to the predominant place held by nursing in the life of the infant. Desires to be stroked and cuddled, likewise, so characteristic of the very early years of normal development, are prominently held within the schizophrenic. In addition, desires for the relief of genital sexual tensions, even though these have had their advent much later in the life history than have his oral desires, are manifested in much the same level of an early, infantile dependency. That is, such genital hungers are manifested in much the same small-child spirit of, ‘you ought to be taking care of this for me’ as are the oral hungers.
 The psychological needs that are represented among the schizophrenic’s dependency processes consist in the desire for the other person to provide him  with unvarying love and protection, and to assume a total guidance of his living,
 In the course of furthering characterizations of the schizophrenic’s dependency  processes will be defined much more fully, that is to say, it is to be emphasized that no of the dependency processes are but described is characteristic only of the schizophrenic, or qualitatively different from processes operative at some level of consciousness in persons with other varieties of psychiatric illness and in normal persons. With regard to dependency processes, we find research in schizophrenia has its greatest potential value in the fact that schizophrenic shows us in a sharply etched form that which is so obscured, by years progressive adaptation to adult interpersonal living, in human beings in general. Wherefore, but in some degree, are about the patient’s anxiety about the dependency needs, are (1) As nearly as can be determined, the patient is unaware of pure dependency needs; for him, apparently, they exist in consciousness, if at all, only in the form of a hopeless conflictual combination of dependency needs plus various defences - defences that render impossible any thoroughgoing sustained gratification of these needs. These defences (which include, grandiosity, hostility, competitiveness, scorns and so forth) have so long ago developed in his personality, as a means of coping with anxiety attendant upon dependency needs, that the experiencing of pure dependency needs it, for him, lost in antiquity and so be achieved only relatively late in therapy after the various defences have been largely relinquished.
 Thus it appears to be not only dependency needs ‘per se’ which arouses anxiety, but rather the dependency needs plus all these various defences (which tend in themselves to be anxiety-provoking) plus the inevitable frustration, to a greater or less degree, of the dependency needs.
 Hostility as one of the defences against awareness of ‘dependency needs,’ that which for certainly repressed dependency needs are one of the most frequent bases of murderous feelings in the schizophrenic, in such instances the murderous feelings may be regarded as a vigorous denial of dependency. What frequently happens in therapy is that both patient and therapist become so anxious about the defensive murderous feelings that the underlying dependency feelings long remain unrecognized.
 Every schizophrenic possesses much self-hatred and guilt that may serve as defences against the awareness of dependency feelings (‘I am too worthless for anyone possibly to care about me’), and which in any case complicate the matter of dependency. The schizophrenic has generally come to interpret the rejections in his past life as meaning that he is a creature who wants too much and, in fact, a creature who has no legitimate needs. Thus, he can accept gratification of his dependency needs, if at all, only if his needs are rendered acceptable to themselves by reason of his becoming physically ill or in a truly desperate emotional state. It is frequently found that a schizophrenic is more accessible to the gratification of his dependency needs when he is physically ill, or filled with despair, than at other times. In that way, th e presence of self-hatred, and guilt, one ingredient of the patient’s overall anxiety about dependancy needs has to do with the fact that these needs connote to him the state of feeling physical illness or despair.
 In essence, then, we can see that the patient has a deep-seated conviction that his dependency needs will not be gratified. Further, we see that this conviction is based not alone on the fortunate past expedience of repeated rejection, but also, the fact that his own defences, called forth concomitantly with the dependency desires, make it virtually certain that this dependency needs will not be met. (2) The dependency needs are anxiety-provoking not only because they involve desires to relate in an infantile or small-child fashion (by breast - or penis sucking, being cuddled, and as so forth) which is not generally acceptable behaviour  among adults, but also, and probably what is more important, because they involve a feeling that the other person is frighteningly important, absolutely indispensable to the patient’s survival.
 This feeling as to the indispensable of importance of the other person derives from two main sources: (a) the regressed state of the schizophrenic’s emotional life, which makes for his perceiving the other for being all-important to  his survival, just as in infancy the mothering one is all-important to the survival of the infant, and (b) certain additional disabling features of his schizophrenic illness, which render him dependent in various special ways that are not quite comparable with the dependency characteristic of normal infancy or early childhood. Thereof, a number of points in reference to (b) are, first, we can perceive that a schizophrenic who is extremely confused, for example, is utterly dependent on or upon the therapist or, some other relevantly significant person to help him establish a bridge between his incomparable, incongruent, conflicting, conditions in which things are out of their normal or proper places or relationships. Such are the complete mental confusions that the authenticity of a corresponding to known facts is to discover or rediscover the real reason for which such things as having no illusions and facing reality squarely face-to-face, a realistic appraisal of his chances for advancing to the reasonable facts as we can see the factional advent for understanding the absolutizing instinct to fancy of its reality.
 Second, we can see also that the patient who is in transition between old, imposed values and not-yet-acquired values of his own, has only the relationship with his therapist to depend upon.
 Third, is the concern and consideration that, in many instances, the schizophrenic appears to be what one might call a prisoner in th e present. He is so afraid both of change and of the memories that tend to be called forth by the present that he clings desperately to what in immediate. He is in this sense imprisoned in immediate experience, and looks to the therapist to free him so that he will be able to live in all his life, temporally speaking - present, past and future.
 Forth, it might be surmised that an oral type of relatedness to the other person (with the all-importance of the other that this entails) is necessary for the schizophrenic to maintain,  partly in order to facilitate his utilization of projection and introjection as defences against anxiety.
 Anxiety, is the constructed foundation whose emotional state from which are grounded to the foundation structural called the ‘edifice’, that an emotional state in which people feel uneasy, apprehensive, or fearful. People usually experience anxiety about events they cannot control or predict, or about events that seem threatening or dangerous. For example, students taking an important test may feel anxious because they cannot predict the test questions or feel certain of a good grade. People often use the words fear and anxiety to describe the same thing. Fear also describes a reaction to immediate danger characterized by a strong desire to escape the situation.
 The physical symptoms of anxiety reflect a chronic ‘readiness’ to deal with some future threat. These symptoms may include fidgeting, muscle tension, sleeping problems, and headaches. Higher levels of anxiety may produce such symptoms as rapid heartbeat, sweating, increased blood pressure, nausea, and dizziness.
 Bychowski (1952) says, ‘’The separation between the primitive ego and the external world is closely connected with orality, both form the basis for the  mechanism that we call projection,’ and would add, for introjection. , That Starcke (1921) for earlier comments ‘I might briefly allude to the possibility that in the repeated alternation between becoming one’s own and not one’s own, which occurs during lactation . . . the situation of being nursed plays a part in the origin of the mechanism of something that extends beyond its level or the normal outer surface in which serves to support projection.
 The patient has anxiety, and, least of mention, his dependency needs lead him either to take in harmful things, or to lose his identity.
 The schizophrenic does not have the ability necessary to tolerate the frustration of his dependency needs, so that he can, once they emerge into awareness, subject them to mature discriminatory judgement before seeking their gratification. Instead, like a voraciously hungry infant, his tendency is to put into his mouth (either literally or figuratively) whatever is at hand, whether nutritious or with a potential of being harmful, this tendency is about th e basis of some of his anxiety concerning his dependency needs, for the fear that they will keep him blindly into receiving harmful medicines, bad advice, electro-shock treatment, lobotomy, and so forth. Schizophrenic patients have been known to beg, in effect, for all these, and many a patients have been known to beg, yet these patients have been ‘successful’ in his dependency desires. A need for self-punishment is, of course, an additional motivation in such instances.
 A statement by Fenichel (1945) indicates that, ‘The pleasure principle, that is, the need for immediate discharge, is incompatible with correct judgement, which is based on considerable and post postponement of the reaction. The time and energy saved by this postponement are used in the function of sound and stable judgments.  That in the early states the weak ego has not yet learned to postpone anything.
 In the same symptomatic of one that finds that th e extent that the schizophrenic projects onto other persons his own needs too such and to devour, he feels threatened with being devoured by these other persons.
 To elaborate now in a somewhat different direction upon this fear of loss of identity. Th e schizophrenic fears that his becoming dependent on another person will lead him into a state of conformity that other person’s wishes and life values. A conformer is almost the last sort of person as the schizophrenic wishes to become, since his sense of individuality resides in his very eccentricities. He assumes that the therapist, for example, in the process, requiring him to give up his individuality for the kinds of parental future in his past had e been able to salvage his refuge used to pay the price.
 It seems of our apparent need to give the impression of being without necessarily being so in fact that things are not always the way they seem, as things accompanied with action orient of doing whatever is apprehended as having actual, distinct and demonstrateable existence from which there is a place for each thing in the cosmological understanding idea in that something conveys to the mind a rational allotment of the far and near, such of the values and standards moderate the newly proposed to modify as to avoid an extreme or keep within bounds.
 For what is to say, in that we need to realize, that the patient is not solely a broken, inert victim of the hostility of persons in his past life. His hebephrenic apathy or his catatonic immobility, for example, represents for one thing, an intense active endeavour toward unconscious regressive goals, as Greenson (1949, 1953) has for his assistance to make clear in the boredom and apathy in neurotic patients. The patient is, in other words, no inert vehicle that needs to be energized by the therapist; rather, an abundance of energy is locked in him, pressing ceaselessly to be freed, and a hovering ‘helpful’ orientation on the part of the therapist would only get in the way. We must realize that the patient has made, and is continually making, a contribution to his own illness, however unwittingly, and however obscure the nature of this contribution may long remain.
 More than often, it has been found that the histories of schizophrenic patients, whether male or female, describe the father for being by far, the warmer, the more accessible, of the responsive parents, and the patient as having always been very much attached to the father, whereas the mother was always a relatively cold, rejecting, remote figure, but for the repetitive correlative coefficient, that it was to be found that, disguised behind the child’s idol or inseparable buddy, is a matter of the father’s transference to the child’s being a mother-figure that the father, in these instances, is an infantile individual who reacts both to his wife and to his child, as the mother-figure, and who, by striving to be both father and mother to the child, unconsciously seeks to intervene between mother and child, that in such a way as to have each of them to himself, in the considerations that suggest of a number of cases when both are in the transference-development with the patient and the selective prospect of the patient’s generalization that limits or qualifies an agreement or other conditions that may contain or  depend on a conditioning need for previsional advocates that include the condition that the transference phenomena would effectually raise the needed situational alliance.
 The various forms of intense transference on the part of the schizophrenic individual tend forcibly to evoke complementary feeling-responses, comparably intense, in the therapist. Mabel Blake Cohen (1952) has made the extremely valuable observation, for psychoanalysis in general, that:
 . . . it seems that the patient applies great pressure to the analyst in a variety of nonverbal ways to behave like the significant adults in the patient’s earlier life, it is not merely a matter of the patient’s seeing the analyst as like his father, but of his actually manipulating the relationship in such away as to elicit the same kind of behaviour from the analyst. . . .
It is no too much to say that, in response to the schizophrenic patient’s transference, the therapist not only behaves like the significant adults in the patient’s childhood, but experiences most intimately, within himself, activated by the patient’s transference the very kind of intense and deeply conflictual feelings that were at work, however repressed, in those adults in the past, as well as experiencing, through the mechanisms of projection and introjection in the relationship between himself and the patient, the comparably intense and conflictual emotion that formed the seed-bed of psychosis in the child himself, years ago.
 The accountable explanation in the support for reason to posit for the necessarily deep feeling-involvement on the part of the therapist is inherent in the nature of early ego-formation. The healthy reworking of which is so central to the therapy of schizophrenia. Spitz (1959), in his monograph on the early development of the ego, repeatedly emphasizes that emotion plays a leading role in th e formation of what he described as the ‘organizers of the psyche’ (which he defines as ‘emergent, dominant centres of integration’) during the first eighteen months of life. H e says, for example, that:
 . . . the road that leads to this integration of isolated functions is built by the infant’s object relations, by experiences of an effective nature. Accordingly, the indicator of the organizer of the psyche will be of an effective nature, it is an effective behaviour that clearly precedes development in all other sectors of the personality by several months.
The phases comprising the overall course of psychotherapy with chronically schizophrenic persons, is that of recent years it has become increasingly reassuring that it is possible to delineate such phases in the complex, individualistic and dynamic events of clinical work. One can be said, that, in this difficult effort at conceptualization, from Freud’s delineation of the successive phases of libidinal development in healthy maturation, Erikson’s (1956) portrayal of the process of identity formation as gradual unfolding of the personality through phase-specific psycho-social crises of evolution of the reality principle in healthy development - the typical conflicts, the sequence of danger situations, and
the ways they are dealt with - can be traced in this process.
 The successive phases of which are best characterised, the psychotherapy of chronic schizophrenia, are the ‘out-of-contact phases, the phase of ambivalent symbiosis, the phase of pre-ambivalent symbiosis, the phase of resolution of the symbiosis, and the late phase, - that of establishment, and elaboration, of the newly won individuation through selective new identification and repudiation of outmoded identifications.
 The sequence of these phases retraces, in reverse, the phases by which the schizophrenic illness was originally formed: The way of thinking, the aetiological roots of schizophrenia are formed when the mother-infant symbiosis fails to resolve into individuation of mother and infant - or, still more harmfully fails even to become at all firmly established - because of deep ambivalence of the part of the mother that hindered the integration and differentiation of the infant’s and young child’s ego, the child fails then to proceed through the normative development phases of symbiosis and subsequent individuation. Instead the core of his personality remains uniform, and ego-fragmentation and dedifferentiation becomes powerful, though deeply primitive and unconscious defences against the awareness of ambivalence in the object and in himself. Even in normal development, one becomes separate person only by becoming able to face, and accept ownership of, one’s ambivalence with which he had to cope in his relationship with his mother was too great, and his ego-formation too greatly impeded, for him to be able to integrate his conflictual feeling-states into an individual identity.
 Of these, the theoretical concept has been fostered by Mahler’s (1956) paper on autistic and symbiotic infantile psychosis and by Balint‘s (1953, 1955) writings concerning phenomena of early ego-formation that he encountered in the psychoanalysis of neurotic patients. From a purely descriptive viewpoint, schizophrenia can be seen to consist essentially in an impairment of both ‘integration’ and ‘differentiation’ - which are but opposite faces of a unitary growth-process. From a Psychodynamic view point seems basic to all the bewilderingly plexuity with which are a varying manifestations of schizophrenia.
 Taking in, is the matter of integration; when we assess schizophrenia individual in terms of the classical structural areas of the personality - id, ego, and superego - we discover these to be poorly integrated with one another. The id is experienced by the ego as a Pandora’s box, the contents of which will overwhelm one if it is opened. The ego is, as many writers have stated, severely split, sometimes into innumerable islands that are not linked discernibly with one another. And the superego has the nature of a cruel tyrant whose assaults upon the weak and unintegrated ego are, if anything, even more destructive to it than are the assessions of the threatening id-impulses, as Szalita-Pemow (1951), Hill (1955), and others. Moreover, the superego is, like the ego, even in itself not well integrated; its utterances contain the most glaring inconsistencies from one moment to the next. Jacobson (1954) has shown that there is actually as dissolution of the superego, as an integrated destruction - a regressive transformation back into the threatening parental images whose conglomeration originally formed it.
 Differentiation is a process that is essential to integration, and vice versa. For personality structure-functions or psychic contents to become integrated, they must first have emerged as partially differentiated or separate from one another, and differentiation in turn can emerge only out of a foundation of more or less integrated functions or contents. The intertwining mesh upon which is interwoven in the growth precesses of integration and differentiation, such that the impairment of both likewise interlocking. But in the schizophrenic these two processes tend to be out of step with one another, so that at one moment a patient’s more urgent need may be for increased integration, whereas at another he may more urgently need increased differentiation. And these are some patients who show for months end, a more urgent need in one of these areas, before the alternate growth-phase on the scene, that type is a modicum of validity in speaking and of two different ’types’ of schizophrenic patients.
 One comes to realize, upon reasons of how premature have been one’s effort to find out what feelings the patient is experiencing or what thoughts he is having; one comes to realize that much of the time he has neither feelings nor thoughts differentiated as such and communicable to us.
 Such differentiations as the patient posses of an inclining inclination that tend to break down when intense emotion enters his awareness. A paranoid man, for example, may find that when his hatred toward another person reaches a certain degree of intensity, he is flooded with anxiety because he no longer knows whether he hates, or instead ‘really loves’ the other individual. This is not based, on any line or its course, whereupon the primary mechanism that Freud (1911) outlined in his classical description of the nature of paranoid delusions of persecution, a description in which repressed homosexual love played the central role. The central difficulty is rather than the ego is too poorly differentiated to maintain its structure in the face of such powerful affects, and the patient becomes flooded with what can only be described as ‘undifferentiated passion’, precisely as one finds an infant to be overwhelmed at times with affect that the observer cannot be specifically identity as any one kind of emotion.
 As for the feelings with which the therapist himself experiences in working within the variations in the differentiated patient, we find, again, a persistent threat of the therapist’s sense of identity. But, whereas in the unitary integration complex manifestations of such of a schizophrenic’s sense of identity. But as in the first instance that the threat was felt predominantly as a disturbance of one’s personal integration, it seems possible as a weakening of one’s sense of differentiation. In this instance, the ‘therapeutic symbiosis’ which implicates the necessary developments that it tends to occur earlier for which of the patient’s predominant mode of relatedness with other persons, at the developmental level at which we find him at the very beginning of our work, is a symbiotic one. Such descriptions, least of mention, agree with the necessary developments, in that it tends to occur for the patient ‘s predominant mode of relatedness with other persons, the symbiotic relatedness, with its subjective absence of ego-boundaries, involves not only special gratification, but anxiety-provoking disturbances on one’s sense of personal identity.
 The comparatively rapid development of symbiotic relatedness is facilitated by the patient’s characteristically nonverbal, and physically more or less immobile, functioning during the therapeutic sessions. In response, the therapist’s own behaviour becomes more and  more similar, is that each participant is now offering to the other, saying that over the hours of counselling, a silent, impassive screen that facilitates abundant mutual projecting and introjecting. Thus a symbiotic state is likely to be reached earlier than in one’s work with the typically much more verbal type of the patient when described for that instance, the patient’s and therapist’s more abundant verbalization’s tend persistently to stress the ego-boundaries separating the to persons from one another.
 The applicability for which the predominantly non-differentiated patient, in that the therapist’s sense of identity as a complexly differentiated individual entity becomes further eroded, or undermined, as he finds the patient persistently operating on the unwavering conviction, that the hours of counselling are but an undifferentiated aspect of the whole vague mass of the institution, even in Psychodynamic terms, is in actuality the patient’s projection of his own poorly differentiated hostility, through which the patient’s tenaciously held view, is the way the world around him really is.
 Further, since the patient typically verbalizes little but a few maddening monotonous stereotypes, the therapist tends to feel, over the course of time, with so little of his own intellectual content being explicitly tapped in the relationship, that his richness of intellect is progressively rusting away - becoming less differentiated, more stereotyped and rudimentary. Moreover, the patient presents but one of two emotional wavelengths to which the therapist can himself tune in, rather than a rich spectrum of emotion that calls into response a similarly wide range of feelings from the therapist himself. Thus not only the therapist’s intellectual resources, but his emotional capacities too, becomes subjectively narrowed down and impoverished, as he finds that, over the sessions of counselling, his patient in him neither any wide range of ideas, nor any emotions except, for example, rage, or contempt or dull hopelessness.
 The feeling experience on his part, anxiety-provoking and discouraging though he finds it, is a necessary therapeutic development. It is for him thus to experience at first hand something of the patient’s own lack of differentiation; for, as in the therapy with the non-integrated patient, as, once, again, the healing process occurs external to the patient, as it was, at an intrapsychic level in the therapist, before it becomes established in the patient himself. That is, the therapist’s coming to view the patient, his relationship with the patient, and himself in this relationship, all for being largely non-differentiated, is a development that sets the stage for the patient’s gradually increasing differentiation. Now the therapist comes to sense, time and again, newly emerging tendrils of differentiation in the patient, before the latter are themselves and conscious of them. In responding to these with spontaneity as they show themselves, again, that in the therapist, helps the patient to become aware-theat they are a part of him.
 To analyst and analytic student alike, the term ‘transference psychosis’ usually connotes a dramatic but dreaded development in which an analysand, who at the beginning of the analysis was overtly sane but who had in actuality a borderline ego-structure, becomes overtly psychotic, that the course of the evolving transference relationship. We generally blame the analyst for such as development and prefer not to think any more about such matters, because of our own personal fear that we, like the poor misbegotten analysand, might become, or narrowly avoid becoming, psychotic in our own analysis. By contrast, in working with the chronically schizophrenic patient, we are confronted with a person whose transference to us is no harder too identify partly for the very reason that his whole daily life consists in incoherent psychotic transference reactions, for which is to whatever, to everyone about him, including the analyst in the treatment session. Little’s comment (1960) that the delusional state ‘remains unconscious’ until it is uncovered in the analysts’ holds true only in the former instance, in the borderline schizophrenic patient; there, it is the fact that the transference is delusional which is the relative covert, hard-to-discern aspect of the situation, in chronic schizophrenia, by contrast, nearly everything is delusional, and the difficult task to foster the emergence of a coherent transference meaning in the delusional symptomatology. In other words, the difficult thing in the work with the chronically schizophrenic patient is to discover the ‘transference reality’ in his delusional experience.
 The difficultly of discerning the transference aspect of one’s relationship with the patient can be traced to his having regressed to a state of ego functioning which is marked by severe impairment in his capacity either to differentiate among, or to integrate, his experiences. He is so incompletely differentiated in his ego functioning that he tends to feel, not that the therapist reminds him of, or is like, his mother or that of his father (or whomever, from his early life) but rather his functioning toward the therapist is couched in the unscrutinised assumption that the therapist is the mother or father. When, for example, in trying to bring to the attention of a paranoid schizophrenic women how much like she seemed to find the persons in her childhood on the one hand, and the person about her in the institution, including me, on the other, she dismissed this with an impatient retort, ‘That’s what I’ve been trying to tell you, What difference does it make? For years subsequently in our work together, all the figures in her experience were composite figures, without any clear subjective distinction between past and present experiences, figures from the institutional scene peopled her memories of her past, and figures from what has become known to be her past were experienced by her as blended with the persons she saw about her in current life.
 Transference situations in which the psychosis is manifested at a phase in therapy in which the deeply chronically confused patient, who in childhood had been accustomed to a parent’s during his thinking for him, is ambivalently (a) trying to perpetuate a symbiotic relationship wherein the therapist to a high degree does the patient’s thinking for him, and (b) expressing, by what the therapist feels to be sadistic and castrative and nullifying or undoing the therapist’s effort to be helpful, a determination to be a separately thinking, and otherwise separately functioning, individual
 Difficult though it is to discern the nature and progressive evolution of the patient’s transference to the therapist, it is even more difficult to conceptualize that which is ‘new’ which the therapist brings into the relationship, and which, as J. M. Rioch (1943) has emphasized, is crucial to the patient’s recovery. Rioch is quite right in saying that, ‘Whether intentionally or not, whether conscious of it or not, the analyst does express, day in and day out, subtle or overt evidences of his own personality in relationship to the patient.’
 The conjectural considerations for which inadequate evidences in the understanding of questionable intent is that there is a companion evolution of reality relatedness between patient and therapist, concomitant with such a transference evolution as having had the impression that it is only when the reality relatedness between patient and therapist has reached, finally and after many ‘real life’ vicissitudes between them, a depth of intense fondness that there now emerges, in the form of a transference development, a comparably intense and long-repressed fondness for the mother.
 Presumably, a point that Freud (1922) concerning projection also holds true for transference, he stated that projection occurs no  ‘into the sky, so to speak, where there is nothing of the sort already’, but rather the persons who in reality posses an attitude qualitatively like that which the projecting person is attributing to them. So it is with transference, we may presume that when a patient comes to react to us as a loved and loving mother, this phrase - as well as other phrases - of the transference is founded upon our having come to feel, in reality, thus toward him. M. B. Cohen (1952) stresses the importance of the therapist’s  inevitable feeling response to the patient’s transference, and, if only to suggest, that an equally healthy source of the therapist’s feeling participation be the evolving reality relatedness that pursues its own course, related to and parallelling, but not fully embraced by, the evolving transference relatedness over the years of person’s working together. What is more, is the countertransference that has already been written, but as to indicate, there is a great need for us to become clear about the sequence that the recovery process in the schizophrenic adult, very roughly analogous to the growth process in normal infancy, childhood, and adolescence, tends innately to follow. When we have become clearer and surer about this, and particularly about the validity-relatedness element necessary to it, in that the frequently - though by no means always - various manifestations of feeling regarded as unwanted countertransference will be seen to be inevitable, and utterly essential, components of the recovery process.
 Further, the opening view of the personality for being divisible into the areas, id, ego, and superego, tends to shield us from the anxiety-fostering realization that in psychoanalytic change is not merely quantitative and partial - where id was, there shall ego be - in Freud’s dictum - but qualitative and all-persuasive. That is, that in such passages as the following. Freud gives a picture of personality-structure, and of maturation, which leaves the inaccurate but comforting impression that at least a part of us - namely, as part of the id - is free from change. In his paper entitled ‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’ in 1915, he said,
 . . . the evolution of the mind shows a peculiarity that is present in no other process of development. When a village grows into a town, a child into a man, the village and the child become submerged in the town and the man, . . . it is otherwise with the development of the mind  . . . the primitive stages [of mental development] can always be reestablished, the primitive mind is, in the fullest meaning of the word, imperishable (Freud, 1915).
In ‘Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis,’ he says that in psychoanalytic treatment,
 . . .  By means of the work of interpretation, which transforms what is unconscious into what is conscious, the ego is enlarged at the cos  of this unconscious . . . (Freud, 1915-17)
In ‘The Ego and the Id’ he said that,
 . . . the ego is that part of the id that has been modified by the direct influence of the external world . . . the pleasure-principle . . . reigns unrestricted by the id . . . the ego represents what may be called reason and common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions (Freud, 1923)
Glover, in his book on technique published in 1955, states similarly that,
 . . . a successful analysis may have uncovered a good deal of the repressed . . . [and] have mitigated the archaic censoring functions of the superego, but it can scarcely be expected to abolish the id (Glover, 1955)
The state of developmental sciences, and about our own individual the individual therapeutic skills, should not cause us to understate the all-embracing extent of human personality-growth in normal maturation at least a few psychoanalysis. It is believed that all encountered, and, at lest a few fortunate instances that have made us wonder whether maturation really leaves any area of the personality untouched, leaves any steel-bound core within which the pleasure principle reigns immutably, or whether, instead, we have seen such a genuine metamorphosis, from an erstwhile hateful and self-seeking orientation to a loving and giving orientation, quite as wonderful and thoroughgoing the metamorphosis of the tadpole into the frog thoroughgoing as the metamorphosis of the tadpole into the frog or that of the caterpillar into the butterfly.
 Freud himself, in his emphasis upon the ‘negative therapeutic reaction’ (1923), the repetition compulsion, and the resistance to analytic insight  that he discovered in his work with neurotic patients, has shown the importance, in the neurotic individual, of anxiety concerning change, and him agrees with Jung’s statement that ‘a peculiar psychic inertia’ hostile to change and progress, is the fundamental condition of neurosis (Freud, 1915). This is, as we know, even more true of psychosis - so much as that only in very recent decades have psychotic patients achieved full recovery though modified psychoanalytic therapy. Finding it instructive to explore in detail the psychodynamics of schizophrenia in terms of the anxiety concerning change which one encounters, in a particular intense degree, at work in these patients, and in oneself in the course of treating them.  What the therapy of schizophrenia can teach us of the human being’s standing concerning change, can broaden and deepen our understanding of the non-psychotic individual also.
 This development can occur only after successive resolution of increasingly ancient personality-warp in the patient, and the establishment  thereby, of a hard-won mutual trust and security. In this atmosphere the therapist relationship makes contact with the healthy ingredients of the patient’s symbiotic relationship with his mother, thus laying the foundation for subsequent new growth as a separate and healthy individual.
 In such fashion the patient develops importance not merely as a separate object, but to a degree as a symbiotic partner, for the therapist as well as for other people, who participate with which the therapist himself, as well as such of the staff members, we hear from fellow-therapists and ward-personal of how ‘stunned’ or even ‘shocked’ them were at seeing dramatic improvements in a long-ill patient.  Characteristically, too, the therapist notices only very belatedly various long-standing symptoms have dropped out of the patient’s behaviour. on looking back through his records, for example, prior to a staff-presentation, he finds to his surprise that a delusion, once long-familiar to him, has not been evidenced by the patient for several months. Thus, his feelings of personal loss are mitigated. Even so, that even among the most technically capable of therapists, is the initial reaction with dismay and discouragement to a patients, is the initial reacting  with express  verbally the depths of his despair, loneliness, confusion, infantile need, and so fort, typically, the therapist only belatedly recognizes the forward move this development constitutes. His initial response is traceable to the unconscious loss that this development inflicts upon him - the loss of the long-familiar and inevitable therefore cherished (unconsciously cherished) relatedness that therefor he had shared with the patient.
 The patient, particularly in the symbiotic phrase of the therapy but in preceding and succeeding phase as well, is notably intolerant of sudden and marked changes in the therapeutic relationship - that is, of suddenly seeing himself, or feeling that his therapist sees him, through new eyes. He rarely gives the therapist to feel that the latter have made an importantly revealing interpretation, and when he himself conveys a highly illuminating nugget of historical information to his therapist, he does so casually, often feeling sure that he has already mentioned this before. He tends to experience important increments of de-repressed material not as earthshattering revelations in his development, yet the forward moves in therapy, on the patient’s part occur each time only after a recrudescence in his symptoms. It is as though he was to find reassurance of his personal identity, for being really the same hopeless person he has long felt himself to be, before he can venture into a bit of new and more hopeful identity.
 There is a necessary phase of symbiosis between patient and doctor in the transference evolution followed by the recovering schizophrenic patient, a phase in which the ego boundaries between himself and the therapist are mutually relinquished to a large degree. This development can occur only after successive resolutions of increasingly ancient personality-wrap in the patient, and the establishment, thereby, of a hard-won in the patient, and his identity.
 The following considerations, to be sure, the patient, in this reality and that this mutuality of a comparative participation is essentially inclined of a better understanding and a successful therapeutic outcome.
Freud (1911) made the comment that:
 We have long observed that every neurosis has as its result, and probably therefore its purpose, a forcing of the patient out of real life, an alienating of him from reality . . . neurotics turn away from reality because they find it unbearable - either the whole or parts of it. The most extreme type of this turning away from result is shown by certain cases of hallucinatory psychosis that seek to deny the particular event that occasioned the outbreak of their inanity. But in fact every neurosis does the same with some fragment of reality . . .
Bion, in his paper in 1957 concern the differentiation, in any one schizophrenic patient, between what he calls the psychotic personality and the non-psychotic personality, concludes the presentation of his theoretical formulations with,
. . . Further, I consider that this holds true for the severe neurotic, in whom   believe there is a psychotic personality concealed by neurosis as the neurotic personality is screened by psychosis in the psychotic, that has to be laid bare and dealt with.
Bion conveys in his paper entitled ‘Language d the Schizophrenic’ (1955) a warning of the patient’s tendency to project his own sanity upon the analyst and of the massive regression that follows if this is condoned by the analyst. He says:
 . . . I have no doubt whatever that the analyst should always insist, by the way in which he conducts the case, that he is addressing himself to a sane person and is entitled to expect some sane reception  . . . ,
There is wide spread agreement that it is inherent in therapy that the therapist functions as an auxiliary ego so the patient in the patent’s struggle  with inner conflicts, until such time as to make this greater strength part of his own ego. To the extent that the schizophrenic patient does not posses an observing ego of sufficient strength to permit the therapist usefully to make transference interpretations, to that degree the therapist must be able to endure - and, eventually, to enjoy  - various part-object transference role, until such time as the patient, through increasing ego-integration, becomes of the therapist. Another way of saying this is that the patient develops ego-strength. in the face of his own id impulses and pathogenic superego retaliations, in that, if identification with the therapist who can endure, and integrate into his own larger self, the kind of subjectively nonhuman part-object relatedness that the patient fosters in and needs from him.
 Similarly, because the therapist has seen the patient to be, earlier in the therapy, such a deeply fragmented person, he tends to retain a lingering impression of the fragility, an impression that may interfere with his going along at the faster pace that the patient, now a very different and far stronger person, is capable of setting. But even this memory-image of the fragile patient, carried with the therapist, has a natural function in the course of the psychotherapy, for it is only very late in the work that the patient himself is able to realize how very ill, how very fragile, he once was, until he becomes strong enough to integrate his realization into his self-image, the therapist has to be the bearer of this piece of the patient’s identity. This process is analogous to the well-known phenomenon in which each major forward stride in the patient’s therapeutic growth is accompanied, or presaged, by the therapist’s suddenly seeing in the patient a new and healthier person, there, too, the impact of the development falls primarily,  for a time, upon the therapist rather than the patient. The patient himself, because his sense of identity is still, during the earlier therapeutic phases to which is easily overwhelming,  and relatively tenuous. By the realization of the extent to which he is now changed, even though this change is, in our view, a most beneficial and welcoming one.
 More often than not, is that the histories of schizophrenic patients, whether male or female, describe the father for being by far the warmer, and more accessible of the two parents, the father, whereas the mother was always relatively cold, rejecting, remote figure. However, that the disguise behind the child’s idol inseparable ‘buddy’ is a matter of the father’s transference to the child for being a mother-figure upon whom he, the father makes insatiable demands. It seems that the father, in these instances, is an infantile individual, who reacts both to his wife and to his child unconscious ly seeks to intervene between mother and child in such a way as to have each of them to himself. The seeming evidence of this by now, in a considerable number of cases, both in the transference-development and interviews with the parents.
 The point being made, is that the mother and child allow this interposition by the father to happen, because of their anxiety about their fondness for being a mother-figure who exasperatingly allows as an infantile ‘buddy’, a kind of father to keep intervening, placing impossible demands for mothering upon the patient; finally comes a phase of th e patient’s responding to the therapist as a mother with whom he can share unashamedly fond relatedness, no longer burdened by the father’s scornfully and demandingly coming between them.
 So it is with transference, we may presume that when a patient comes to react to us as a love and loving mother, this phase - as well as other phases - of the transference is founded upon our having come to feel, in reality, as, M. B. Cohen (1952) stresses the importance of the therapist ‘s inevitable feeling response to the patient’s transference, only to suggest, that of the therapist’s feeling participation is the evolving reality relatedness that pursue its own course, related to and parallelling, but not fully embraced by, the evolving transcendence relatedness over which time to occur is, namely introduced as countertransference, nonetheless, in the realm, as situated as one crucial phase of the work - a symbiotic kind of mutual dependency, which he mutually comes to feel toward the patient, his acceptance of a mutual caring which amounts at times to an adoration, and his being able to acknowledge the patient’s contribution - inevitable, in successful therapy - to his own personal integration. It must be noted, that the schizophrenic patient responds with great regularity to the therapist’s material warmth for being a sure indication that the latter are a homosexual  or a lesbian. The younger therapist needs to become quite clear that this is, in actuality, a formidable resistance in the patient again the very kind of loving mother-infant relatedness that offers the patient his only avenue of salvation from his illness. Not to say, that the therapist should depreciate the degree of anxiety, referable to the deep ambivalence of the patient’s early relationship with his mother, which is contained within this resistance, perhaps, that the therapist’s deep-seated doubts as to his own sexual identity - and what person is totally free of such doubt? - should not make him lose of the fact that the patient’s contempt (or revulsion, or what not) is basically a resistance against going ahead and picking up the threads of the loving infant-mother relatedness that were long ago severed.
 Upon comment, the patient has in reference to a different person, and is often couched in terms of a different temporal era, that is intended by the preconscious or unconscious impulse striving for expression. The circumstance of the patient’s having regressed to a more or less early level of ego-functioning is explanatory of many of the idiosyncrasies of schizophrenic communication.  The clinical picture is complicated, in most instances, by the fact that the level of regression varies unceasingly, at times from one moment to the next, and there are even instances where the patient is functioning on more than one developmental level simultaneously.
 The fact of the patient’s regressed, mode of psychological functioning helps to account for the ‘concretization’, or contrariwise the seeming oversymbolization, of his communications; these phenomena represent his having regressed, in his thinking (and overall subjective experiencing), to a developmental level comparable with that in the young child who has not yet become able to differentiate between concrete and metaphorical (or similar forms of highly symbolic) thinking.
 Similarly, the patient may tittle-tattle in a way that gives us to know that the content of his speech is relatively unimportant to him at the moment he is immersed in the pleasure of saying the words and hearing the sound of them, much like the young child who has not yet learned to talk but loves to babble and to hear the sound of his babbling. A nonverbal patient may usefully be regarded as having regressed even further, to the pre-verbal era of infancy or very early childhood.
 The strikingly intense ambivalence, another fundamental aspect of the schizophrenic individual’s psychodynamics, contributes to a number of different typical kinds of schizophrenic communications. (1) The indirect communication, (2) Self-contradictory verbal and nonverbal communications, and (3) Verbal communications in which there is a split between content and vocal feeling-tone.
 In assessing the meaning of such communications, one soon learns to brush aside the content and attend to the feeling-tone - o r, in still, more complex instances, tones - in which the words are said.
 Incidently, a patient sometimes evidences a quite accurate grasp of the true import of such communications that they come from the therapist. at the end of each of the maddening points or the enduring intervals of times of silence. After this had happened several times dawning upon that which he was very accurately expressing the covert message contained in the parting comment to him, as to the (4) No-verbal expression of a feeling contrarily enacted to the one being verbalized? And (5) Expression of contradictory feeling at an entirely nonverbal level.
 The archaically harsh, forbidding superego of the patient is another basic factor that helps to account for his heavily disguised and often fragmentary communications.
 I can only surmise that there is a companion evolution of reality relatedness between parent and the therapist, concomitant with such a transference evolution, it is only when the real possibilities relatedness between patient and therapist has reached, of a final and after man a depth intensity that there is now emerging, in the form of a transference development a comparable intense and long-represented direction in the fondness for the mother. However, this brings us back to other topics comprising the overall course of psychotherapy as a chronically schizophrenic person, a person preceding in the complex individuality extended to dynamical events of clinical work.
 The quality of the transference resistances is to a great extent deepened on the quantity of other resistances. Resistances have the tendency to accumulate wherever there is a favourable opportunity to withstand the analysis. In most cases the transference offers the best opportunity, for example, we see the resistance coming from the conscious repetition, from the unconscious feeling of guilt and from the resistance by repression, takes part of building up the transference resistance. Freud speaks of the transference of resistance into a negative, hostile transference: It is on account of this transformation that the dissolution that transference resistances so often because the chief task of the therapeutics work. In the case of our patient the analysis finally showed the development of anxiety in the transference to be castration anxiety that had arisen from infantile masturbation with accompanying incestuous wishes toward the mother and the hared and castration wishes toward the father. In the analysis, if the resistance resulting factors in the development of anxiety in the analysis. If the resistance result from this anxiety is analysis the addition of other resistances, then the final resistance in the analysis cannot be considered as an index to the amount of the genuine infantile anxiety for the anxiety resulting from infantile masturbation, on account of the genuine infantile anxiety: For the anxiety resulting from infantile masturbation on account of its anxiety resulting from infantile masturbation, on account of its particular capacity for being used as a resistance in analysis, becomes the nucleus of crystallisation or the basis for the addition of all the other resistances. In a footnote to his paper ‘The Dynamics of th Transference,’ this idea was alluded to by Freud, that, ‘Over and over again, when one draws near to a pathogenic complex, that part of it that is first thrust forward into consciousness will be some aspect of it that can be transferred, having been so, it will then be defended with the utmost obstinacy by the patient’. The footnote says: ‘From which however one need not infer in general any very particular pathogenic importance in the point selected for resistance by transference. In warfare, when a bitter fight is raging over the possession of some little chapel or a single farmhouse, we do not necessarily assume that the church is a national monument, or that the barns contain the military funds. Their value may be merely tactical; in the next onslaught they will very likely be of no importance’.
 The dissolution of the transference resistance means then not only the dissolution of the resistance resulting from the genuine infantile castration anxiety but a liberation of the supporting resistance that often can only later be separately dissolved, because during the phase of the violent acting-out in the transference these resistances are not accessible to interpretation and dissolution.
 For what is said about the psychology of metaphor is analogous to the transformational aspects of developed transferences and steadfast interpretations that both facilitate and organize them as transferences. Allowing that these transferences and ‘remembered’ experiences come into existence over a period of time, nothing that is identical with them has ever before been enacted, and nothing identical with them will ever be enacted again. They are creations that may be fully achieved only under specific analytic conditions. For example, at the time of his childhood scene with his father, the young man of the clinical example, could not have had the specific experience as recounted. strictly speaking, he was not reliving that moment. As a bo y, he must have experienced some of the main precursors and constituents of his present mode of experience, but he could not have done so in the present articulated and integrated manner. That present manner was the basis of his anguished outcry. words like re-creating, but re-experiencing and reliving simply do not do justice to the phenomena. In the way he was doing it, he was living that moment for the first time.
 By making this claim, there is no constricting some of our well-established ideas about interpretation and insight, for example, disputing point that insight refers to more than the recovery of lost memories, and takes in, as well, a new grasp of the significance and interrelations of events one has always remembered.  The latter connections that the analysand will say, as Freud pointed out, ‘As a matter of fact I’ve always known it, only I’ve  never thought of’ (1914). In fact, it is to develop that points further to say that the young child simply does not have the means of fully defining what we later regard as its own life experiences. It takes an adult to do that, especially with the help of an analyst. It was, after all, Freud’s analysis that made it possible to define infantile psychosexuality. in this respect, but without disrespect, child analysis retains a quality of applied psychoanalysis. The adult definition of infantile psychosexuality is ‘artificial’ in the same way that the interpreting transference neurosis is: Both are ways of describing as true something that was not truer in quite that way as, at the time of its greatest development significance. this apparent paradox about ‘remembering’ as a form of creating goes a long was, that saying, what it is this distinctive about psychoanalytic interpretation.
 In steadfastly and perspicaciously making transference interpretation, the analyst helps constitute new modes of experience and new experiences. This newness characterizes the experience of analytic transference in them. Unlike extra-analytic transference, they can no longer be sheerly repetitive or merely new editions. Instead, they become repetitively new editions understood as such because defined as such by the simplification and steadfast transference interpretation, instead of responding to the analysand in kind, Which would actualize the repetition, the analyst makes an interpretation. This interpretation does not necessarily or regularly match something the analysand does often seem to have always represented often, but he does not seem to have done so at all. To think otherwise about this would, in effect, to claim that, unconsciously, every analysand is Freud or a fully insightful Freudian analyst. And that claim is totally absurd.
 It would be closer to the truth to say this: Unconsciously, the analysand already knows or has experienced fragmentary, amorphous, uncoordinated constituents of many of the transference interpretations. Alternatively, one may say that, implicitly, the analysand has been insisting on some as yet unspecified certainties and, in keeping with this, following some set of as yet  unspecified rules in his actions, these the transference interpretations now organize explicitly. Each transference interpretation thus refers to many things that have already been defined by the analysand, and it does so in a way that transforms them.  That’s why one may call it interpretation. Otherwise, it would be mere repeating or sterile paraphrasing. Interpretation is a creative redescription that implicitly has the structure of a simile. It says, ‘This is like it,’ Each interpretation does, therefore, add new actions to the life the analysand has already lived.
 Technically, redescription in the terms of transference-repetition is necessary. This is so because, up to the time of interpretation and working through, the analysand has been, in one sense unable and, in another sense, unconsciously and desperately unwilling, to conduct his life differently, in and of them, the repetitions cannot after the symptoms, the subjective distress, the wasting of one’s possibilities rather they can only perpetuate a static situation by repeatedly confirming its necessity. They prove once again, the unconsciously maintained damaging certainties. But once they get to be viewed as historically grounded actions and subjectively defined situations. As they do upon being interpreted and worked through, they appear as having always been, in crucial respects, inventions of the analysand’s making and, so, as his responsibility. in being seen as versions one’ past life, they may be changed in significant and beneficial ways. Less of all, are they presented as purely inevitable happenings, as a fixed fate or as the well-established way of the world. However, we encounter a second paradox that goes to the heart of psychoanalysis interpretation, namely, that responsible, insightful change is possible through psychoanalysis just because, as a child the analysand mistakenly assumes and then denied responsibility for much that he encountered in the early formative environment and during maturation.
 One major point remains to be made about the logic of viewing transference interpretation as simplifying yet innovative redescription. This point is that the interpretations bring about a coordination of the terms in which to state both the analysand’s current problems and their life-historical background. The analysand’s symptoms and distress are described as actions and modes of action, with due regard for the principle of multiple function or multiple meaning: In coordination with that description, the decisive developmental situation and conflicts are stated as actions and modes of action. Continuity is established between the childhood constructions of relationships and the self and the present constructions of these interpretations of transference shows who both are part of the same set of practices, that is, how they follow the same set of rules. Past and present are coordinated to show continuity rather than arranged in a definite sequence.
 In the same way, the form of analytic behaviour and the content of association are given co-ordinated descriptions, say, as being defiant,  devouring, or reparative. Or, in the case of depression, the depressive symptoms, the depressive analytic transference, the themes of present and past loss, destructiveness and helplessness, all will be redescribed under the aspect of one continuously developing self-presentation. And this coordination will be worked out in that hermeneutically circular fashion in which the analyst defines both th facts to be explained and the explanations to be applied to these facts. In the end, as is well known, both the paramount issues of the analysis and the leading explanatory account of them are likely to be significantly different from the provisional versions of them used at the beginning of the analysis.
 The increasing influence of the modernist version of transference and its interpretation represents an adaptation to several long-term philosophical, scientific, and cultural shifts we can now recognize. this changing view of transference is also the most visible emblem of the deep changes in psychoanalytic theory that are now quietly taking place, and of their theoretical pluralism that is so prevalent today (Cooper, 1985).
 One of these long-term changes in the climate in which psychoanalysis dwells results from a large philosophical debate concerning the nature of history, veridicality, and narrative. Kermode (1985) has written of the change during this century in our modes of understanding and interpreting the past and the present, ‘Once upon a time it seemed obvious that you could best understand how things are by asking how they got to be that way. Now attention [is] directed to how things are in their immediate plexuities. There is a switch to use the linguistic expressions, from the diachronic to the synchronic view. Diachrony, roughly speaking, studies things in their synchrony to be as they are, synchrony concerns itself with things as they are and ignores the question, how they got that way. This distinction, put forth by de Sasussure (1915), has achieved philosophical dominance today and is the clear source of the hermeneutic view so prevalent in psychoanalysis, proposed by Ricoeur (1970). From here, it is a short distance to Schafer (1981), and Gill (1982), or Spence (1982) who in varying ways adopt the synchronic view. In this view, the analytic task is interpretation, with the patient, of the events of the analytic situation - usually broadly labelled transference - with a construction rather than a reconstruction of the past. In effect, while there is a past of ‘there and then’ it is knowable only through the filter of the present, of ‘here and now’. There is no other past than the one as we construct, and there is no way of understanding the past but through its relation to the present.
 Psychoanalysis, like history but unlike fiction, does have anchoring points, for history’s anchoring points are the evidences that events really did occur, There was a Roman empire, it did have dates, actual persons lived and died. These ‘facts’ place a limitation for the narratives an interpretations that may seriously be entertained. Psychoanalysis is anchored in its scientific developmental psychology and in the biology of attachment and affects. Biology confers regularities and limits on possible histories, and our constructions of the past must accord with this scientific knowledge. constructions of childhood that are incompatible with what we know of developmental possibilities may open our eye’s to new concepts of development, but more likely they alert us to maimed childhoods that have led our patients to usual narrative constructions in the effort to maintain self-esteem and internal coherence. A second, far less secure, anchorage is the enormous amount of convergent data that accumulate during the course of an analysis, which are likely to give the analyst the impression that he is reconstructing rather than constructing the figures and the circumstances of his patient’s past. While a diachronic view may no longer suffice, it may also not be fully dispensable if our patient’s histories are to maintain psychoanalytic coherence, rooted in bodily experience, and the loving, hating and terrifying affects accompanying the fantastic world of infantile psychic reality. Not all analysis are yet as ready as Spence, for example, to give up all claim to the truth value explanatory power of the understanding of the past, even if it is limited to knowing past constructions of the past. Nevertheless, the change in philosophical outlook during our century is profound and contributes to our changing view of the analytic process is exemplified in the transference and its interpretation.
 Approaching the same issue from an entirely different vantage point, Emde (1981) speaking for the ‘baby-watchers’ and discussing changing models of infancy and early development, details a second source of the major change of climate to which he writes, The models suggest that what we reconstruct, and what may be extraordinarily helpful to the patient in making a biography, may never have happened. The human being, infant child, is understood to be fundamentally active in constructing his experience. Reality is neither given nor is it necessarily registered in an unmodified form. Perhaps it makes sense for the psychoanalysis to place renewed emphasis on recent and current experiences - first, as a context for interpreting early experience - first, as a context for interpreting the potential amelioration, . . . Psychoanalysts are specialists in dealing with the intrapsychic world not only particular with the dynamic unconscious, but we need to pay attention not only to the intrapsychic realm.  conflicting-laden and conflict-free, but also to the interpersonal realm. He concludes, . . . we have probably placed far to much an emphasis on early experience itself as opposed to the process by which it is modified or made use of by subsequent experience.
 This view of psychic developments, discarding the timeless unconscious and so powerful at odds with the views that were held by psychoanalysts during the time when most of our ideas of transference interpretation were  formed, clearly suggests the modernist model of transference interpretation.
 A change in the cultural environment of psychoanalysis provides a third source for the changing model of transference interpretation. Valenstein describes oscillations in psychoanalytic outlook between an emphasis on cognition at one end, and on affect at the other. One might see these as differences between old-fashioned scientific and romantic world views. Surely the period of ego psychology, perhaps reflected in the English translation of Freud, and certainly reflected in the effect to insist on the libidinal energetic point of view, represented the attempt to see psychoanalysis as Freud usually did, as an objective science in the nineteenth century style, with hypotheses created out of naïve observations. It accorded with that view to see the transference as an objective reflection of history. We are currently in one of our more romantic periods. It is consonant with that view to see transference  as an activity - stormy, romantic, active, affective - a kind of adventure from which the two individuals emerge changed and renewed. In this romantic view, interpretation of the transference are intended to remove obstacles interfering with the heightening and intimacy of the experience, with the implication that self-knowledge and change will result from their encounter. A romantic figure, the patient and analyst set forth on a quest into the unknown, and whether or not one of them returns with a Holy Grail, they return with many new stories to tell and a new life experience - the analysis. Gardner’s (1983) book, ‘Self Inquiry’ epitomizes this romantic view of analyst and patient as a poet-pair engaged in mutual self-inquiry. It is clear that many analysis would rather be artistic than scientist. By contrast, the older, cognitive view of the transference is of an intellectual journey, emotionally loaded of course, but basically a trip back in history, seeking truth and insight.
 Finally, our newer ideas of transference interpretation come from the rereading and reinterpretations of Freud that necessarily accompany the changes in outlook in the corresponding pendulum of analytic techniques from Freud’s actual technique, as reconstructed from his notes and the report s of his patients, to the so-called ‘classical’ technique that held sway after Freud’s death, and again, to the currently changing technical scene. Lipton (1977) has insisted that in the 1940s andv1950s the so-called classical technique replaced Freud’s own more personal and relaxed technique, probably in reaction to Alexander’s suggestion of the corrective emotional experience. It was Lipton’s view that the misnamed ‘classical’ technique, in contrast to Freud’s, emphasized rules for the analyst’s behaviour and sacrificed the purpose of the analysis. Eissler’s 1953 description of analysis as an activity that ideally uses only interpretations became the paradigm for ‘classical’ analysis. It was, Lipton, says, a serious and severe distortion of the mature analytic technique developed by Freud. Freud regarded the analyst ‘s personal behaviour, the personality of the analyst exemplified for Lipton in the case of the Rat Man. The so-called ’classical’ (and in his view non-Freudian) techniques attempted to include every aspect of the analytic situation as part of technique and led to the model of the silent, restrained psychoanalyst. Lipton’s argument is persuasive.
 These two different models of technique have obvious implications concerning the transference and its interpretation. Unless we believe in an extreme version of the historical model, we must expect that the silent, restraint, nonparticipatory psychoanalyst will elicit different responses from his patient than will the vivid, less-hidden, more responsive analyst. The range of personal behaviours available to the analyst before we need be concerned that the analyst is engaging in activities that are excessively self-revelatory or that force the patient into a social relationship is probably much broader than we thought a few years ago. But we also know that almost any behaviour of the analyst, including restraint or silence, immediately influences the patient’s responses. In these newer views of the analytic situation it is not easy to know that intrapsychically derived patient behaviours.
 It is evident today that psychoanalyst’s under the sway of their theories and personalities, differ greatly concerning matters to which they are sensitive, and, of course, we can interpret only the transferences we perceive. Despite this limitation, a review of the literature reveals, along with the usual rigidities, a laudable tendency to describe one’s experience as fully as possible, without heed to how it contradicts belief, often blurring over when experience and theory do not match. However, we have always been better at what we do than at what we say we do. This is exemplified in Heimann’s (1956) paper. Speaking from a modified Kleinian perspective, and holding the historical theory of transference interpretation, Heimann managed 30 years ago to describe vividly and to support passionately much of what today is under discussion as the modernist version. That her position were contradictory bothered her not at all. While many of us prefer to think we are following our theories, like all good scientists, good psychoanalysts, beginning with Freud, have always seen and responded to far more than our theories admit. when we have seen too much, we change our theories.
 Overall, during the last half of this century, these trends, as well as our ever-increasing knowledge of our increasing  distance from Freud’s authority  have led to specific theoretical developments (Cooper, 1984, 1985), many of them inferred in the newer transference model. Our current pluralistic theoretical world, in which almost all analysts are working, wittingly or not, with individual amalgams of Freud’s drive theory, ego psychology, interpersonal Sullivanian psychoanalysis, object-relationship theory, Bowlbyan or Mahlerian attachment theory, and usually smuggled-in versions of self-psychology, lies at the base of the newer ideas and disagreements concerning transference interpretation.
 Although the historical definitions of transference and transference   interpretation have the merit of seeming precision and limited scope, they are based on a psychoanalytical theory that no longer stands alone and has lost  ground in at least, subsumed, by modernist conceptions that are more attuned to the theories that abound today.
 Asa prefatory remark about Freud and transference, the observations can be offered that Freud wrote briefly about transference and did so, in the main, before 1917. Another observation which can rarely be made about Freud’s work, what he did write on transference and did not reach the high level of analytical thought which has come to be regarded as standard for him. Some indication of what his contribution consist of is given by the editors of the Standard Edition, who list them in several places. One of the longer lists, in a footnote includes six reference ‘Studies on Hysteria’, with Breuer (1895),the Dora paper (1905), The Dynamics of Transference’ (1912), Observations on Transference-Love’ (1915), the chapter on transference in the Introductory Lectures (1917), and Analysis Terminable and Interminable (1937). Although the editors in no sense suggest that these six papers include everything Freud wrote on the subject that these six papers include everything Freud wrote on the subject, it does seem evident that, considering the essential importance of transference to analysis, he wrote little. moreover, the three papers in which transference is the specific theme. `The Dynamics of Transference,`Transference-Love ; and the transference chapter in the Introductory Lectures, come across as perhaps his least significant contributions.
 Freud’s first direct mention of transference occurs in ‘Studies on Hysteria’ (1895), His first significant reference to it, however, did not appear until five years later when, in a lecture to Fliess on April 16, 1900, he said (Freud 1887-1902) he was ‘beginning to see that the apparent endlessness of the treatment is something of an inherent feature and is connected with transference. In a footnote to his letter the editors state that, ‘this is the first insight  into the role of transference in psychoanalytic therapy’.
 Despite these early references, it seems correct to say that yet another five yea s was to go by before the phenomenon of transference was actually introduced. Even then the introduction was far from prominent, for it was tacked like an afterthought as a four-page portion of a postscript to what was perhaps Freud’s most fascinating case history to date, the case of Dora (1905).
 Using data from Dora’s three-month-long, unexpected terminated analysis, and especially from her dramatic transference reactions which had taken him quite unaware. Freud now gave to transference its first distinct psychological entity for th first time indicated its essential role in the analytic process. His account, although in general more than adequate - in fact elegant and remarkable ‘finished’ - was brief, almost Iaconic, and perhaps not an entirely worthy introduction to such a truly great discovery. What was uniquely great was his recognizing the usefulness of transference. In his analysis of Dora h e had noted not only that transference feelings existed and were powerful, but much to his dismay, he had realized that as serious, perhaps, even insurmountable, obstacle they could be,. Then, in what seems like a creative leap, Freud made the almost und unbelievable discovery that transference was in fact the key to analysis, that by properly taking the patient’s transference into account, an entirely new, essential and immensely effective heuristic and therapeutic force was added to the analytic method.
 A neuron is a long cell that has a thick central area containing the nucleus; it also has one long process called an ‘axon’ and one or more short, bushy processes called ‘dendrites’. Dendrites receive impulses from other neurons. (The exceptions are sensory neurons, such as those that transmit information about temperature or touch, in which the signal is generated by specialized receptors in the skin.) These impulses are propagated electrically along the cell membrane to the end of the axon. At the tip of the axon the signal is chemically transmitted to an adjacent neuron or muscle cell.
 Like all other cells, neurons contain charged ions, potassium and sodium (positively charged) and chlorine (negatively charged). Neurons differ from other cells in that they are able to produce a nerve impulse. A neuron is polarized - that is, it has an overall negative charge inside the cell membrane because of the high concentration of chlorine ions and low concentration of potassium and sodium ions. The concentration of these same ions is exactly reversed outside the cell. This charge differential represents stored electrical energy, sometimes referred to as ‘membrane potential’ or ‘resting potential’. The negative charge inside the cell is maintained by two features. The first is the selective permeability of the cell membrane, which is more permeable to potassium than sodium. The second feature is sodium pumps within the cell membrane that actively pump sodium out of the cell. When depolarization occurs, this charge differential across the membrane is reversed, and a nerve impulse is produced.
 Depolarization is a rapid change in the permeability of the cell membrane. When sensory input or any other kind of stimulating current is received by the neuron, the membrane permeability is changed, allowing a sudden influx of sodium ions into the cell. The high concentration of sodium, or action potential, changes the overall charges within the cell from negative too irrefutable positivity, and charged to ion concentrations, for triggering similar reactions along the membrane, propagating the nerve impulse. After a brief period called the ‘refractory period’, during which the ionic concentration returned to resting potential, the neuron can repeat this process.
 Nerve impulses travel at different speeds, depending on the cellular composition of a neuron. Where speed of impulse is important, as in the nervous system, axons are insulated with a membranous substance called ‘myelin’. The insulation provided by myelin maintains the ionic charge over long distances. Nerve impulses are propagated at specific points along the myelin sheath; these points are called the ‘Nodes of Ranvier’. Examples of myelinated axons are those in sensory nerve fibres and nerves connected to skeletal muscles. In non-myelinated cells, the nerve impulse is propagated more diffusely.
 When the electrical signal reaches the tip of an axon, it stimulates small presynaptic vesicles in the cell. These vesicles contain chemicals called neurotransmitters, which are released into the microscopic space between neurons (the synaptic cleft). The neurotransmitters subjoin of abounding deliberations to particularly specific receptors on the surface of the adjacent neuron their adherence of fastening or affix by a state of being firmly attached to the receptor or something that causes the adjacent cell to depolarize and propagate an action potential of its own. The duration of a stimulus from a neurotransmitter is limited by the breakdown of the chemicals in the synaptic cleft and the ‘reuptake’ by the neuron that produced them. Formerly, each neuron was thought to make only one transmitter, but recent studies have shown that some cells progress of two or more.
 The signals conveying everything that human beings sense and think, and every motion they make, follows nerve pathways in the human body as waves of ions (atoms or groups of atoms that carries electric charges). Australian physiologist Sir John Eccles discovered many of the intricacies of this electrochemical signalling process, particularly the pivotal step in which a signal is conveyed from one nerve cell to another. He shared the 1963 Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine for this work, which he described in the 1965 Scientific American article.
 A neuron is a long cell that has a thick central area containing the nucleus, it also has one long process called an axon and one or more short, bushy processes called ‘dendrites’. Dendrites receive impulses from other neurons. (The exceptions are sensory neurons, such as those that transmit information about temperature or touch, in which the signal is generated by specialized receptors in the skin.) These impulses are propagated electrically along the cell membrane to the end of the axon. At the tip of the axon the signal is chemically transmitted to an adjacent neuron or muscle cell.
 Depolarization is a rapid change in the permeability of the cell membrane. When sensory input or any other kind of stimulating current is received by the neuron, the membrane permeability is changed, allowing a sudden influx of sodium ions into the cell. The high concentration of sodium, or action potential, changes the overall charges within the cell from negative too positively in finding the local change in ion concentration, which triggers similar reactions along the membrane, propagating the nerve impulse. After a brief period called the ‘refractory period’, during which the ionic concentration returned to resting potential, the neuron can repeat this process.
 When the electrical signal reaches the tip of an axon, it stimulates small presynaptic vesicles in the cell. These vesicles contain chemicals called neurotransmitters, which are released into the microscopic space between the synaptic cleft. The neurotransmitters attach to specialized or specific receptors on the surface of the adjacent neuron. This stimulus causes the adjacent cell to depolarize and propagate an action potential of its own. The duration of a stimulus from a neurotransmitter is limited by the breakdown of the chemicals in the synaptic cleft and the reuptake by the neuron that produced them.
 If to say, that Roderick MacKinnon, born in 1956, is the American biomedical researcher and co-winner of the 2003 Nobel Prize in chemistry for his discoveries involving ion channels. The pores that govern the passage of molecules into and out of cells, in that of every second in each of the billions of cells in the human body, millions of ions, such as potassium and sodium, shuttles back and forth through these special portals in the cellular membrane. This action underlies a range of physiological processes, including muscle contraction and the communication of impulses between nerve cells. MacKinnon and his colleagues were the first to show the detailed structure of one type of ion channel.
 Born in 1956, MacKinnon grew up in Burlington, Massachusetts, outside Boston. He earned his bachelor’s degree in biochemistry from Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts, in 1978, and his medical degree from Tufts University School of Medicine in Boston in 1982. After beginning a career in medicine, MacKinnon turned to biomedical research. Postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Brandeis ultimately led to a professorship in the Department of Neurobiology at Harvard Medical School in 1989. In 1996 MacKinnon moved to Rockefeller University in New York City, where he became a professor of molecular Neurobiology and biophysics.
 To study an ion channel - in this case, a particular cellular protein involved in the transport of potassium - MacKinnon chose a difficult method known as X-ray crystallography. This method involves forming the protein into a crystal and then using X rays to determine the protein’s structure. Many scientists doubted that the approach would work, but in 1998 MacKinnon and his team achieved success, presenting a detailed three-dimensional picture of the potassium channel.
 In subsequent research, MacKinnon and his colleagues discovered more about the chemical workings of ion channels. This work helped to explain, for example, how such a pore permits the passage of millions of potassium ions per second while largely blocking the passage of sodium ions. Increased knowledge of these protein pores will be important for the design of future drugs because the malfunctioning of ion channels has been linked to heart disease and cystic fibrosis, among other illnesses.
 In addition to the Nobel Prize, MacKinnon has been honoured with the 1999 Albert Lasker Basic Medical Research Award. He shared the Nobel Prize with American biologist Peter Agre, who, in separate research, discovered the molecular channel through which cells transport water.
 When a neuron is in its resting state, its voltage is about -70 millivolts. An excitatory neurotransmitter alters the membrane of the postsynaptic neuron, making it possible for ions (electrically charged molecules) to move back and forth across the neuron’s membranes. This flow of ions makes the neuron’s voltage rise toward zero. If enough excitatory receptors have been activated, the postsynaptic neuron responds by firing, generating a nerve impulse that causes its own neurotransmitter to be released into the next synapse. An inhibitory neurotransmitter causes different ions to pass back and forth across the postsynaptic neuron’s membrane, lowering the nerve cell’s voltage to -80 or -90 millivolts. The drop in voltage makes it less likely that the postsynaptic cell will fire.
 If the postsynaptic cell is a muscle cell rather than a neuron, an excitatory neurotransmitter will cause the muscle to contract. If the postsynaptic cell is a gland cell, an excitatory neurotransmitter will cause the cell to secrete its contents.
 While most neurotransmitters interact with their receptors to create new electrical nerve impulses that energize or inhibit the adjoining cell, some neurotransmitter interactions do not generate or suppress nerve impulses. Instead, they interact with a second type of receptor that changes the internal chemistry of the postsynaptic cell by either causing or blocking the formation of chemicals called second messenger molecules. These second messengers regulate the postsynaptic cell’s biochemical processes and enable it to conduct the maintenance necessary to continue synthesizing neurotransmitters and conducting nerve impulses. Examples of second messengers, which are formed and entirely contained within the postsynaptic cell, include cyclic adenosine monophosphate, diacylglycerol, and inositol phosphates.
 Once neurotransmitters have been secreted into synapses and have passed on their chemical signals, the presynaptic neuron clears the synapse of neurotransmitter molecules. For example, acetylcholine is broken down by the enzyme acetylcholinesterase into choline and acetate. Neurotransmitters like dopamine, serotonin, and GABA is removed by a physical process called reuptake. In reuptake, a protein in the presynaptic membrane acts as a sort of sponge, causing the neurotransmitters to reenter the presynaptic neuron, where they can be broken down by enzymes or repackaged for reuse.
 Neurotransmitters are known to be involved in a number of disorders, including Alzheimer’s disease. Victims of Alzheimer’s disease suffer from loss of intellectual capacity, disintegration of personality, mental confusion, hallucinations, and aggressive - even violent - behaviour. These symptoms are the result of progressive degeneration in many types of neurons in the brain. Forgetfulness, one of the earliest symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease, is partly caused by the destruction of neurons that normally release the neurotransmitter acetylcholine. Medications that increase brain levels of acetylcholine have helped restore short-term memory and reduce mood swings in some Alzheimer’s patients.
 Neurotransmitters also play a role in Parkinson disease, which slowly attacks the nervous system, causing symptoms that worsen over time. Fatigue, mental confusion, a mask-like facial expression, stooping posture, shuffling gait, and problems with and speaking is among the difficulties suffered by Parkinson victims. These symptoms have been partly linked to the deterioration and eventual death of neurons that run from the base of the brain to the basal ganglia, a collection of nerve cells that manufacture the neurotransmitter dopamine. The reasons why such neurons die are yet to be understood, but the related symptoms can be alleviated. L-dopa, or levodopa, widely used to treat Parkinson disease, acts as a supplementary precursor for dopamine. It causes the surviving neurons in the basal ganglia to increase their production of dopamine, thereby compensating to some extent for the disabled neurons.
 Many other effective drugs have been shown to act by influencing neurotransmitter behaviour. Some drugs work by interfering with the interactions between neurotransmitters and intestinal receptors. For example, belladonna decreases intestinal cramps in such disorders as irritable bowel syndrome by blocking acetylcholine from combining with receptors. This process reduces nerve signals to the bowel wall, which prevents painful spasms.
 Other drugs block the reuptake process. One well-known example is the drug fluoxetine (Prozac), which blocks the reuptake of serotonin. Serotonin then remains in the synapse for a longer time, and its ability to act as a signal is prolonged, which contributes to the relief of depression and the control of obsessive-compulsive behaviours.
 Neurotransmitters are released into a microscopic gap, called a synapse, that separates the transmitting neuron from the cell receiving the chemical signal. The cell that generates the signal is called the presynaptic cell, while the receiving cell is termed the postsynaptic cell.
 After their release into the synapse, neurotransmitters combine chemically with highly specific protein molecules, termed receptors, that are embedded in the surface membranes of the postsynaptic cell. When this combination occurs, the voltage, or electrical force, of the postsynaptic cell is either increased (excited) or decreased (inhibited).
 When a neuron is in its resting state, its voltage is about -70 millivolts. An excitatory neurotransmitter alters the membrane of the postsynaptic neuron, making it possible for ions (electrically charged molecules) to move back and forth across the neuron’s membranes. This flow of ions makes the neuron’s voltage rise toward zero. If enough excitatory receptors have been activated, the postsynaptic neuron responds by firing, generating a nerve impulse that causes its own neurotransmitter to be released into the next synapse. An inhibitory neurotransmitter causes different ions to pass back and forth across the postsynaptic neuron’s membrane, lowering the nerve cell’s voltage to -80 or -90 millivolts. The drop in voltage makes it less likely that the postsynaptic cell will fire.
 If the postsynaptic cell is a muscle cell rather than a neuron, an excitatory neurotransmitter will cause the muscle to contract. If the postsynaptic cell is a gland cell, an excitatory neurotransmitter will cause the cell to secrete its contents.
 While most neurotransmitters interact with their receptors to create new electrical nerve impulses that energize or inhibit the adjoining cell, some neurotransmitter interactions do not generate or suppress nerve impulses. Instead, they interact with a second type of receptor that changes the internal chemistry of the postsynaptic cell by either causing or blocking the formation of chemicals called second messenger molecules. These second messengers regulate the postsynaptic cell’s biochemical processes and enable it to conduct the maintenance necessary to continue synthesizing neurotransmitters and conducting nerve impulses. Examples of second messengers, which are formed and entirely contained within the postsynaptic cell, include cyclic adenosine monophosphate, diacylglycerol, and inositol phosphates.
 Once neurotransmitters have been secreted into synapses and have passed on their chemical signals, the presynaptic neuron clears the synapse of neurotransmitter molecules. For example, acetylcholine is broken down by the enzyme acetylcholinesterase into choline and acetate. Neurotransmitters like dopamine, serotonin, and GABA is removed by a physical process called reuptake. In reuptake, a protein in the presynaptic membrane acts as a sort of sponge, causing the neurotransmitters to reenter the presynaptic neuron, where they can be broken down by enzymes or repackaged for reuse.
 Severe mental illness almost always alters a person’s life dramatically. People with severe mental illnesses experience disturbing symptoms that can make it difficult in holding down a job, or go to school, relate to others, or cope with ordinary life demands. Some individuals require hospitalization because they become unable to care for themselves or because they are at risk of committing suicide.
 The symptoms of mental illness can be very distressing. People who develop schizophrenia may hear voices inside their head that say nasty things about them or command them to act in strange or unpredictable ways. Or they may be paralysed by paranoia - the deep conviction that everyone, including their closest family members, wants to injure or destroy them. People with major depression may feel that nothing brings pleasure and that life is so dreary and unhappy that it is better to be dead. People with panic disorder may experience heart palpitations, rapid breathing, and anxiety so extreme that they may not be able to leave home. People whom experience episodes of mania may engage in reckless sexual behaviour or may spend money indiscriminately, acts that later cause them to feel guilt, shame, and desperation.
 Other mental illnesses, while not always debilitating, create certain problems in living. People with personality disorders may experience loneliness and isolation because their personality style interferes with social relations. People with an eating disorder may become so preoccupied with their weight and appearance that they force themselves to vomit or refuse to eat. Individuals who develop post-traumatic stress disorder may become angry easily, experience disturbing memories, and have trouble concentrating.
 Experiences of mental illness often differ to be unlike or distinct in nature as it depends on one’s culture or social group, sometimes greatly so. For example, in most of the non-Western world, people with depression complain principally of physical ailments, such as lack of energy, poor sleep, loss of appetite, and various kinds of physical pain. And yet, even in North America these complaints are commonplace. But in the United States and other Western societies, depressed people and mental health professionals who treat them tend to emphasize psychological problems, such as feelings of sadness, worthlessness, and despair. The experience of schizophrenia also differs by culture. In India, one-third of the new cases of schizophrenia involve catatonia, a behavioural condition in which a person maintains a bizarre statue-like posture for hours or days. This condition is rare in Europe and North America.
 Schizophrenia, is a very severe mental illness characterized by a variety of symptoms, including loss of contact with reality, bizarre behaviour, disorganized thinking and speech, decreased emotional expressiveness, and social withdrawal. Usually only some of these symptoms occur in any one person. The term schizophrenia comes from Greek words meaning ‘split mind.’ However, contrary to common belief, schizophrenia does not refer to a person with a split personality or multiple personality. For a description of a mental illness in which a person has multiple personalities, to observers, schizophrenia may seem like madness or insanity, but persons with schizophrenia have disturbed, frightening thoughts and may have trouble telling the difference between real and unreal experiences.
 Perhaps more than any other mental illness, schizophrenia has a debilitating effect on the lives of the people who suffer from it. A person with schizophrenia may have difficulty telling the difference between real and unreal experiences, logical and illogical thoughts, or appropriate and inappropriate behavioural interactions whose appropriations are to  express of the  objectifying descriptions upon the cases to act of having or having to carry of a definite direction, resisting  upon those forms that exploit the contribution in weights of others, or sustain without the adequate issues for which exists or going together without conflict or incongruity, which are accorded to the agreeing conditions, that are disinherently limited. Schizophrenia seriously impairs a person’s ability to work, go to school, enjoy relationships with others, or take care of oneself. In addition, people with schizophrenia frequently require hospitalization because they pose a danger to themselves. About 10 percent of people with schizophrenia commit suicide, and many others attempt suicide. Once people develop schizophrenia, they usually suffer from the illness for the rest of their lives. Although there is no cure, treatment can help many people with schizophrenia lead productive lives.
 Schizophrenia also carries an enormous cost to society. People with schizophrenia occupy about one-third of all beds in psychiatric hospitals in the United States. In addition, people with schizophrenia account for at least 10 percent of the homeless population in the United States. The National Institute of Mental Health has estimated that schizophrenia costs the United States tens of billions of dollars each year in direct treatment, social services, and lost productivity.
 Approximately 1 percent of people develop schizophrenia at some time during their lives. Experts estimate that about 1.8 million people in the United States have schizophrenia. The prevalence of schizophrenia is rather being one than another or more, regardless of sex, race, and culture. Although women are just as likely as men to develop schizophrenia, women tend to experience the illness to a lesser extent than is severely, with fewer hospitalizations and better social functioning in the community.
 Schizophrenia usually develops in late adolescence or early adulthood, between the ages of 15 and 30. Much less common, schizophrenia develops later in life. The illness may begin abruptly, but it usually develops slowly over months or years. Mental health professionals diagnose schizophrenia based on an interview with the patient in which they determine whether the person has experienced specific symptoms of the illness.
 Symptoms and functioning in people with schizophrenia tend to vary over time, sometimes worsening and other times improving. For many patients the symptoms gradually become less severe as they grow older. About 25 percent of people with schizophrenia become symptom-free later in their lives.
 A variety of symptoms characterize schizophrenia. The most prominent include symptoms of psychosis - such as delusions and hallucinations - as well as bizarre behaviour, strange movements, and disorganized thinking and speech. Many people with schizophrenia do not recognize that their mental functioning is disturbed.
 Delusions are false beliefs that appear obviously untrue to other people. For example, a person with schizophrenia may believe that he is the king of England when he is not. People with schizophrenia may have delusions that others, such as the local police are plotting against them or spying on them. They may believe that aliens are controlling their thoughts or that their own thoughts are being broadcast to the world so that other people can hear them.
 People with schizophrenia may also experience hallucinations (false sensory perceptions). People with hallucinations see, hear, smell, feel, or taste things that are not really there. Auditory hallucinations, such as hearing voices when no one else is around, are especially common in schizophrenia. These hallucinations may include, in and around two or more voices conversing with other, voices that continually comment on the person’s life, or voices that command the person to do something.
 People with schizophrenia often behave bizarrely. They may talk to themselves, walk backward, laugh suddenly without explanation, make funny faces, or masturbate in public. In rare cases, they maintain a rigid, bizarre pose for hours on end. Alternately, they may engage in constant random or repetitive movement, such that the actions justified, the dynamical situation has proven current to the motional services in moderation that include the primary presence of its operateness.
 People with schizophrenia sometimes talk in incoherent or nonsensical ways, which may commonly suggest of an impounding distinction the impact to cause confused or disorganized thinking? In conversation they may eradicably jump from subject to subject or string together loosely associated phrases. They may combine words and phrases in meaningless ways or make up new words. In addition, they may show poverty of speech, in which they talk less and more slowly than other people, fail to answer questions or reply only briefly, or suddenly stop talking in the middle of speech.
 Another common characteristic of schizophrenia is social withdrawal. People with schizophrenia may avoid others or act as though others do not exist. They often show decreased emotional expressiveness. For example, they may talk in a low, monotonous voice, avoid eye contact with others, and display a blank facial expression. They may also have difficulties experiencing pleasure and may lack interest in participating in activities.
 Other symptoms of schizophrenia include difficulties with memory, attention span, abstract thinking, and planning ahead. People with schizophrenia commonly have problems with anxiety, depression, and suicidal thoughts. In addition, people with schizophrenia are much more likely to abuse or become dependent upon drugs or alcohol than other people. The use of alcohol and drugs often worsens the symptoms of schizophrenia, resulting in relapses and hospitalizations.
 Schizophrenia appears to result not from a single cause, but from a variety of factors. Most scientists believe that schizophrenia is a biological disease caused by genetic factors, an imbalance of chemicals in the brain, structural brain abnormalities, or abnormalities in the prenatal environment. In addition, stressful life events may contribute to the development of schizophrenia in those who are predisposed to the illness.
 Some evidence suggests that schizophrenia may result from an imbalance of chemicals in the brain called ‘neurotransmitters’. These chemicals enable neurons (brain cells) to communicate with other. Some scientists suggest that schizophrenia result from excess activity of the neurotransmitter dopamine in certain parts of the brain or from an abnormal sensitivity to dopamine. Support for this hypothesis comes from Antipsychotic drugs, which reduce psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia by blocking brain receptors for dopamine. In addition, amphetamines, which increase dopamine activity, intensify psychotic symptoms in people with schizophrenia. Despite these findings, many experts believe that excess dopamine activity alone cannot account for schizophrenia. Other neurotransmitters, such as serotonin and norepinephrine, may play important roles as well.
 Brain imaging techniques, such as ‘magnetic resonance’ imaging and ‘positron-emission tomography’, have led researchers to discover specific structural abnormalities in the brains of people with schizophrenia. For example, people with chronic schizophrenia tend to have enlarged brain ventricles (cavities in the brain that contains cerebrospinal fluid). They also have a smaller overall volume of brain tissue compared to mentally healthy people. Other people with schizophrenia show abnormally low activity in the frontal lobe of the brain, which governs abstract thought, planning, and judgment. Research has identified possible abnormalities in many other parts of the brain, including the temporal lobes, basal ganglia, thalamus, hippocampus, and superior temporal gyrus. These defects may partially explain the abnormal thoughts, perceptions, and behaviours that characterize schizophrenia.
 Evidence suggests those factors in the prenatal environment and during birth can increase the risk of a person later developing schizophrenia. These events are believed to affect the brain development of the fetus during a critical period. For example, pregnant women who have been exposed to the influenza virus or who have poor nutrition have a slightly increased chance of giving birth to a child who later develops schizophrenia. In addition, obstetric complications during the birth of a child - for example, delivery with forceps - can slightly increase the chances of the child later developing schizophrenia.
 Although scientists favour a biological cause of schizophrenia, stress in the environment may affect the onset and course of the illness. Stressful life circumstances - such as growing up and living in poverty, the death of a loved one, an important change in jobs or relationships, or chronic tension and hostility at home - can increase the chances of schizophrenia in a person biologically predisposed to the disease. In addition, stressful events can trigger a relapse of symptoms in a person who already has the illness. Individuals who have effective skills for managing stress may be less susceptible to its negative effects. Psychological and social rehabilitation can help patients develop more effective skills for dealing with stress.
 Although there is no cure for schizophrenia, effective treatment exists that can improve the long-term course of the illness. With many years of treatment and rehabilitation, significant numbers of people with schizophrenia experience partial or full remission of their symptoms.
 Treatment of schizophrenia usually involves a combination of medication, rehabilitation, and treatment of other problems the person may have. Antipsychotic drugs (also called ‘neuroleptics’) are the most frequently used medications for treatment of schizophrenia. Psychological and social rehabilitation programs may help people with schizophrenia function in the community and reduce stress related to their symptoms. Treatment of secondary problems, such as substance abuse and infectious diseases, is also an important part of an overall treatment program.
 Serotonin, neurotransmitter, or chemical that transmits messages across the synapses, or gaps, between adjacent cells, in among the many functions, serotonin is released from blood cells called platelets to activate blood vessel constriction and blood clotting. In the gastrointestinal tract, serotonin inhibits gastric acid production and stimulates muscle contraction in the intestinal wall. Its functions in the central nervous system and effects on human behaviour - including mood, memory, and appetite control - have been the subject of a great deal of research. This intensive study of serotonin has revealed important knowledge about the serotonin-related cause and treatment of many illnesses.
 Serotonin is produced in the brain from the amino acid tryptophan, which is derived from foods high in protein, such as meat and dairy products. Tryptophan is transported to the brain, where it is broken down by enzymes to produce serotonin. In the process of neurotransmission, serotonin is transferred from one nerve cell, or neuron, to another, triggering an electrical impulse that stimulates or inhibits cell activity as needed. Serotonin is then reabsorbed by the first neuron, in a process known as reuptake, where it is recycled and used again or converted into an inactive chemical form and excreted.
 While the complete picture of serotonin’s function in the body is still being investigated, many disorders are known to be associated with an imbalance of serotonin in the brain. Drugs that manipulate serotonin levels have been used to alleviate the symptoms of serotonin imbalances. Some of these drugs, known as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), block or inhibit the reuptake of serotonin into neurons, enabling serotonin to remain active in the synapses for a longer period of time. These medications are used to treat such psychiatric disorders as depression; obsessive-compulsive disorder, in which repetitive and disturbing thoughts trigger bizarre, ritualistic behaviours; and impulsive aggressive behaviours. Fluoxetine (more commonly known by the brand name Prozac), is a widely prescribed SSRI used to treat depression, and more recently, obsessive-compulsive disorder.
 Drugs that affect serotonin levels may prove beneficial in the treatment of nonpsychiatric disorders as well, including diabetic neuropathy (degeneration of nerves outside the central nervous system in diabetics) and premenstrual syndrome. Recently the serotonin-releasing agent dexfenfluramine has been approved for patients who are 30 percent or more over their ideal body weight. By preventing serotonin reuptake, dexfenfluramine promotes satiety, or fullness, after eating less food.
 Other drugs serve as agonists that react with neurons to produce effects similar to those of serotonin. Serotonin agonists have been used to treat migraine headaches, in which low levels of serotonin cause arteries in the brain to swell, resulting in a headache. Sumatriptan is an agonist drug that mimics the effects of serotonin in the brain, constricting blood vessels and alleviating pain.
 Drugs known as ‘antagonists’ bind with neurons to prevent serotonin neurotransmission. Some antagonists have been found effective in treating the nausea that typically accompanies radiation and chemotherapy in cancer treatment. Antagonists are also being tested to treat high blood pressure and other cardiovascular disorders by blocking serotonin’s ability to constrict blood vessels. Other antagonists may produce an effect on learning and memory in age-associated memory impairment.
 Antipsychotic medications, developed in the mid-1950's, can dramatically improve the quality of life for people with schizophrenia. The drugs reduce or eliminate psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions. The medications can also help prevent these symptoms from returning. Common Antipsychotic drugs include risperidone (Risperdal), olanzapine (Zyprexa), clozapine (Clozaril), quetiapine (Seroquel), haloperidol (Haldol), thioridazine (Mellaril), chlorpromazine (Thorazine), fluphenazine (Prolixin), and trifluoperazine (Stelazine). People with schizophrenia usually must take medication for the rest of their lives to control psychotic symptoms. Antipsychotic medications appear to be less effective at treating other symptoms of schizophrenia, such as social withdrawal and apathy.
 Mood disorders, also called ‘affective disorders’, create disturbances in a person’s emotional life. Depression, mania, and bipolar disorder are examples of mood disorders. Symptoms of depression may include feelings of sadness, hopelessness, and worthlessness, as well as complaints of physical pain and changes in appetite, sleep patterns, and energy level. In mania, on the other hand, an individual experiences an abnormally elevated mood, often marked by exaggerated self-importance, irritability, agitation, and a decreased need for sleep. In bipolar disorder, also called manic-depressive illness, a person’s mood alternates between extremes of mania and depression.
 Bipolar disorder is a mental illness that causes mood swings. In the manic phase, a person might feel ecstatic, self-important, and energetic. But when the person becomes depressed, the mood shifts to extreme sadness, negative thinking, and apathy. Some studies indicate that the disease occurs at unusually high rates in creative people, such as artists, writers, and musicians. But some researchers contend that the methodology of these studies was flawed and their results were misleading. In the October 1996 Discover Magazine article, anthropologist Jo Ann C. Gutin presents the results of several studies that explore the link between creativity and mental illness.
 Freud created an entirely new approach to the understanding of human personality by his demonstration of the existence and force of the unconscious. In addition, he founded a new medical discipline and formulated basic therapeutic procedures that in modified form are applied widely in the present-day treatment of neuroses and psychoses. Although never accorded full recognition during his lifetime, Freud is generally acknowledged as one of the great creative minds of modern times.
 Among his other works are Totem and Taboo (1913), Ego and the Id (1923), New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933), and Moses and Monotheism (1939).
 The ego, the term occurring in psychoanalysis, that designates its term as denoting the central part of the personality structure that deals with reality and is influenced by social forces. According to the psychoanalytic theories developed by Sigmund Freud, the ego constitutes one of the three basic provinces of the mind, the other two, being the id and the superego. Formation of the ego begins at birth in the first encounters with the external world of people and things. The ego learns to modify behaviour by controlling those impulses that are socially unacceptable. Its role is that of a mediator between unconscious impulses and acquired social and personal standards.
 In philosophy, ego means the conscious self or ‘I.’ It was viewed by some philosophers, notably the 17th-century Frenchman René Descartes and the 18th-century German Johann Gottlieb Fichte, as the sole basis of reality; they saw the universe as existing only in the individual's knowledge and experience of it. Other philosophers, such as the 18th-century German Immanuel Kant, proposed two forms of the ego, one perceiving and the other thinking.
 As well, the term Id was oriented into psychoanalytic theory, one of the three basic elements of personality, the others being the ego and the superego. The id can be equated with the unconscious of common usage, which is the reservoir of the instinctual drives of the individual, including biological urges, wishes, and affective motives. The id is dominated by the pleasure principle, through which the individual is pressed for immediate gratification of his or her desires. In strict Freudian theory the energy behind the instinctual drives of the id is known as the libido, a generalized force, basically sexual in nature, through which the sexual and psychosexual nature of the individual finds expression.
 Also, the Superego, in psychoanalytic theory is one of the three basic and most fundamental constituents of the mind, the others being the id and the ego. As postulated by Sigmund Freud, the term designates the element of the mind that, in normal personalities, automatically modifies and inhibits those instinctual impulses or drives of the id that tend to produce antisocial actions and thoughts.
 According to psychoanalytic theory, the superego develops as the child gradually and unconsciously adopts the values and standards, first of his or her parents, and later of the social environment. According to modern Freudian psychoanalysts, the superego includes the positive ego, or conscious self-image, or ego ideal, that each individual develops.
 Psychoanalysis, is the name applied to a specific method of investigating unconscious mental processes and to a form of psychotherapy. The term refers, as well, to the systematic structure of psychoanalytic theory, which is based on the relation of conscious and unconscious psychological processes.
 The techniques of psychoanalysis and much of the psychoanalytic theory based on its application were developed by Sigmund Freud. His work concerning the structure and the functioning of the human mind had influential significance, both practically and scientifically, and it continues to influence contemporary thought.
 Of Freud’s three basic personality structures - id, ego, and superego - only the id is totally unconscious. The first of Freud's innovations was his recognition of unconscious psychiatric processes that follow laws different from those that govern conscious experience. Under the influence of the unconscious, thoughts and feelings that belong together may be shifted or displaced out of context; two disparate ideas or images may be condensed into one; thoughts may be dramatized in the form of images rather than expressed as abstract concepts; and certain objects may be represented symbolically by images of other objects, although the resemblance between the symbol and the original object may be vague or farfetched. The laws of logic, indispensable for conscious thinking, do not apply to these unconscious mental productions.
 Recognition of these modes of operation in unconscious mental processes made possibly the understanding of such previously incomprehensible psychological phenomena as dreaming. Through analysis of unconscious processes, Freud saw dreams as serving to protect sleep against disturbing impulses arising from within and related to early life experiences. Thus, unacceptable impulses and thoughts, called the latent dream content, are transformed into a conscious, although no longer immediately comprehensible, experience called the manifest dream. Knowledge of these unconscious mechanisms permits the analyst to reverse the so-called dream work, that is, the process by which the latent dream is transformed into the manifest dream, and through dream interpretation, to recognize its underlying meaning.
 A basic assumption of Freudian theory is that the unconscious conflicts involve instinctual impulses, or drives, that originate in childhood. As these unconscious conflicts are recognized by the patient through analysis, his or her adult mind can find solutions that were unattainable to the immature mind of the child. This depiction of the role of instinctual drives in human life is a unique feature of Freudian theory.
 According to Freud's doctrine of infantile sexuality, adult sexuality is an end-product of a complex process of development, beginning in childhood, involving a variety of body functions or areas (oral, anal, and genital zones), and corresponding to various stages in the relation of the child to adults, especially to parents. This distinguishes the oedipus Complex, in psychoanalysis, a son’s largely unconscious sexual attraction toward his mother accompanied by jealousy toward his father. The terminological distinction of the oedipus complex, derived from the Greek legend of Oedipus, was first used in the late 1800's by Austrian psychiatrist Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis. Freud thought that the Oedipus complex was the most important event of a boy’s childhood and had a great effect on his subsequent adult life. Freud claimed that in nearly all cases the boy represses the desire for his mother and the jealousy toward his father. As a result of this unconscious experience, Freud believed, a boy with an Oedipus complex feels guilt and experiences strong emotional conflicts. Freud thought that young women went through a similar experience, in which they are attracted to their father and surmount the disconfirming antagonistic attitude toward their mother. He called this the Electra complex. According to Freud, if a woman remains under the influence of the Electra complex, she is likely to choose a husband with characteristics similar to those of her father.
 Of crucial importance is the so-called Oedipal period, occurring at about four to six years of age, because at this stage of development the child for the first time becomes capable of an emotional attachment to the parent of the opposite sex that is similar to the adult's relationship to a mate; the child simultaneously reacts as a rival to the parent of the same sex. Physical immaturity dooms the child's desires to frustration and his or her first step toward adulthood to failure. Intellectual immaturity further complicates the situation because it makes children afraid of their own fantasies. The extent to which the child overcomes these emotional upheavals and to which these attachments, fears, and fantasies continue to live on in the unconscious greatly influences later life, especially ‘loves’ relationships.
 The conflicts occurring in the earlier developmental stages are no less significant as a formative influence, because these problems represent the earliest prototypes of such basic human situations as dependency on others and relationship to authority. Also, basic in moulding the personality of the individual is the behaviour of the parents toward the child during these stages of development. The fact that the child reacts, not only to objective reality, but also to fantasy distortions of reality, however, greatly complicates even the best-intentioned educational efforts.
 The effort to clarify the bewildering number of interrelated observations uncovered by psychoanalytic exploration led to the development of a model of the structure of the psychic system. Three functional systems are distinguished that are conveniently designated as the id, ego, and superego.
 The first system refers to the sexual and aggressive tendencies that arise from the body, as distinguished from the mind. Freud called these tendencies ‘Triebe’, which literally means ‘drives,’ but which is often inaccurately translated as ‘instincts’ to indicate their innate character. These inherent drives claim immediate satisfaction, which is experienced as pleasurable; the id thus is dominated by the pleasure principle. In his later writings, Freud tended more toward psychological rather than biological conceptualization of the drives.
 How the conditions for satisfaction are to be brought about is the task of the second system, the ego, which is the domain of such functions as perception, thinking, and motor control that can accurately assess environmental conditions. In order to fulfill its function of adaptation, or reality testing, the ego must be capable of enforcing the postponement of satisfaction of the instinctual impulses originating in the id. To defend itself against unacceptable impulses, the ego develops specific psychic means, known as defence mechanisms. These include repression, the exclusion of impulses from conscious awareness; projection, the process of ascribing to others one's own unacknowledged desires; and reaction formation, the establishments of a pattern of behaviour directly opposed to a strong unconscious imperative necessarily in need for or required to employ of its relief. Such defence mechanisms are put into operation whenever anxiety signals a danger that the original unacceptable impulses may reemerge.
 An id impulse becomes unacceptable, not only as a result of a temporary need for postponing its satisfaction until suitable reality conditions can be found, but more often because of a prohibition imposed on the individual by others, originally the parents. The totality of these demands and prohibitions constitutes the major content of the third system, the superego, the function of which is to control the ego in accordance with the internalized standards of parental figures. If the demands of the superego are not fulfilled, the person may feel shame or guilt. Because the superego, in Freudian theory, originates in the struggle to overcome the Oedipal conflict, it has a power akin to an instinctual drive, is in part unconscious, and can give rise to feelings of guilt not justified by any conscious transgression. The ego, having to mediate among the demands of the id, the superego, and the outside world, may not be strong enough to reconcile these conflicting forces. The more the ego is impeded in its development because of being enmeshed in its earlier conflicts, called fixations or complexes, or the more it reverts to earlier satisfactions and archaic modes of functioning, known as regression, the greater is the likelihood of succumbing to these pressures. Unable to function normally, it can maintain its limited control and integrity only at the price of symptom formation, in which the tensions are expressed in neurotic symptoms.
 A cornerstone of modern psychoanalytic theory and practice is the concept of anxiety, which institutes appropriate mechanisms of defence against certain danger situations. These danger situations, as described by Freud, are the fear of abandonment by or the loss of the loved one (the object), the risk of losing the object's love, the danger of retaliation and punishment, and, finally, the hazard of reproach by the superego. Thus, symptom formation, character and impulse disorders, and perversions, as well as sublimations, represent compromise formations - different forms of an adaptive integration that the ego tries to achieve through more or less successfully reconciling the different conflicting forces in the mind.
 Various psychoanalytic schools have adopted other names for their doctrines to indicate deviations from Freudian theory.
 Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung began his studies of human motivation in the early 1900's and created the school of psychoanalysis known as analytical psychology. A contemporary of Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud, Jung at first collaborated closely with Freud but eventually moved on to pursue his own theories, including the exploration of personality types. According to Jung, there are two basic personality types, extroverted and introverted, which alternate equally in the completely normal individual. Jung also believed that the unconscious mind is formed by the personal unconscious (the repressed feelings and thoughts developed during an individual’s life) and the collective unconscious (those feelings, thoughts, and memories shared by all humanity).
 Carl Gustav Jung, one of the earliest pupils of Freud, eventually created a school that he preferred to call analytical psychology. Like Freud, Jung used the concept of the libido; however, to him it meant not only sexual drives, but a composite of all creative instincts and impulses and the entire motivating force of human conduct. According to his theories, the unconscious is composed of two parts, as the personal unconscious, which contains the results of the individual's entire experience, and the collective unconscious, the reservoir of the experience of the human race. In the collective unconscious exist a number of primordial images, or archetypes, common to all individuals of a given country or historical era. Archetypes take the form of bits of intuitive knowledge or apprehension and normally exist only in the collective unconscious of the individual. When the conscious mind contains no images, however, as in sleep, or when the consciousness is caught off guard, the archetypes commence to function. Archetypes are primitive modes of thought and tend to personify natural processes in terms of such mythological concepts as good and evil spirits, fairies, and dragons. The mother and the father also serve as prominent archetypes.
 An important concept in Jung's theory is the existence of two basically different types of personality, mental attitude, and function. When the libido and the individual's general interest are turned outward toward people and objects of the external world, he or she is said to be extroverted. When the reverse is true, and libido and interest are centred on the individual, he or she is said to be introverted. In a completely normal individual these two tendencies alternate, dominating, but usually the libido is directed mainly neither in one direction nor of the other; as a result, two personality types are recognizable.
 The Jungian concepts in the term ‘complex’, was an acceptable group of repressed ideas that shape an individual’s response to think, feel, and act in a certain habitual pattern. Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung, who originally coined the term complex, derived it from the Latin word complexus, meaning interweaving or braiding. Jung stated that a complex is a ‘grouping of psychic elements about emotionally toned contents,’ adding that it ‘consists of a nuclear element and a great number of secondarily constellated associations.’ The components of a complex may be present in consciousness or in the unconscious. Conflicts, frustrations, and threats to personal security encountered during infancy are then repressed into the unconscious, where they remain dormant, but not forgotten. These unconscious memories will govern an individual’s response to emotional conflict even into adult life, as the original trauma and its associated effect patterns thinking and behaviour to meet the new conflict.
 The Oedipus and Electra complexes as described by Sigmund Freud, and the inferiority complex as described by Alfred Adler, have been influential concepts within the context of psychoanalytic theory
 Jung rejected Freud's distinction between the ego and superego and recognized a portion of the personality, somewhat similar to the superego, that he called the persona. The persona consists of what a person appears to be to others, in contrast to what he or she actually is. The persona is the role the individual chooses to play in life, the total impression he or she wishes to make on the outside world.
 Austrian psychologist and psychiatrist Alfred Adler, after leaving the university he studied and was associated with Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis. In 1911 Adler left the orthodox psychoanalytic school to found a neo-Freudian school of psychoanalysis. After 1926 he was a visiting professor at Columbia University, and in 1935 he and his family moved to the United States.
 In his analysis of individual development, Adler stressed the sense of inferiority, rather than sexual drives, as the motivating force in human life. According to Adler, conscious or subconscious feelings of inferiority (to which he gave the name inferiority complex), combined with compensatory defence mechanisms, is the basic cause of psychopathological behaviour. The function of the psychoanalyst, furthermore, is to discover and rationalize such feelings and break down the compensatory, neurotic will for power that they engender in the patient. Adler's works include ‘The Theory and Practice of Individual Psychology’ (1918) and ‘The Pattern of Life’ (1930).
 Adler’s analysis of individual development stressed the sense of inferiority, rather than sexual drives, as the motivating force in human life. According to Adler, conscious or subconscious feelings of inferiority (to which he gave the name inferiority complex), combined with compensatory defence mechanisms, is the basic cause of psychopathological behaviour. The function of the psychoanalyst, furthermore, is to discover and rationalize such feelings and break down the compensatory, neurotic will for power that they engender in the patient. Adler's works include ‘The Theory and Practice of Individual Psychology’ (1918) and ‘The Pattern of Life’ (1930).
 Alfred Adler, another of Freud's pupils, differed from both Freud and Jung in stressing that the motivating force in human life is the sense of inferiority, which begins as soon as an infant is able to comprehend the existence of other people who are better able to care for themselves and cope with their environment. From the moment the feeling of inferiority is established, the child strives to overcome it. Because inferiority is intolerable, the compensatory mechanisms set up by the mind may get out of hand, resulting in self-centred neurotic attitudes, overcompensations, and a retreat from the real world and its problems.
 Adler laid particular stress on inferiority feelings arising from what he regarded as the three most important relationships: those between the individual and work, friends, and loved ones. The avoidance of inferiority feelings in these relationships leads the individual to adopt a life goal that is often not realistic and is frequently expressed as an unreasoning will to power and to all others are influenced by the dominant ascendancy leading to every type of antisocial behaviour from bullying and boasting to political tyranny. Adler believed that analysis can foster a sane and rational ‘community feeling’ that is constructive rather than destructive.
 Austrian psychologist and psychotherapist Otto Rank worked with Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, before developing his own theories about mental and emotional disorders. Rank believed that an individual’s neurotic tendencies could be linked to the traumatic experience of birth.
 Another student of Freud, Dr. Otto Rank, introduced a new theory of neurosis, attributing all neurotic disturbances to the primary trauma of birth. In his later writings he described individual development as a progression from complete dependence on the mother and family, to a physical independence coupled with intellectual dependence on society, and finally to complete intellectual and psychological emancipation. Rank also laid great importance on the will, defined as ‘a positive guiding organization and integration of self, implementing its use in the constant critical creativites as well as that it inhabits and controls the instinctual drives.’
 American psychoanalyst and social philosopher Erich Fromm stressed the importance of social and economic factors on human behaviour. His focus was a departure from a traditional psychoanalysis, which emphasized the role of the subconscious. In the 1969 essay for Collier’s Year Book, Fromm presents various explanations for human violence. He argues that violence cannot be controlled by imposing stronger legal penalties, but rather by creating a more just society in which people connect with other as humans and are able to control their own lives.
 Later noteworthy modifications of psychoanalytic theory include those of the American psychoanalyst’s Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, and Harry Stack Sullivan. The theories of Fromm lay particular emphasis on the concept that society and the individual is not separate and opposing forces, that the nature of society is determined by its historic background, and that the needs and desires of individuals are largely formed by their society. As a result, Fromm believed, the fundamental problem of psychoanalysis and psychology is not to resolve conflicts between fixed and unchanging instinctive drives in the individual and the fixed demands and laws of society, but to bring about harmony and an understanding of the relationship between the individual and society. Fromm also stressed the importance to the individual of developing the ability to fully use his or her mental, emotional, and sensory powers.
 Horney worked primarily in the field of therapy and the nature of neuroses, which she defined as of two types: situation neuroses and character neuroses. Situation neuroses arise from the anxiety attendant on a single conflict, such for being faced with a difficult decision. Although they may paralyse the individual temporarily, making it impossible to think or act efficiently, such neuroses are not deeply rooted. Character neuroses are characterized by a basic anxiety and a basic hostility resulting from a lack of love and affection in childhood.
 Sullivan believed that all development can be described exclusively in terms of interpersonal relations. Character types as well as neurotic symptoms are explained as results of the struggle against anxiety arising from the individual's relations with others, including security measures of which a system is maintained for the purpose of allaying anxiety.
 An important school of thought is based on the teachings of the British psychoanalyst Melanie Klein. Because most of Klein's followers worked with her in England, this has come to be known as the English school. Its influence, nevertheless, is very strong throughout the European continent and in South America. Its principal theories were derived from observations made in the psychoanalysis of children. Klein posited the existence of complex unconscious fantasies in children under the age of six months. The principal source of anxiety arises from the threat to existence posed by the death instinct. Depending on how concrete representations of the destructive forces are dealt within the unconscious fantasy life of the child, two basic early mental attitudes result that Klein characterized as a ‘depressive position’ and a ‘paranoid position.’ In the paranoid position, the ego's defence consists of projecting the dangerous internal object onto some external representative, which is treated as a genuine threat emanating from the external world. In the depressive position, the threatening object is introjected and treated in fantasy as concretely retained within the person. Depressive and hypochondriacal symptoms result. Although considerable doubt exists that such complex unconscious fantasies operate in the minds of infants, these observations have been of the utmost importance to the psychology of unconscious fantasies, paranoid delusions, and theory concerning early object relations.
 Scottish physician William Cullen coined the term neurosis near the end of the 18th century to describe a wide variety of nervous behaviours with no apparent physical cause. Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud and his followers popularized the word in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Freud defined neurosis as one class of mental illnesses. In his view, people became neurotic when their conscious mind repressed inappropriate fantasies of the unconscious mind.
 Until 1980 neuroses appeared as a specific diagnostic category in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, a handbook for mental health professionals. Neurosis encompassed a variety of mental illnesses, including Dissociative disorders, anxiety disorders, and phobias.
 In the psychoanalytic model, neurosis differs from a psychosis, another general term used to describe mental illnesses. Individuals with neuroses can function at work and in social situations, whereas people with psychoses find it quite difficult to function adequately. People with neuroses do not grossly distort or misinterpret reality as those with psychoses do. In addition, neurotic individuals recognize that their mental functioning is disturbed while psychotic individuals usually do not. Most mental health professionals now use the term psychosis to refer to symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions, and bizarre behaviour.
 Psychosis, the mental illness in which a person loses contact with reality and has difficulty functioning in daily life. Psychotic symptoms can indicate severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (manic-depressive illness). Unlike people with fewer severe psychological problems, psychotic individuals do not usually recognize that their mental functioning is disturbed.
 Once, again, a psychosis, is categorized as a mental illness in which a person loses contact with reality and has difficulty functioning in daily life. Psychotic symptoms can indicate severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (manic-depressive illness). Unlike people with fewer severe psychological problems, psychotic individuals do not usually recognize that their mental functioning is disturbed.
 Mental health professionals generally divide psychotic symptoms into three broad types: hallucinations, delusions, and bizarre behaviour. Hallucinations refer to hearing, seeing, smelling, feeling, or tasting something when nothing in the environment actually caused that sensation. For example, a person experiencing an auditory hallucination might hear a voice calling their name even though no one else is actually present. A delusion is a false belief held by a person that appears obviously untrue to other people in that person’s culture. For example, a man may believe that Martians have implanted a microchip in his brain that controls his thoughts. Bizarre behaviour refers to behaviour in a person that is strange or incomprehensible to others who know the person. For example, hoarding unused scraps of tin because of their ‘magical properties’ would be a type of bizarre behaviour.
 In philosophy, ego means the conscious self or ‘I.’ It was viewed by some philosophers, notably the 17th-century Frenchman René Descartes and the 18th-century German Johann Gottlieb Fichte, as the sole basis of reality; they saw the universe as existing only in the individual's knowledge and experience of it. Other philosophers, such as the 18th-century German Immanuel Kant, proposed two forms of the ego, one perceiving and the other thinking.
 As well, the term id was oriented into psychoanalytic theory, one of the three basic elements of personality, the others being the ego and the super-ego. The id can be equated with the unconscious of common usage, which is the reservoir of the instinctual drives of the individual, including biological urges, wishes, and affective motives. The id is dominated by the pleasure principle, through which the individual is pressed for immediate gratification of his or her desires. In strict Freudian theory the energy behind the instinctual drives of the id is known as the libido, a generalized force, basically sexual in nature, through which the sexual and psychosexual nature of the individual finds expression.
 Also, the Super-ego, in psychoanalytic theory is one of the three basic and most fundamental constituents of the mind, the others being the id and the ego. As postulated by Sigmund Freud, the term designates the element of the mind that, in normal personalities, automatically modifies and inhibits those instinctual impulses or drives of the id that tend to produce antisocial actions and thoughts.
 According to psychoanalytic theory, the super-ego develops as the child gradually and unconsciously adopts the values and standards, first of his or her parents, and later of the social environment. According to modern Freudian psychoanalysts, the super-ego includes the positive ego, or conscious self-image, or ego ideal, that each individual develops.
 Psychoanalysis, is the name applied to a specific method of investigating unconscious mental processes and to a form of psychotherapy. The term refers, as well, to the systematic structure of psychoanalytic theory, which is based on the relation of conscious and unconscious psychological processes.
 The techniques of psychoanalysis and much of the psychoanalytic theory based on its application were developed by Sigmund Freud. His work concerning the structure and the functioning of the human mind had far-reaching significance, both practically and scientifically, and it continues to influence contemporary thought.
 Of Freud’s three basic personality structures - id, ego, and super-ego - only the id is totally unconscious. The first of Freud's innovations was his recognition of unconscious psychiatric processes that follow laws different from those that govern conscious experience. Under the influence of the unconscious, thoughts and feelings that belong together may be shifted or displaced out of context; two disparate ideas or images may be condensed into one; thoughts may be dramatized in the form of images rather than expressed as abstract concepts; and certain objects may be represented symbolically by images of other objects, although the resemblance between the symbol and the original object may be vague or farfetched. The laws of logic, indispensable for conscious thinking, do not apply to these unconscious mental productions.
 Recognition of these modes of operation in unconscious mental processes made possibly the understanding of such previously incomprehensible psychological phenomena as dreaming. Through analysis of unconscious processes, Freud saw dreams as serving to protect sleep against disturbing impulses arising from within and related to early life experiences. Thus, unacceptable impulses and thoughts, called the latent dream content, are transformed into a conscious, although no longer immediately comprehensible, experience called the manifest dream. Knowledge of these unconscious mechanisms permits the analyst to reverse the so-called dream work, that is, the process by which the latent dream is transformed into the manifest dream, and through dream interpretation, to recognize its underlying meaning.
 A basic assumption of Freudian theory is that the unconscious conflicts involve instinctual impulses, or drives, that originate in childhood. As these unconscious conflicts are recognized by the patient through analysis, his or her adult mind can find solutions that were unattainable to the immature mind of the child. This depiction of the role of instinctual drives in human life is a unique feature of Freudian theory.
 According to Freudian doctrine of infantile sexuality, adult sexuality is an end-product of a complex process of development, beginning in childhood, involving a variety of body functions or areas (oral, anal, and genital zones), and corresponding to various stages in the relation of the child to adults, especially to parents. This distinguishes the oedipus Complex, in psychoanalysis, a son’s largely unconscious sexual attraction toward his mother accompanied by jealousy toward his father. The terminological distinction of the oedipus complex, derived from the Greek legend of Oedipus, was first used in the late 1800's by Austrian psychiatrist Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis. Freud thought that the Oedipus complex was the most important event of a boy’s childhood and had a great effect on his subsequent adult life. Freud claimed that in nearly all cases the boy represses the desire for his mother and the jealousy toward his father. As a result of this unconscious experience, Freud believed, a boy with an Oedipus complex feels guilt and experiences strong emotional conflicts. Freud thought that girls go through a similar experience, in which they are attracted to their father and surmount the disconfirming antagonistic attitude toward their mother. He called this the Electra complex. According to Freud, if a woman remains under the influence of the Electra complex, she is likely to choose a husband with characteristics similar to those of her father.
 Of crucial importance is the so-called Oedipal period, occurring at about four to six years of age, because at this stage of development the child for the first time becomes capable of an emotional attachment to the parent of the opposite sex that is similar to the adult's relationship to a mate; the child simultaneously reacts as a rival to the parent of the same sex. Physical immaturity dooms the child's desires to frustration and his or her first step toward adulthood to failure. Intellectual immaturity further complicates the situation because it makes children afraid of their own fantasies. The extent to which the child overcomes these emotional upheavals and to which these attachments, fears, and fantasies continue to live on in the unconscious greatly influences later life, especially ‘loves’ relationships.
 The conflicts occurring in the earlier developmental stages are no less significant as a formative influence, because these problems represent the earliest prototypes of such basic human situations as dependency on others and relationship to authority. Also, basic in moulding the personality of the individual is the behaviour of the parents toward the child during these stages of development. The fact that the child reacts, not only to objective reality, but also to fantasy distortions of reality, however, greatly complicates even the best-intentioned educational efforts.
 The effort to clarify the bewildering number of interrelated observations uncovered by psychoanalytic exploration led to the development of a model of the structure of the psychic system. Three functional systems are distinguished that are conveniently designated as the id, ego, and super-ego.
 The first system refers to the sexual and aggressive tendencies that arise from the body, as distinguished from the mind. Freud called these tendencies ‘Triebe’ which literally means ‘drives,’ but which is often inaccurately translated as ‘instincts’ to indicate their innate character. These inherent drives claim immediate satisfaction, which is experienced as pleasurable; the id thus is dominated by the pleasure principle. In his later writings, Freud tended more toward psychological rather than biological conceptualization of the drives.
 How the conditions for satisfaction are to be brought about is the task of the second system, the ego, which is the domain of such functions as perception, thinking, and motor control that can accurately assess environmental conditions. In order to fulfill its function of adaptation, or reality testing, the ego must be capable of enforcing the postponement of satisfaction of the instinctual impulses originating in the id. To defend itself against unacceptable impulses, the ego develops specific psychic means, known as defence mechanisms. These include repression, the exclusion of impulses from conscious awareness; projection, the process of ascribing to others one's own unacknowledged desires; and reaction formation, the establishments of a pattern of behaviour directly opposed to a strong unconscious imperative necessarily in need for or required to employ of its relief. Such defence mechanisms are put into operation whenever anxiety signals a danger that the original unacceptable impulses may reemerge.
 An id impulse becomes unacceptable, not only as a result of a temporary need for postponing its satisfaction until suitable reality conditions can be found, but more often because of a prohibition imposed on the individual by others, originally the parents. The totality of these demands and prohibitions constitutes the major content of the third system, the super-ego, the function of which is to control the ego in accordance with the internalized standards of parental figures. If the demands of the super-ego are not fulfilled, the person may feel shame or guilt. Because the super-ego, in Freudian theory, originates in the struggle to overcome the Oedipal conflict, it has a power akin to an instinctual drive, is in part unconscious, and can give rise to feelings of guilt not justified by any conscious transgression. The ego, having to mediate among the demands of the id, the super-ego, and the outside world, may not be strong enough to reconcile these conflicting forces. The more the ego is impeded in its development because of being enmeshed in its earlier conflicts, called fixations or complexes, or the more it reverts to earlier satisfactions and archaic modes of functioning, known as regression, the greater is the likelihood of succumbing to these pressures. Unable to function normally, it can maintain its limited control and integrity only at the price of symptom formation, in which the tensions are expressed in neurotic symptoms.
 A cornerstone of modern psychoanalytic theory and practice is the concept of anxiety, which institutes appropriate mechanisms of defence against certain danger situations. These danger situations, as described by Freud, are the fear of abandonment by or the loss of the loved one (the object), the risk of losing the object's love, the danger of retaliation and punishment, and, finally, the hazard of reproach by the super-ego. Thus, symptom formation, character and impulse disorders, and perversions, as well as sublimations, represent compromise formations - different forms of an adaptive integration that the ego tries to achieve through more or less successfully reconciling the different conflicting forces in the mind.
 Various psychoanalytic schools have adopted other names for their doctrines to indicate deviations from Freudian theory.
 Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung began his studies of human motivation in the early 1900's and created the school of psychoanalysis known as analytical psychology. A contemporary of Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud, Jung at first collaborated closely with Freud but eventually moved on to pursue his own theories, including the exploration of personality types. According to Jung, there are two basic personality types, extroverted and introverted, which alternate equally in the completely normal individual. Jung also believed that the unconscious mind is formed by the personal unconscious (the repressed feelings and thoughts developed during an individual’s life) and the collective unconscious (those feelings, thoughts, and memories shared by all humanity).
 Carl Gustav Jung, one of the earliest pupils of Freud, eventually created a school that he preferred to call analytical psychology. Like Freud, Jung used the concept of the libido; however, to him it meant not only sexual drives, but a composite of all creative instincts and impulses and the entire motivating force of human conduct. According to his theories, the unconscious is composed of two parts, as the personal unconscious, which contains the results of the individual's entire experience, and the collective unconscious, the reservoir of the experience of the human race. In the collective unconscious exist a number of primordial images, or archetypes, common to all individuals of a given country or historical era. Archetypes take the form of bits of intuitive knowledge or apprehension and normally exist only in the collective unconscious of the individual. When the conscious mind contains no images, however, as in sleep, or when the consciousness is caught off guard, the archetypes commence to function. Archetypes are primitive modes of thought and tend to personify natural processes in terms of such mythological concepts as good and evil spirits, fairies, and dragons. The mother and the father also serve as prominent archetypes.
 An important concept in Jung's theory is the existence of two basically different types of personality, mental attitude, and function. When the libido and the individual's general interest are turned outward toward people and objects of the external world, he or she is said to be extroverted. When the reverse is true, and libido and interest are centred on the individual, he or she is said to be introverted. In a completely normal individual these two tendencies alternate, dominating, but usually the libido is directed mainly neither in one direction nor of the other; as a result, two personality types are recognizable.
 The Jungian concepts in the term ‘complex’, was an acceptable group of repressed ideas that shape an individual’s response to think, feel, and act in a certain habitual pattern. Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung, who originally coined the term complex, derived it from the Latin word complexus, meaning interweaving or braiding. Jung stated that a complex is a ‘grouping of psychic elements about emotionally toned contents,’ adding that it ‘consists of a nuclear element and a great number of secondarily constellated associations.’ The components of a complex may be present in consciousness or in the unconscious. Conflicts, frustrations, and threats to personal security encountered during infancy are then repressed into the unconscious, where they remain dormant, but not forgotten. These unconscious memories will govern an individual’s response to emotional conflict even into adult life, as the original trauma and its associated effect patterns thinking and behaviour to meet the new conflict.
 The Oedipus and Electra complexes as described by Sigmund Freud, and the inferiority complex as described by Alfred Adler, have been influential concepts within the context of psychoanalytic theory
 Jung rejected Freud's distinction between the ego and super-ego and recognized a portion of the personality, somewhat similar to the super-ego, that he called the persona. The persona consists of what a person appears to be to others, in contrast to what he or she actually is. The persona is the role the individual chooses to play in life, the total impression he or she wishes to make on the outside world.
 Austrian psychologist and psychiatrist Alfred Adler, after leaving the university he studied and was associated with Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis. In 1911 Adler left the orthodox psychoanalytic school to found a neo-Freudian school of psychoanalysis. After 1926 he was a visiting professor at Columbia University, and in 1935 he and his family moved to the United States.
 In his analysis of individual development, Adler stressed the sense of inferiority, rather than sexual drives, as the motivating force in human life. According to Adler, conscious or subconscious feelings of inferiority (to which he gave the name inferiority complex), combined with compensatory defence mechanisms, is the basic cause of psychopathological behaviour. The function of the psychoanalyst, furthermore, is to discover and rationalize such feelings and break down the compensatory, neurotic will for power that they engender in the patient. Adler's works include ‘The Theory and Practice of Individual Psychology’ (1918) and ‘The Pattern of Life’ (1930).
 Adler’s analysis of individual development stressed the sense of inferiority, rather than sexual drives, as the motivating force in human life. According to Adler, conscious or subconscious feelings of inferiority (to which he gave the name inferiority complex), combined with compensatory defence mechanisms, is the basic cause of psychopathological behaviour. The function of the psychoanalyst, furthermore, is to discover and rationalize such feelings and break down the compensatory, neurotic will for power that they engender in the patient. Adler's works include ‘The Theory and Practice of Individual Psychology’ (1918) and ‘The Pattern of Life’ (1930).
 Alfred Adler, another of Freud's pupils, differed from both Freud and Jung in stressing that the motivating force in human life is the sense of inferiority, which begins as soon as an infant is able to comprehend the existence of other people who are better able to care for themselves and cope with their environment. From the moment the feeling of inferiority is established, the child strives to overcome it. Because inferiority is intolerable, the compensatory mechanisms set up by the mind may get out of hand, resulting in self-centred neurotic attitudes, overcompensations, and a retreat from the real world and its problems.
 Adler laid particular stress on inferiority feelings arising from what he regarded as the three most important relationships: those between the individual and work, friends, and loved ones. The avoidance of inferiority feelings in these relationships leads the individual to adopt a life goal that is often not realistic and frequently is expressed as an unreasoning will to power and to all others are influenced by the dominant ascendancy leading to every type of antisocial behaviour from bullying and boasting to political tyranny. Adler believed that analysis can foster a sane and rational ‘community feeling’ that is constructive rather than destructive.
 Austrian psychologist and psychotherapist Otto Rank worked with Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, before developing his own theories about mental and emotional disorders. Rank believed that an individual’s neurotic tendencies could be linked to the traumatic experience of birth.
 Another student of Freud, Dr. Otto Rank, introduced a new theory of neurosis, attributing all neurotic disturbances to the primary trauma of birth. In his later writings he described individual development as a progression from complete dependence on the mother and family, to a physical independence coupled with intellectual dependence on society, and finally to complete intellectual and psychological emancipation. Rank also laid great importance on the will, defined as ‘a positive guiding organization and integration of self, implementing its use in the constant critical creativites as well as that it inhabits and controls the instinctual drives.’
 American psychoanalyst and social philosopher Erich Fromm stressed the importance of social and economic factors on human behaviour. His focus was a departure from a traditional psychoanalysis, which emphasized the role of the subconscious. In the 1969 essay for Collier’s Year Book, Fromm presents various explanations for human violence. He argues that violence cannot be controlled by imposing stronger legal penalties, but rather by creating a more just society in which people connect with other as humans and are able to control their own lives.
 Later noteworthy modifications of psychoanalytic theory include those of the American psychoanalyst’s Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, and Harry Stack Sullivan. The theories of Fromm lay particular emphasis on the concept that society and the individual is not separate and opposing forces, that the nature of society is determined by its historic background, and that the needs and desires of individuals are largely formed by their society. As a result, Fromm believed, the fundamental problem of psychoanalysis and psychology is not to resolve conflicts between fixed and unchanging instinctive drives in the individual and the fixed demands and laws of society, but to bring about harmony and an understanding of the relationship between the individual and society. Fromm also stressed the importance to the individual of developing the ability to fully use his or her mental, emotional, and sensory powers.
 Horney worked primarily in the field of therapy and the nature of neuroses, which she defined as of two types: situation neuroses and character neuroses. Situation neuroses arise from the anxiety attendant on a single conflict, such for being faced with a difficult decision. Although they may paralyse the individual temporarily, making it impossible to think or act efficiently, such neuroses are not deeply rooted. Character neuroses are characterized by a basic anxiety and a basic hostility resulting from a lack of love and affection in childhood.
 Sullivan believed that all development can be described exclusively in terms of interpersonal relations. Character types as well as neurotic symptoms are explained as results of the struggle against anxiety arising from the individual's relations with others, including security measures of which a system is maintained for the purpose of allaying anxiety.
 An important school of thought is based on the teachings of the British psychoanalyst Melanie Klein. Because most of Klein's followers worked with her in England, this has come to be known as the English school. Its influence, nevertheless, is very strong throughout the European continent and in South America. Its principal theories were derived from observations made in the psychoanalysis of children. Klein posited the existence of complex unconscious fantasies in children under the age of six months. The principal source of anxiety arises from the threat to existence posed by the death instinct. Depending on how concrete representations of the destructive forces are dealt within the unconscious fantasy life of the child, two basic early mental attitudes result that Klein characterized as a ‘depressive position’ and a ‘paranoid position.’ In the paranoid position, the ego's defence consists of projecting the dangerous internal object onto some external representative, which is treated as a genuine threat emanating from the external world. In the depressive position, the threatening object is introjected and treated in fantasy as concretely retained within the person. Depressive and hypochondriacal symptoms result. Although considerable doubt exists that such complex unconscious fantasies operate in the minds of infants, these observations have been of the utmost importance to the psychology of unconscious fantasies, paranoid delusions, and theory concerning early object relations.
 Mental health professionals generally divide psychotic symptoms into three broad types: hallucinations, delusions, and bizarre behaviour. Hallucinations refer to hearing, seeing, smelling, feeling, or tasting something when nothing in the environment actually caused that sensation. For example, a person experiencing an auditory hallucination might hear a voice calling their name even though no one else is actually present. A delusion is a false belief held by a person that appears obviously untrue to other people in that person’s culture. For example, a man may believe that Martians have implanted a microchip in his brain that controls his thoughts. Bizarre behaviour refers to behaviour in a person that is strange or incomprehensible to others who know the person. For example, hoarding unused scraps of tin because of their ‘magical properties’ would be a type of bizarre behaviour.
 Psychosis can occur in a number of mental illnesses. These include schizophrenia and schizophrenia-related disorders, bipolar disorder, paranoid personality disorder, and delusional disorder. Less common, psychotic symptoms occur in major depression Dissociative disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder.
 Psychotic symptoms can also result from substance abuse. Stimulants, such as cocaine and amphetamines, can cause psychotic symptoms, especially if taken in high doses or over long periods of time. Hallucinogenic substances, such as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), mescaline and phencyclidine (PCP), can cause psychosis. Alcohol and marijuana can occasionally cause psychotic symptoms as well. Individuals with alcoholism may experience psychotic symptoms, especially hallucinations, as they withdraw from alcohol use. Alcohol dependence over a long period of time can result in Korsakoff’s psychosis, a syndrome that may include psychotic symptoms and an inability to form new memories. Certain medical conditions can also cause psychosis. Syphilis, especially if untreated for many years, can lead to psychosis. Brain tumours can also lead to psychotic symptoms.
 Treatment of psychotic symptoms usually involved taking antipsychotic drugs, and called neuroleptics. Common Antipsychotic drugs include chlorpromazine (Thorazine), fluphenazine (Prolixin), thioridazine (Mellaril), trifluoperazine (Stelazine), clozapine (Clozaril), haloperidol (Haldol), olanzapine (Zyprexa), and risperidone (Risperdal). These medications can help reduce psychotic symptoms and prevent symptoms from returning. However, they can also cause severe side effects, such as muscle spasms, tremors, and tardive dyskinesia - a permanent condition marked by uncontrollable lip smacking, grimacing, and tongue movements. Psychotic symptoms in individuals with bipolar disorder may respond to other types of medication, including lithium, carbamazepine (Tegretol), and valproate (Depakene).
 Psychotic symptoms that occur as a result of substance abuse usually disappear gradually after the person stops using the substances. Physicians sometimes use Antipsychotic medications temporarily to treat these individuals. Physicians have not discovered any effective treatments for Korsakoff’s psychosis. Psychotic symptoms resulting from medical conditions often disappear after treatment of the underlying medical problem.
  The Sociocultural perspective regards mental illness as the result of social, economic, and cultural factors. Evidence for this view comes from research that has demonstrated an increased risk of mental illness among people living in poverty. In addition, the incidence of mental illness rises in times of high unemployment. The shift in the world population from rural areas to cities - with their crowding, noise, pollution, decay, and social isolation - and, has also, been implicated in causing relatively high rates of mental illness. Furthermore, rapid social change, which has particularly affected indigenous peoples throughout the world, brings about high rates of suicide and alcoholism. Refugees and victims of social disasters - warfare, displacement, genocide, violence - have a higher risk of mental illness, especially depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder.
 Social scientists emphasize that the link between social ills and mental illness is correlational rather than causal. For example, although societies undergoing rapid social change often have high rates of suicide the specific causes have not been identified. Social and cultural factors may create relative risks for a population or class of people, but it is unclear how such factors raise the risk of mental illness for an individual.
 There are no blood tests, imaging techniques, or other laboratory procedures that can reliably diagnose a mental illness. Thus, the diagnosis of mental illness is always a judgment or an interpretation by an observer based on the spoken exchange, ideas, behaviours, and experiences of the patient.
  In the late 19th century Viennese neurologist Sigmund Freud developed a theory of personality and a system of psychotherapy known as psychoanalysis. According to this theory, people are strongly influenced by unconscious forces, including innate sexual and aggressive drives.
 The Psychodynamic perspective views mental illness as caused by unconscious and unresolved conflicts in the mind. As stated by Freud, these conflicts arise in early childhood and may cause mental illness by impeding the balanced development of the three systems that constitute the human psyche: the id, which comprises innate sexual and aggressive drives; the ego, the conscious portion of the mind that mediates between the unconscious and reality; and the super-ego, which controls the primitive impulses of the id and represents moral ideals. In this view, generalized anxiety disorder stems from a signal of unconscious danger whose source can only be identified through a thorough analysis of the person’s personality and life experiences. Modern Psychodynamic theorists tend to emphasize sexuality less than Freud did and focus more on problems in the individual’s relationships with others.
 Both the humanistic and existential perspectives view abnormal behaviour as resulting from a person’s failure to find meaning in life and fulfill his or her potential. The humanistic school of psychology, as represented in the work of American psychologist Carl Rogers, views mental health and personal growth as the natural conditions of human life. In Rogers’s view, every person possesses a drive toward self-actualization, the fulfilment of one’s greatest potential. Mental illness develops when a person’s condition by some circumstantial environment interferes with this drive. The existential perspective sees emotional disturbances as the result of a person’s failure to act authentically - that is, to behave in accordance with one’s own goals and values, rather than the goals and values of others.
 The pioneers of behaviourism, American psychologist’s John B. Watson and B. F. Skinner, maintained that psychology should confine itself to the study of observable behaviour, rather than explore a person’s unconscious feelings. The behavioural perspective explains mental illness, as well as all of human behaviour, as a learned response to, malaria, and infection’s stimuli. In this view, rewards and punishments in a person’s environment shape that person’s behaviour, for example, a person involved in a serious car accident may develop a phobia of cars or the generalized fear to all forms of transportation.
 The cognitive perspective holds that mental illness result from problems in cognition - that is, problems in how a person reasons, perceives events, and solves problems. American psychiatrist Aaron Beck proposed that some mental illnesses - such as depression, anxiety disorders, and personality disorders - result from a way of thinking learned in childhood that is not consistent with reality. For example, people with depression tend to see themselves in a negative light, exaggerate the importance of minor flaws or failures, and misinterpret the behaviour of others in negative ways. It remains unclear, however, whether these kinds of cognitive problems actually cause mental illness or merely represent symptoms of the illnesses themselves.
  People have tried to understand the causes of mental illness for thousands of years. The modern era of psychiatry, which began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, has witnessed a sharp debate between biological and psychological perspectives of mental illness. The biological perspective views mental illness in terms of bodily processes, whereas psychological perspectives emphasize the roles of a person’s upbringing and environment.
 These two perspectives are exemplified in the work of German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin and Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud. Kraepelin, influenced by the work in the mid-1800's of German psychiatrist Wilhelm Griesinger, believed that psychiatric disorders were disease entities that could be classified like physical illnesses. That is, Kraepelin believed that the fundamental causes of mental illness lay in the physiology and biochemistry of the human brain. His classification system of mental disorders, first published in 1883, formed the basis for later diagnostic systems. Freud, on the other hand, argued that the source of mental illness lay in unconscious conflicts originating in early childhood experiences. Freud found evidence for this idea through the analysis of dreams, free association, and slips of speech.
 This debate has continued into the late 20th century. Beginning in the 1960's, the biological perspective became dominant, supported by numerous breakthroughs in psychopharmacology, genetics, neurophysiology, and brain research. For example, scientists discovered many medications that helped to relieve symptoms of certain mental illnesses and demonstrated that people can inherit a vulnerability to some mental illnesses. Psychological perspectives also remain influential, including the Psychodynamic perspective, the humanistic and existential perspectives, the behavioural perspective, the cognitive perspective, and the Sociocultural perspective.
 Psychiatry has increasingly emphasized a biological basis for the causes of mental illness. Studies suggest a genetic influence in some mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, although the evidence is not conclusive.
 Clinical depression is one of the most common forms of mental illness. Although depression can be treated with psychotherapy, many scientists believe there are biological causes for the disease. In the June 1998 Scientific American article, neurobiologist Charles B. Nemeroff reports upon the connection between biochemical changes in the brain and depression.
 Scientists have identified a number of neurotransmitters, or chemical substances that enable brain cells to communicate with other, that appears important in regulating a person’s emotions and behaviour. These include dopamine, serotonin, norepinephrine, gamma-amino butyric acid (GABA), and acetylcholine. Excesses and deficiencies in levels of these neurotransmitters have been associated with depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia, but scientists have yet to determine the exact mechanisms involved.
 Research shows that the more genetically related a person is to someone with schizophrenia, the greater the risk that person has of developing the illness. For example, children of one parent with schizophrenia have a 13 percent chance of developing the illness, whereas children of two parents with schizophrenia have a 46 percent chance of developing the disorder.
 Advances in brain imaging techniques, such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and positron emission tomography (PET), have enabled scientists to study the role of brain structure in mental illness. Some studies have revealed structural brain abnormalities in certain mental illnesses. For example, some people with schizophrenia have enlarged brain ventricles (cavities in the brain that contains cerebrospinal fluid). However, this may be a result of schizophrenia rather than a cause, and not all people with schizophrenia show this abnormality.
 Are a person’s characteristics primarily shaped by early influences, remaining relatively stable thereafter throughout life? Or does change spontaneously occur continuously throughout life? Many people believe that early experiences are formative, providing a strong or weak foundation for later psychological growth. This view is expressed in the popular saying ‘As the twig is bent, so grows the tree.’ From this perspective, it is crucial to ensure that young children have a good start in life. But many developmental scientists believe that later experiences can modify or even reverse early influences; studies show that even when early experiences are traumatic or abusive, considerable recovery can occur. From this vantage point, early experiences influence, but rarely determine, later characteristics.
 Traumatic experiences in this early period of life will damage a personality more seriously than those occurring in later childhood such as are found in the history of psychoneurotics. The infant’s mind is more vulnerable the younger and less used it has been, further, the trauma has quickened the infant ‘s egocentricity. In addition early traumatic experiences shortens the only period in life in which an individual ordinarily enjoys the most security, thus endangering the ability to store up as it were a reasonable supplies of assurance and self-reliance for the individual’s later struggles through life. Thus, as such, a child sensitized considerably more toward the frustrations of later like than by later traumatic experiences. hence many experiences in later life which would mean little to a ‘healthy’ person and not much to a psychoneurotic, mean a great deal of pain and suffering to the schizophrenic. His resistance against frustration is easily exhausted.
 Once he reaches his limit of endurance, he escapes the unbearable reality of his present life by attempting to reestablish the autistic, delusional world of the infant, but this is impossible because the content of his delusions and hallucinations are naturally coloured by the experiences of his whole lifetime.
 How do these developments influence the patient’s attitude toward the analyst and the analyst’s approach to him?
 Due to the very damage and the succeeding chain of frustrations which the schizophrenic undergoes before finally giving in to illness, he feels extremely suspicious and distrustful of everyone, particularly of the psychotherapist ho approaches him with the intent of intruding into his isolated world and personal life. To him the physician’s approach means the threat of being compelled to return to the frustrations of real life and to reveal his inadequacy to meet them or, - still worse – a repetition of the aggressive interference with his initial symptoms and peculiarities which he has encountered in his previous environment.
 The difficulty that the patient’s dilemma through his frustrations is the product through which is called ‘delusion’: Delusion itself is a false belief which is firmly held by a person even though other people recognize the belief as obviously untrue. For example, a person who truly believes he is Napoleon Bonaparte is delusional. Religious beliefs or popular conceptions, such as the belief that people have been abducted by aliens, are not delusions because they are widely held beliefs. Delusions are a type of psychotic symptom that indicate a person has lost contact with reality.
 There are many different types of delusions. A person with a paranoid delusion believes that others -  such as the FBI, or the CIA, even the Mafia as trying to harm or plot against him.  A person with a delusion of reference believes that events or people refer specifically to him or her when they do not. For example, a woman with schizophrenia may believe that a television news broadcaster is talking personally to her rather than to the entire viewing audience. A grandiose delusion is a belief that one is extremely famous or that one has special powers, such as the ability to magically heal people.
 A delusion of control is a belief that others are able to control one’s thoughts, feelings, or actions. For example, a man with this type of delusion may believe that someone has implanted a microchip in his brain that enables other people to control his thoughts. A somatic delusion is a belief that something is wrong with one’s body - for example, that one’s brain is rotting away - even though no medical evidence supports this belief. A person with an erotic delusion believes that someone is in love with him or her despite a lack of evidence for this belief. In a delusion of jealousy, a person believes that his or her spouse or lover is unfaithful despite evidence to the contrary.
 Delusions commonly occur in certain severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder (also called manic-depressive illness), some cases of major depression, Dissociative disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, and paranoid personality disorder. In addition, delusions may result from abuse of certain drugs, including alcohol, cocaine, amphetamines, and hallucinogens such as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), phencyclidine (PCP), and mescaline. Medical conditions affecting the brain, such as syphilis and brain tumours, may also cause delusions.
 Delusional disorder is a relatively uncommon mental illness characterized by delusions. People with this disorder have one or more delusions that persist for at least one month. In addition, they do not suffer from other symptoms of schizophrenia, such as disorganized speech and bizarre behaviour. Usually their delusions are less bizarre than those that occur in schizophrenia and seem merely odd or unsupported by facts. Examples of nonbizarre delusions include beliefs that one is being followed, loved by someone famous, or deceived by one’s spouse. Because delusional disorder is relatively rare, little research has systematically examined its treatment. However, doctors most often use Antipsychotic drugs (also called neuroleptics) to treat this disorder. These drugs help reduce or eliminate delusions, hallucinations, and other psychotic symptoms.
 In spite of his narcissistic retreat, every schizophrenic has some underlying notion of the unreality and loneliness of his substitute delusionary world. He longs for human contact and understanding, yet is afraid to admit of himself, or his therapist for fear of further frustration.
 That is why the patient may take weeks and months to test the analyst before being willing to accept him, however, once he has accepted him. His dependence on the analyst is greater and he is more sensitive about it than is the psychoneurotic because of the schizophrenic’s deeply rooted insecurity, the narcissistic seemingly self-righteous attitude is but a defence.
 Whenever the analyst fails the patient from reasons to be discussed later - one cannot at times avoid failing one’s schizophrenic patients - it will be severe disappointment and a repetition of the chain of frustrations the schizophrenic has previously endured.
 The instinctually primitive part of the schizophrenic’s mind that does not discriminate between himself and the environment, it may mean the withdrawal of the impersonal supporting forces of his infancy. Severe anxiety will follow  this vital deprivation.
 In the light of his personal relationship with the analyst it means that the therapist seduced the patient to use him as a bridge over which he might possibly be led from the utter loneliness of his own world to reality and human warmth, only to have him discover that this bridge is not reliable. if so, he will respond helplessly with an outburst of hostility or with renewed withdrawal as may be seen most impressively in catatonic stupor.
 The symptoms of mental illness can be very distressing. People who develop schizophrenia may hear voices inside their head that say nasty things about them or command them to act in strange or unpredictable ways. Or they may be paralysed by paranoia—the deep conviction that everyone, including their closest family members, wants to injure or destroy them. People with major depression may feel that nothing brings pleasure and that life is so dreary and unhappy that it is better to be dead. People with panic disorder may experience heart palpitations, rapid breathing, and anxiety so extreme that they may not be able to leave home. People whom experience episodes of mania may engage in reckless sexual behaviour or may spend money indiscriminately, acts that later cause them to feel guilt, shame, and desperation.
 Other mental illnesses, while not always debilitating, create certain problems in living. People with personality disorders may experience loneliness and isolation because their personality style interferes with social relations. People with an eating disorder may become so preoccupied with their weight and appearance that they force themselves to vomit or refuse to eat. Individuals who develop post-traumatic stress disorder may become angry easily, experience disturbing memories, and have trouble concentrating.
 Experiences of mental illness often interact differently but depends on one’s culture or social group, sometimes greatly so. For example, in most of the non-Western world, people with depression complain principally of physical ailments, such as lack of energy, poor sleep, loss of appetite, and various kinds of physical pain. Indeed, even in North America these complaints are commonplace. But in the United States and other Western societies, depressed people and mental health professionals who treat them tend to emphasize psychological problems, such as feelings of sadness, worthlessness, and despair. The experience of schizophrenia also differs by culture. In India, one-third of the new cases of schizophrenia involve catatonia, a behavioural condition in which a person maintains a bizarre statue like pose for hours or days. This condition is rare in Europe and North America.
 With appropriate treatment, most people can recover from mental illness and return to normal life. Even those with persistent, long-term mental illnesses can usually learn to manage their symptoms and live productive lives.
 By a variety of symptoms, including loss of contact with reality, bizarre behaviour, disorganized thinking and speech, decreased emotional expressiveness, and social withdrawal. Usually only some of these symptoms occur in any one person. The term schizophrenia comes from Greek words meaning ‘split mind.’ However, contrary to common belief, schizophrenia does not refer to a person with a split personality or multiple personality. For a description of a mental illness in which a person has multiple personalities. To observers, schizophrenia may seem or appear for being as some sorted kind of madness or a manufacturing insanity.
 Perhaps more than any other mental illness, schizophrenia has a debilitating effect on the lives of the people who suffer from it. A person with schizophrenia may have difficulty telling the difference between real and unreal experiences, logical and illogical thoughts, or appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. Schizophrenia seriously impairs a person’s ability to work, go to school, enjoy relationships with others, or take care of oneself. In addition, people with schizophrenia frequently require hospitalization because they pose a danger to themselves. About 10 percent of people with schizophrenia commit suicide, and many others attempt suicide. Once people develop schizophrenia, they usually suffer from the illness for the rest of their lives. Although there is no cure, treatment can help many people with schizophrenia lead productive lives.
 Schizophrenia also carries an enormous cost to society. People with schizophrenia occupy about one-third of all beds in psychiatric hospitals in the United States. In addition, people with schizophrenia account for at least 10 percent of the homeless population in the United States. The National Institute of Mental Health has estimated that schizophrenia costs the United States tens of billions of dollars each year in direct treatment, social services, and lost productivity.
 Approximately 1 percent of people develop schizophrenia at some time during their lives. Experts estimate that about 1.8 million people in the United States have schizophrenia. The prevalence of schizophrenia is the same regardless of sex, race, and culture. Although women are just as likely as men to develop schizophrenia, women tend to experience the illness less severely, with fewer hospitalizations and better social functioning in the community.
 Schizophrenia usually develops in late adolescence or early adulthood, between the ages of 15 and 30. Much less commonly, schizophrenia develops later in life. The illness may begin abruptly, but it usually develops slowly over months or years. Mental health professionals diagnose schizophrenia based on an interview with the patient in which they determine whether the person has experienced specific symptoms of the illness.
 Symptoms and functioning in people with schizophrenia tend to vary over time, sometimes worsening and other times improving. For many patients the symptoms gradually become less severe as they grow older. About 25 percent of people with schizophrenia become symptom-free later in their lives.
 A variety of symptoms characterize schizophrenia. The most prominent include symptoms of psychosis—such as delusions and hallucinations - as well as bizarre behaviour, strange movements, and disorganized thinking and speech. Many people with schizophrenia do not recognize that their mental functioning is disturbed.
 Delusions are false beliefs that appear obviously untrue to other people. For example, a person with schizophrenia may believe that he is the king of England when he is not. People with schizophrenia may have delusions that others, such as the police or the FBI, are plotting against them or spying on them. They may believe that aliens are controlling their thoughts or that their own thoughts are being broadcast to the world so that other people can hear them.
 Research suggests that the genes one inherits strongly influence one’s risk of developing schizophrenia. Studies of families have shown that the more close one is related to someone with schizophrenia, the greater the risk one has of developing the illness. For example, the children of one parent with schizophrenia have about a 13 percent chance of developing the illness, and children of two parents with schizophrenia have about a 46 percent chance of eventually developing schizophrenia. This increased risk occurs even when such children are adopted and raised by mentally healthy parents. In comparison, children in the general population have only about a 1 percent chance of developing schizophrenia.
 Some evidence suggests that schizophrenia may result from an imbalance of chemicals in the brain called neurotransmitters. These chemicals enable neurons (brain cells) to communicate with each other. Some scientists suggest that schizophrenia results from excess activity of the neurotransmitter dopamine in certain parts of the brain or from an abnormal sensitivity to dopamine. Support for this hypothesis comes from Antipsychotic drugs, which reduce psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia by blocking brain receptors for dopamine. In addition, amphetamines, which increase dopamine activity, intensify psychotic symptoms in people with schizophrenia. Despite these findings, many experts believe that excess dopamine activity alone cannot account for schizophrenia. Other neurotransmitters, such as serotonin and norepinephrine, may play important roles as well.
 Although scientists favour a biological cause of schizophrenia, stress in the environment may affect the onset and course of the illness. Stressful life circumstances - such as maturing in age and character as for living in poverty, the death of a loved one, an important change in jobs or relationships, or chronic tension and hostility at home—can increase the chances of schizophrenia in a person biologically predisposed to the disease. In addition, stressful events can trigger a relapse of symptoms in a person who already has the illness. Individuals who have effective skills for managing stress may be less susceptible to its negative effects. Psychological and social rehabilitation can help patients develop more effective skills for dealing with stress.
 Although there is no cure for schizophrenia, effective treatment exists that can improve the long-term course of the illness. With many years of treatment and rehabilitation, significant numbers of people with schizophrenia experience partial or full remission of their symptoms.
 Treatment of schizophrenia usually involves a combination of medication, rehabilitation, and treatment of other problems the person may have. Antipsychotic drugs (also called neuroleptics) are the most frequently used medications for treatment of schizophrenia. Psychological and social rehabilitation programs may help people with schizophrenia function in the community and reduce stress related to their symptoms. Treatment of secondary problems, such as substance abuse and infectious diseases, is also an important part of an overall treatment program.
 Antipsychotic medications, developed in the mid-1950s, can dramatically improve the quality of life for people with schizophrenia. The drugs reduce or eliminate psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions. The medications can also help prevent these symptoms from returning. Common Antipsychotic drugs include risperidone (Risperdal), olanzapine (Zyprexa), clozapine (Clozaril), quetiapine (Seroquel), haloperidol (Haldol), thioridazine (Mellaril), chlorpromazine (Thorazine), fluphenazine (Prolixin), and trifluoperazine (Stelazine). People with schizophrenia usually must take medication for the rest of their lives to control psychotic symptoms. Antipsychotic medications appear to be less effective at treating other symptoms of schizophrenia, such as social withdrawal and apathy.
 Because many patients with schizophrenia continue to experience difficulties despite taking medication, psychological and social rehabilitation is often necessary. A variety of methods can be effective. Social skills training helps people with schizophrenia learn specific behaviours for functioning in society, such as making friends, purchasing items at a store, or initiating conversations. Behavioural training methods can also help them learn self-care skills such as personal hygiene, money management, and proper nutrition. In addition, cognitive-behavioural therapy, a type of psychotherapy, can help reduce persistent symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions, and social withdrawal.
 Because many patients have difficulty obtaining or keeping jobs, supported employment programs that help patients find and maintain jobs are a helpful part of rehabilitation. In these programs, the patient works alongside people without disabilities and earns competitive wages. An employment specialist (or vocational specialist) helps the person maintain their job by, for example, training the person in specific skills, helping the employer accommodate the person, arranging transportation, and monitoring performance. These programs are most effective when the supported employment is closely integrated with other aspects of treatment, such as medication and monitoring of symptoms.
 Some people with schizophrenia are vulnerable to frequent crises because they do not regularly go to mental health centres to receive the treatment they need. These individuals often relapse and face rehospitalization. To ensure that such patients take their medication and receive appropriate psychological and social rehabilitation, assertive community treatment (ACT) programs have been developed that deliver treatment to patients in natural settings, such as in their homes, in restaurants, or on the street.
 People with schizophrenia often have other medical problems, so an effective treatment program must attend to these as well. One of the most generally shared in or participated in things conforming to a type without noteworthy excellence or faults just as common a rule, by ordinary, frequent and ordinarily as an idea or expression deficient in originality or freshness, yet, only of its exchanging the commonplace of the common associated problems is vehemently and usually coarsely expressed condemnation or disapproved, as the interpretative category of an unequalled vocabulary is itself a genuine abuse. Successful treatment of substance abuse inpatients with schizophrenia requires careful coordination with their mental health care, so that the same clinicians are treating both disorders at the same time.
 The high rate of substance abuse in patients with schizophrenia contributes to a high prevalence of infectious diseases, including hepatitis B and C and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Assessment, education, and treatment or management of these illnesses is critical for the long-term health of patients.
 Other problems frequently associated with schizophrenia include housing instability and homelessness, legal problems, violence, trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression, and suicide attempts. Close monitoring and psychotherapeutic interventions are often helpful in addressing these problems.
 Several other psychiatric disorders are closely related to schizophrenia. In schizoaffective disorder, a person shows symptoms of schizophrenia combined with either mania or severe depression. Schizophreniform disorder refers to an illness in which a person experiences schizophrenic symptoms for more than one month but fewer than six months. In schizotypal personality disorder, a person engages in odd thinking, speech, and behaviour, but usually does not lose contact with reality. Sometimes mental health professionals refer to these disorders together as schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.
 Severe mental illness almost always alters a person’s life dramatically. People with severe mental illnesses experience disturbing symptoms that can cause of such difficulties and holding to a job, or go to school, relate to others, or cope with ordinary life demands. Some individuals require hospitalization because they become unable to care for themselves or because they are at risk of committing suicide.
 The symptoms of mental illness can be very distressing. People who develop schizophrenia may hear voices inside their head that say nasty things about them or command them to act in strange or unpredictable ways. Or they may be paralysed by paranoia - the deep conviction that everyone, including their closest family members, wants to injure or destroy them. People with major depression may feel that nothing brings pleasure and that life is so dreary and unhappy that it is better to be dead. People with panic disorder may experience heart palpitations, rapid breathing, and anxiety so extreme that they may not be able to leave home. People whom experience episodes of mania may engage in reckless sexual behaviour or may spend money indiscriminately, acts that later cause them to feel guilt, shame, and desperation.
 Other mental illnesses, while not always debilitating, create certain problems in living. People with personality disorders may experience loneliness and isolation because their personality style interferes with social relations. People with an eating disorder may become so preoccupied with their weight and appearance that they force themselves to vomit or refuse to eat. Individuals who develop post-traumatic stress disorder may become angry easily, experience disturbing memories, and have trouble concentrating.
 Experiences of mental illness often take issue upon its stability for depending on one’s culture or social group, sometimes greatly so. For example, in most of the non-Western world, people with depression complain principally of physical ailments, such as lack of energy, poor sleep, loss of appetite, and various kinds of physical pain. Indeed, even in North America these complaints are commonplace. But in the United States and other Western societies, depressed people and mental health professionals who treat them tend to emphasize psychological problems, such as feelings of sadness, worthlessness, and despair. The experience of schizophrenia also differs by culture. In India, one-third of the new cases of schizophrenia involve catatonia, a behavioural condition in which a person maintains a bizarre statue like pose for hours or days. This condition is rare in Europe and North America.
 Of furthering issues regarding depersonalization disorder, meaning, in effect, that it is a categorised illness based within its intendment for being an illness, of mind, in which people experience an unwelcome sense of detachment from their own bodies. They may feel as though they are floating above the ground, outside observers of their own mental or physical processes. Other symptoms may include a feeling that they or other people are mechanical or unreal, a feeling of being in a dream, a feeling that their hands or feet are larger or smaller than usual, and a deadening of emotional responses. These symptoms are chronic and severe enough to impede normal functioning in a social, school, or work environment.
 Depersonalization disorder is a relatively rare syndrome thought to result from severe psychological stress. It may occur as part of other mental illnesses, especially anxiety disorders. For example, some people with panic disorder feel nervous, have a sense of doom about their future and health, and have a troubling sense of detachment form the lose in the attemptive use in making or doing or achieving a useful regularity as might be expected of the control over their bodies. Depersonalization disorder may also be a component of more severe mental illness, such as schizophrenia. Treatment may include training in relaxation techniques that enhance body perception and control, hypnosis to modify symptoms, and psychotherapy to explore possible stress-related components of the disorder.
 Psychiatrists classify depersonalization disorder as one of the Dissociative disorders. Such disorders involve a disruption of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception.
 All the while, the schizophrenic responds to altercations in the analyst’s defections and understanding by corresponding stormy and dramatic changes from love to hatred, from willingness to leave his delusional world to resistance and renewed withdrawal.
 As understandable as these changes are, nevertheless may come as a surprise to the analyst who frequently has not observed their source, this is quite in contrast to his experience with psychoneurosis whose emotional reactions during an interview he can usually predict. These unpredictable changes seem to be the reason for the conception of the unreliability of the schizophrenic’s transference reaction, yet they follow the same dynamic rules as the psychoneurotic’s oscillations between positive and negative transference and resistance, however, if the schizophrenic’s reactions are stormy and seemingly more unpredictable than those of the psychoneurotic, that instances suggested to be due to the inevitable errors in the analyst’s approach to the schizophrenic, of which he himself may be unaware, rather than to the unreliability of the patient‘s emotional response?
 Why is it inevitable that the psychoanalyst disappoint his schizophrenic patient time and again?
 The schizophrenic withdraws from painful reality and retires to what resembles the early speechless phase of development where consciousness is not yet crystalized. As the expression of his feelings is not hindered by the convention that he has eliminated, as his thinking, feelings, behaviour and speech - when present - obey the working rules of the archaic unconscious. His thinking is magical and does not follow logical rules. It does not admit to every last ‘no’, and likewise the no to ‘yes’: There is no recognition of space and time, I, you, and they, are interchangeable expression through which of symbols and often by movement and gestures rather than by words.
 As the schizophrenic is suspicious, he will distrust the words of his analyst. He will interpret them and incidental gestures and attitudes of the analyst according to his own delusional experience. The analyst may not even be aware of these involuntary manifestations of his attitudes, yet they mean much to the hypersensitive schizophrenic who uses them as a means of orienting himself to the therapist‘s personality and intentions toward him.
 In other words, the schizophrenic patient and the therapist are people living in different worlds and no different levels of personal development with different means of expressing and of orienting themselves. We know little about the language of the unconscious that belongs to the schizophrenic, and our access to it is blocked by the very process of our own adjustment to a world the schizophrenic has relinquished, so, we should not be surprised that errors and misunderstandings occur when we under take to communicate and strive for a rapport with him.
 Another source of the schizophrenic’s disappointment arises form which the analyser accepts and does not interfere with the behaviour of the schizophrenic, his attitude may lead the patient to expect that the analyst will assist in carrying out all the patient’s wishes, even though they may not seem to be in his interest to the analyser‘s and the hospital’s in their relationship to society. This attitude of acceptance so different from the patient’s previous experiences readily fosters the anticipation that the analyst will try to carry out the patient’s suggestion and take his part, even against conventional society with which it should occasionally arise. Frequently it will be wise for the analyst to agree with the patient‘s wish to remain unbattled and untidy until he is ready to talk about the reasons for his behaviour or to change spontaneously. At other times, he will unfortunately be unable to take the patient’s part without being able to make the patient understand and accept the reasons for the analyst’s position.
 If the analyst is not able to accept the possibility of misunderstanding the reaction of the schizophrenic patient and in turn of being misunderstood by him, it may  shake his security with his patient.
 That is to say, that, among other things, the schizophrenic, once he accepts  the analyst’s insecurity. being helpless and open to himself - in spite of his pretended grandiose isolation - he will feel utterly defeated by the insecurity of his would-be helper. Such disappointment may furnish reasons for outbursts of hatred and are comparable to the negative transference reactions of psychoneurosis, yet more intense than these, since they are not limited by the restrictions of the actual world - that is, it exists in or based on fact, its only problem is a sure-enough externalization for which things are existing in the act of being external in something that has existence, ss if it were an actualization as received in the obtainable enactment for being externalized, such that its problem of in some actual life that proves obtainable achieved, in that of doing something that has an existence for having absolute actuality.
 These outbursts are accompanied by anxiety, feelings of guilt, and fear of retaliations which in turn lead to increased hostility. Yet this established a vicious circle: We disappoint the patient, he is afraid that we hate him for his hatred and therefore continues to hate us. If in addition he senses that the analyst is afraid of his aggressiveness, it confirms his fear that he is actually considered as some dangerous and unacceptable, and this augments his hatred.
 This establishes that the schizophrenics capable of developing strong relationships of love and hatred toward the  analyst. After all, one could not be so hostile if it were not for the background of a very close relationship. In addition, the schizophrenic develops transference reactions on the narrower sense which he can differentiate from the actual interpersonal relationship. For which the schizophrenic’s emotional reactions toward the analyst have to be met with extreme care and caution. The love which the sensitive schizophrenic feels as he first emerges, and his cautions acceptance of the analyst’s warmth of interest are really most delicate and tender things. If the analyst deals with the transference reactions of a psychoneurotic is bad enough, though as a reparable rule, but if he fails with a schizophrenic in meeting positive feelings by pointing it out for instance before the patient indicates that he is ready to discuss it, he may easily freeze to death what has just begun to grow and so destroy any further possibility of therapy.
 Some analysts may feel that the atmosphere of complete acceptance and of strict avoidance of any arbitrary denials which we recommend as a basic rule for the treatment of schizophrenics may not avoid our wish to guide of reacceptance of reality, nevertheless, Freud says that every science and therapy which accepts his teachings about unconscious, about transference and resistance and about infantile sexuality, may be called psychoanalysis. According in this definition we believe we are practising psychoanalysis with our schizophrenic patients.
 Whether we call it analysis or not, it is clear that successful treatment does not depend on technical rules of any special psychiatric school but rather on the basic attitude of individual therapist toward psychologic persons. If he meets them as strangle creatures of another world whose productions are not comprehensible to ‘normal’ beings, he cannot treat them, if he realizes, however, that the difference between himself and the psychologic is only of degree, and not of kind, he will know better how to meet him. He will not be able to identify himself sufficiently with the patient to understand and accept his emotional reactions without becoming involved in them.
 The process of constant and perpetual change is examined and closely matched within the study of philosophical speculations and pointed of a world view which asserts that basic reality is constantly in a process of flux and change. Indeed, reality is identified with pure process. Concepts such as creativity, freedom, novelty, emergence, and growth are fundamental explanatory categories for process philosophy. This metaphysical perspective is to be contrasted with a philosophy of substance, the view that a fixed and permanent reality underlies the changing or fluctuating world of ordinary experience. Whereas substance philosophy emphasizes static being, process philosophy emphasizes dynamically becoming.
 Although process philosophy is as old as the 6th-century Bc Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, renewed interest in it was stimulated in the 19th century by the theory of evolution. Key figures in the development of modern process philosophy were the British philosophers Herbert Spencer, Samuel Alexander, and Alfred North Whitehead, the American philosophers Charles S. Peirce and William James, and the French philosophers Henri Bergson and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Whitehead's Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (1929) is generally considered the most important systematic expression of process philosophy.
 Contemporary theology has been strongly influenced by process philosophy. The American theologian Charles Hartshorne, for instance, rather than interpreting God as an unchanging absolute, emphasizes God's sensitive and caring relationship with the world. A personal God enters into relationships in such a way that he is affected by the relationships, and to be affected by relationships is to change. So too is in the process of growth and development. Important contributions to process theology have also been made by such theologians as William Temple, Daniel Day Williams, Schubert Ogden, and John Cobb, Jr.
 ‘Reality’ is a difficult word to use to every one’s satisfaction or even to one’s own satisfaction. In this instance the word reality is used arbitrarily to designate the direct, here-and-now impact of the analyst upon the patient. Reality. In this sense, contrasts with the impact the analyst has through his representation in the patient’s fantasy life, neurosis, and transference, since both kinds of impact seem always to coexist and since the former - the analyst’s real impact - may be the worst enemy of the transference, the matter of their differentiation is possibly the most challenging aspect of analysis.
 The analytic situation, which is set up to shut out ordinary reality intrusions, that cannot nor should not exclude all, but to say, that in the beginning months, for instance, reality inevitably has the upper hand. The analyst, the office, the procedure, are all overwhelmingly real. Everything is strange, frightening and exciting, gratifying and frustrating. Unlike the patient can test it and orient himself to it, the impact of this reality is usually so great that even an ordinary useful transference relationship cannot be expected to develop.
 Perhaps the most confusing aspect of this beginning period is the frequent appearance in it of what can be regarded as a false transference relationship. With great intensity and clarity, the patient may reveal, through transference-like references about the analyst, some of the deepest secrets only of his neurosis but of its genesis. The pseudotransference, too good to be true, is almost sure to be nothing more than the patient’s attempt to deal with the person of the analyst, the entire spectrum of his various patterns of behaviour. If, it is easy to do, the analyst overlooks the likelihood that the patient’s relationship with at this time is really about that almost everything said about it is related, analysis may get off to a very bad start. And if, as is even earlier to do, the analyst’s interests the genetic meaning of the openly exposed material, a good transference relationship may be seriously delayed and a workable transference neurosis may never appear. even after initial reality has had time to fade, reality may continue to intrude in ways that are very hard to detect and that are very troublesome.
 One of the most serious problems of analysis is the very substantial help which the patient receives directly from the analyst and the analytic situation. For many a patient, the analyst in the analytic situation is in fact the most stable, reasonable, wise and understanding person he has ever met, and the setting in which they meet may actually be the most honest, open, direct and regular relationship he has ever experienced. Added to this is the considerable helpfulness to him of being able to clarify his life storey. confess his guilt, express his ambitions, and explore his confusions. Further real help comes from the learning-about-life accruing from the analyst’s skilled questions, observations and interpretations. Taken together, the total real value to the patient of the analytic situation can easily be immense. The trouble with this kind of help is that it goes on and on, it may have such a real, direct and continuing impact upon the patient that he can never get deeply enough involved in transference situation to allow him to resolve or even to become acquainted with his most crippling internal difficulties. The trouble is far too good, the trouble also is that we as analysts apparently cannot resist the seductiveness of being directly helpful, and this, when combined with the compelling assumption that helpfulness is bound to be good, permits us top credit patient improvements to ‘analysis’ when more properly it should often be recognized for being the amounting result for the patient’s using the analytic situation, as the model, for being the preceptors and supporter in the dealing practically within the immediate distractions as holding to some problem.
 Perhaps, we can now refer to something in a clear unmistakable manner, and it would be to mention, for being, that one more difficult-to-handle intrusion of reality into the analysis, that by saying, that this is the definitive and final interruption of the transference neurosis by the reality of termination; in the sense, the situation is reversed and the intrusion is analytically desirable, since ideally the impact of reality of impending and certain termination is used to facilitate the resolution of the transference. As with the resolution of earlier episodes of transference neurosis, this final one is brought about principally by the analyst’s interpretations and reconstructions. As these take effect, the transference neurosis and, hopefully, along with it the original neurosis is resolved. This final resolution, however, which is much more comprehensive, is usually very different and may not come about at all without the help of the reality of termination. Accordingly, any attenuation of the ending, such as tapering off or causal or tentative stopping, should be expected to stand in the way of an effective resolution of the transference. Yet, it seems that this is what most commonly happens to an ending, and because of this a great many patients may lose the potentially great benefit of a thorough resolution and are forever after left suspended in the net of unresolved transference.
 Yet, utter indistinctly rigorous termination seems understandable, as difficult as transference neurosis may be in the analyst at other times, this ending period, if rigorously carried out, simply has to be the period of his greatest emotional strain. There can surely be no more likely time for an analyst to surrender his analytic position and, responding to his own transference, become personally involved with his patient than during the process of separating from a long and self-restrained relationship. Accordingly, it may be better to slur over the ending lightly than to mishandle it in an attempt to be rigorous.
 In considering more broadly the function of the transference in the psychoanalytic process, one is confronted by the apparent naïve, but, nonetheless important questions of the role of the actual (current) object as compared with that of the object representation of the original personage in the past. We recall Freud’s paradoxical, somewhat gloomy, but portentous concluding passage in ‘The Dynamics of Transference.’ This struggle between the doctor and the patient, between intellect and instinctual life, between understanding and seeking to act, is played out almost exclusively in the phenomena of transference. It is on that field that the victory must be won - the victory whose expression is on that field that the victory must be won - the victory whose expression is the permanent cure of the neuroses. It cannot be disputed that controlling the phenomena of transference presents the psychoanalysis with the greatest difficultly, but it should not be forgotten that they do us the inestimable service of making the patient ‘s hidden and forgotten erotic impulses of showing their immediate and manifested impossibilities, for when all is said and done, it is impossible to destroy anyone in absentia or in effigies.
 Both object and representation are made necessary by the basic phenomenon of original separation. The existence of an image of the object, which persist in the absence of the object, is one of the important beginnings of psychic life in general, certainly an indispensable prerequisite for object relationship. As generally construed. Whether this is viewed as (or a times demonstrably is) something unstable for allotting introjection, s always subject to alternative projection, or an intrapsychic object representation clearly distinguished from the self-representation, or firm identification in the super-ego, or in the ego itself, these phenomena are in various ways components of the system of mastery of the fact of separation, or separateness, from the original absolutely necessarily anaclitic (in the earliest period) symbiotic ‘object’. In the light of clinical observation, it would appear to be that the relative stability (parental) object representation. At which time of varying degree, are to a greater extent for the archaic phenomena. Even in nonpsychotic patients, overwhelmed by them, sometimes resembles the restoration from oedipal identification, which provides the preponderant basis for most demonstrable analytic transferences. That within the necrotic patients, the transference is effectively established when this representation invests the analyst to a degree - depending on intensity of drive and most of ego participation - which ranges in all the, wishing and strivings to remake and analyst to biasses judgements and misinterpretation of data, finally are the actual perceptual distortions.
 However, the old object representations as such may be invested, however rigidly established the libidinal or aggressive cathexis of the image may be, this as such can become the actual and exclusive focus of instinctual discharge, or of complicated and intense instinct-defence solutions, only and general energy-sparing quality of strictly intrapsychic processes. For the vast majority of persons, visible to any degree, including those with severe neurosis, character distortions, addictions and certain psychoses, the striving is toward the living and actual object, even at the cost of intense suffering. In a sense, this returns us to the state in which the psychological ‘object-to-be’. Has a critical importance never again to be duplicated, except in certain acute life emergencies, even if the object is not firmly perceived as such, in the sense of later object relations? And it does seem that trance impressions from the earliest contacts in the service of life preservation,  and the associated instinctual gratifications, and innumerable secondarily associated sensory impressions. Are activated by the specific inborn urges of sexual maturation? These propel the individual to renew many of the earliest modes of actual bodily contact, in connection with seeking for specific instinctual gratification. Or, to look away from clear-cut instinctual matters to the more remote elaborations of human contact: Few regard loneliness as other than a source of suffering, even self-imposed, as an apparent matter of choice, and the forcible imposition of ‘solitary confinement ‘ is surely one of the most cruel of punishments.
 In taking to question, we are entering an area of life in which things are other then themselves, where meaning is multifaceted, and where the line between the old and the new is blurred. It should, by, its immediate measure, help develop our recognition or meaning of the pertinent applicability as to the relevance of interrelated aspects of the psychology of ‘metaphor’. In the  psychology of metaphor we will find a useful analogy to the psychology of transference interpretation. Our’s will be newly encountered as good metaphors, those it response to which we say, ‘That’s it exactly’ or ‘That really captures it‘ or ‘That says it all’.
 Some literary and linguistic analysis, (e.g., Lewis, 1936 and Snell, 1953) and also people in everyday life, believe that there are experiences that can only be expressed metaphorically. And it is for this achievement that these metaphors, which may be entire poem or as lines or even words highly valued. But how can this be so? Just what in th e ‘it’ that the metaphor ‘is’ or ‘captures’ or ‘says’? If this ‘is’ or this ‘experience’ can only be rendered metaphorically, when we can know it only as such, that is, as the metaphor itself. Of the position out of which are put forward by, T.S, Eliot (1933) and E.W. Harding (1963) in their discussion of poetry, for in these instances we are granted that there is no known and logically independent version of the experience that can serve to validate the metaphor. Whatever the metaphor makes available to us depends on it and it and so cannot be used to prove its correctness.
 It seems justifiable to conclude that the metaphor is a new experience rather than a mere paraphrase of an already fully constituted expedience. The metaphor creates an experience that one has never had before. It is an experience one has not realized by oneself. The metaphor does, of course, suggest certain constituent experiences of which one may have been more or less dimly aware. One may say, therefore, that the metaphor speaks for those constituents, on the existence of which much of its appeal depends. But in its organizing and implicit ly rendering these constituents in its new way, it is a creation rather than a mere paraphrase or anew edition. Paraphrasing and new editions never speak as forcefully as good new metaphors, nor could they facilitate further new experience. One analytically familiar feature of these creations is that they make it safe and pleasing to experience something that otherwise would be considered too threatening and so would be kept in fragmented obscurity through defensive measures.
 Thus, when one says, ‘That’s it exactly’ one is implicitly recognizing and announcing that one has found and accepted a new mode of experiencing oneself and one’s world, which is to say, asserting a transformation of one’s own subjectivity. Something is now said to be true, and in a sense it is true, but it is true for the first time. Where this quality or state of being, is that there is nothing just like it, or can ever happen again, for the second time cannot be the same as the first. One can’ t step into a stream of the same watering point and then step once again into the same spot. A revelatory metaphor re-encountered or repeated later may lose some of its force, alternatively, it may gain some significance, but it cannot  remain exactly the same metaphor or mobilize an experience identical with the first. The point applies as well as to new metaphors that are similar to familiar ones: They have to be judged or experienced through their conventionalized predecessors, as through methods of knowing or already proved instrumentally of perceiving. The audience and the performer, who may be one person, as such that may not have, as yet.
 What is to be said about the psychology of metaphor is analogous to the transformational aspects of developed transference and the steadfast interpretation that both facilitate and organize them as transference. Allowing that these transferences and ‘remembered’ experiences come into existence over a period of time, nothing that is identical with them has ever before been enacted, and nothing will ever be enacted again.  They are creations that may be fully achieved only under specific analytic conditions.  Such that living was not reliving that moment, words like re-living, re-experiencing and reliving simply do not do justice to the phenomena, that in making this claim. A seeming contradiction over-writes some of our well-establish ideas. - in offering, - I am not contradicting some of our well-established ideas about interpretation and insight, I am, however, disputing the point that insight refers to much than the recovery of lost memories, and takes in as well, a new grasp of the significance and interpretations of events one has always remembered. In point, as, Freud pointed out, ‘As a matter of fact I’ve always known it, only that I’ve never thought of it; (1914), In fact, it is to develop that point in furthering to say that it takes an adult to do that, especially with the help of an analyst. It was, after all, Freud’s analysis of adults that make it possible to define infantile psychosexuality. In this respect, but without disregard, child analysis retains a quality of applied psychoanalysis’ in the same way that the interpreted transference neurosis is: Both are always of describing as true something that was not true in quite that way at the time of its greatest developmental significance. This apparent paradox about ‘remembering’ as a form of creating goes a long way, probably that what it is, is distinctive about psychoanalytic interpretation.
 In steadfastly and perspicaciously making transference interpretation. This newness characterizes the experience of analytic transference themselves. Unlike extra-analytic transferences, they can no longer be sheerly repetitive or merely new editions. Instead, they become repetitive new editions understood as such because defined as such by the simplifying and steadfast transference interpretations. Instead of responding to the analysand in kind, which would actualize the repetition, the analyst makes an interpretation. This interpretation does not necessarily or regularly match something the analysand already knows or has experienced unconsciously. Although, the analysand does often seem to have already represented some things unconsciously in the very terms of the interpretation. Equally often he does not seem to have done so at all. To think otherwise about this would be, in effect, to claim that, unconsciously, every analysand is Freud or a fully insightful Freudian. And that claim is absurd.
 It would be closer to the truth to say this: Unconsciously, the analysand already knows or has experienced fragmentary, amorphous, uncoordinated constituents of many of the transference interpretations. Alternatively, one may say that, implicitly, the analysand has been insisting on some as yet unspecified certainties and, in keeping with this, following some set of as yet unspecified rules in his actions, these transference interpretations now organize explicitly. Each transference interpretation refers to many things that have already been defined by the analysand, and it does so in a way that transforms them. That’s why one may call it interpretation, but it would be mere repeating or sterile paraphrasing. Interpretation is a creative  redescription that implicitly has the structure of a simile. It says, ‘This is like that’, Each interpretation does, therefore, add new actions to the life and analysand had already lived.
 Technically, redescription in the terms of transference-repetition is necessary. This is so because, up to the time of interpretation and working through, the analysand has been, in one sense, unable and, in another sense, unconsciously and desperately unwilling, to conduct his life differently. in and of themselves, the repetitions cannot alter the symptoms, the subjective distress, and wasting of one’s possibilities, rather, they can only perpetuate state situation by repeatedly confirming its necessity. They prove once again, the unconsciously maintained, damaging certainties. But once they get to be  viewed as historically grounded actions and subjectively defined situations, as they do upon being interpreted and worked through, they appear as having always been, in crucial respects, inventions of the analysand’s making and, so, as his responsibility. in being seen as versions of one’s past life. As they may be significantly different, as the subject of change in favouring - as something that is desirable or beneficial - within the common ability to make intelligent choices and to reach intelligent conclusions or decisions in understanding ways. Less and less are they presented as purely inevitable happenings, as a fixed state or as the well-established way of the world. As, here, we encounter a second paradox that goes to the heart of psychoanalytic interpretation, namely, that responsible, insightful change is possible thorough psychoanalysis just because, as a child, the analysand mistakenly assumed and then denied responsibility for much that he encountered in the early formative environment and during maturation.
 One major point remains to be made about the logic of viewing transference interpretation as simplifying yet innovative redescription. This point is that the interpretation bring about a coordination of the terms in which to state both the analysand’s current problems and their life-historical background. The analysand’s symptoms and desires are described as actions and, modes of action, with due regard for the principle of multiple function or multiple meaning, in coordination with that description, the decisive developmental situations and conflicts are stated as actions and modes of action. Continuity is established between the childhood constructions of relationships and self and the present constructions of these. Interpretation of transferences shows how both are part of the same set of practice, that is,  how they follow the same set of rules. Past and present are coordinated to show continuity rather than arranged in a definite causal sequence.
 In the same way, the form of analytic behaviour and the content of associations are given coordinate descriptions, say, for being defiant, devouring, or reparative. Or, in the case of depression, the depressive symptoms, the depressive analytic transference, the themes of present and past loss destructiveness and helplessness, all will be redecribed under the aspect of one continuously developing self-presentation. And this coordination will be worked out in the hermeneutically circular fashion in which the analyst defines both the facts to be explained and the explanations to be applied to these facts. In the end, as is well known, Both the paramount issues of the analysis and the leading explanatory account of them are likely to be significantly different from the provisional versions of them used at the beginning of the analysis.